UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

# PROGRAMME OF THE FINAL ORAL EXAMINATION
# FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

of

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B.A. (Mount Allison University) 1931

M.A. (University of Toronto) 1932

TUESDAY, MAY 18th, 1937, AT 10.00 A.M.
IN THE SENATE CHAMBER

COMMITTEE IN CHARGE

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Professor J. Line
Professor E. A. Bott

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# BIOGRAPHICAL

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# THESIS

*Actual Entities:*
*A Study of A. N. Whitehead's Theory of Reality.*

### (Abstract)

Alfred North Whitehead proposes to "frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element in our experience can be interpreted". (Process and Reality, p. 4)

These general ideas (Categories) are numerous, forty-five in all. However, there are two which "stand out with a certain extreme finality". (*Ibid.*, p. 33) These are the categories: 'actual entity' and 'eternal object'.

The category 'actual' entity' is the term Whitehead uses to designate the final real things of which the universe is made. In his opinion, it is necessary to focus attention on the notions of 'creativity', 'many' and 'one', in order to understand the nature of actual entities. The category 'eternal object' is the term Whitehead employs to designate the realm of 'pure potentials'.

It is the purpose of this project to state and critically evaluate Whitehead's theory of actual entities. This also inevitably involves a discussion of eternal objects.

The implications of his consideration of 'creativity', 'one' and 'many' have been indicated by comparative reference to the work of other philosophers who have dealt with these topics. The weaknesses found in traditional formulations have been noted. An effort has been made to determine whether or not Whitehead has been able to offer a genuine solution for any of these problems, (for example, in the case of 'purpose', 'space and time', 'freedom', 'relations', 'value', 'identity and permanence').

The criterion which has been used in evaluating the work of Whitehead, and that of other thinkers whose philosophy he seeks to correct, is that set up by Whitehead himself. Whitehead has stated: "The starting point for thought is the analytic observation of components of 'experience'." (*Ibid.*, p. 6) "Metaphysical categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious. They are tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities' discoverable in all actual experience. (*Ibid.*, p. 12) Time after time, in his writings and conversation, Whitehead repeats the claim that his philosophical categories are derived from an observation of facts and functions discoverable in the ordinary experience of unbiased 'common sense' individuals. Philosophical categories are statements (or descriptions) of the 'principles' (patterns) exemplified in all experience. Whitehead admits that it is easy to expose the defects of 'common sense' and 'ordinary experience'. The common sense of one generation is the 'discredited mythology' of a more enlightened age. Despite all this, there is a general and common agreement among all 'normal' individuals concerning certain facts, principles and types of experience. In our non-ultrametaphysical moments we all live in a common world, and agree in the use of a common universe of discourse.

Whitehead's 'philosophy' is taken to be that which is expressed in his four most recent books: *Science and the Modern World, Process and Reality, Adventures of Ideas, Nature and Life*. These, he considers to be the best expression of his metaphysical position.

It is evident from an examination of Whitehead's philosophy of organism that "his course of procedure is to give a comprehensive description of human experience and then to take this description as the key to the nature of reality." (C. W. Morris, *Six Theories of Mind*, p. 183) Whitehead explicitly acknowledges this fact by comparing his position with that formulated by Bradley. It will be remembered that Bradley held that 'feeling' is the basic activity of experience. His analysis of a moment of experience runs thus: "In my general feeling at any moment there is more than the objects before me, and no perception of objects will exhaust the sense of living emotion." (F. H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 159) This experience is characterized as a "unity of many in one". Proceeding on the basis of Bradley's analysis, Whitehead substitutes different terms for those used by Bradley. He states: "I analyse a feeling (or prehension) into the 'datum', which is Bradley's 'object before me', into the 'subjective form' which is Bradley's 'living emotion', and into the 'subject' which is Bradley's 'me'." (Adventures of Ideas, p. 297) Having noted the fact that human beings are aware of 'as yet unrealized' possibilities, Whitehead formulates his category of 'eternal object'.

In the development of the thesis project, certain relevant matters have been dealt with: 1. An effort has been made to indicate types of experience which Whitehead analyzes in order to obtain the information which he uses in formulating his theory of reality. 2. In stating the implications of certain of Whitehead's theories, care has been taken to correct a number of recent misinterpretations. 3. An attempt has been made to indicate in what sense Whitehead may be called a 'panpsychist', and how he differs from most panpsychists. 4. Whitehead claims relationships with Platonism, and the positions of Bradley and James. An examination of this matter has been attempted. The conclusion is that such relationships are not very profound. 5. This thesis emphasizes the fact that Whitehead proposes to regard God as a genuine actual entity, not merely the name for the joint activities of many entities. 6. Reference has been made to the basic differences which distinguish Whitehead's "philosophy of organism" from the traditional "substance" theories of reality.

The critical part of the thesis develops the following topics.

The advisability of interpreting all real entities by means of categories applicable to human experience, has been questioned. Whitehead's position is

thus exposed to some (not all) of the usual objections to panpsychism.

It has been pointed out that the "philosophy of organism" is unable (within the circle of its categories) to account for the emergence of novel organic characteristics. That is to say, in its present form Whitehead's philosophy does not admit the presence in an organism (society) of any qualities which can not be found in its component actual entities. This also involves the question as to whether Whitehead gives sufficient recognition to the element of identity which characterizes enduring societies, i.e., persons and things.

It has been pointed out that God cannot, consistently, be regarded as an 'ordinary' actual entity.

The validity of Whitehead's analysis of the process of perception has been criticised. Whitehead emphasizes the claim that we have no direct experience of the external world. Data derived from past bodily states are 'projected'.

On the basis of this examination and resultant criticism, the conclusion has been reached that, despite many valuable insights, Whitehead's system of general ideas is, in its entirety, neither coherent nor necessary. It has been further claimed that some elements in experience cannot be interpreted by this system of general ideas.

The 'thesis' to be defended is this: Whitehead, unlike many philosophers, formulates a metaphysics which does justice to a number of 'common sense' insights. He holds that there are many real entities, which are externally related (as well as internally), in a world in which change (process) actually occurs. God is not directly responsible for everything which takes place. However, on the basis of his own criterion, Whitehead's metaphysics is open to considerable criticism. His 'categories' do not seem to be applicable to (descriptive of) certain phases of experience. There are, in addition several internal inconsistencies.

## GRADUATE STUDIES

*Major Subject:*

Modern Philosophy—Professor G. S. Brett.

*Minor Subjects:*

Philosophy of Religion—Professor J. Line.
Professor W. B. Lane.

Abnormal and Clinical Psychology—Professor W. E. Blatz.
Professor E. P. Lewis.

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ACTUAL MATERIAL

A STUDY OF L. R. ........'S THEORY OF ...... REALITY

by

Allison Heartz Johnson

April 1957

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Chapter IV (Continued)

PREFACE

In recent years contemporary philosophers have been
either appalled or delighted by the appearance of
A. N. Whitehead's Essay in Cosmology, Process and Reality.
It proposes to "frame a coherent, logical, necessary
system of general ideas in terms of which every element
of our experience can be interpreted." (1)

In this treatise, Whitehead sets out to delineate
the nature of the "real" beings or things in the universe.
In his opinion, "the ultimate notions involved in the
meaning of the synonymous terms 'thing', 'being'(and)
'entity'"(Whitehead prefers the term 'entity')" re
'creativity', 'many' and 'one'." (2)

These concepts or rather, the several notions
implied by them, have had a long and tortured history.
By their use Whitehead deliberately sets himself in the
midst of a great tradition,- which is filled with
ceaseless conflict, darkened by unsolved problems,
illuminated by flashes of insight.

The origin or creation of persons and things has
been accounted for in various ways.  Gods or atoms have
been invoked by pious or hard-headed philosophers.   Lao,

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(1)  A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. 4
              (all references being made to:  The Macmillan Edition,
              New York 1929, unless otherwise specified)
(2)  Ibid  . 31   Brackets mine.

the status of there souls, things, or ones has been the
subject of much discussion. It has been claimed that:
1. atoms are the ultimate real entities,- persons and
things are derived; 2. Persons alone are real. Things
and atoms are merely ideas in a person's mind. 3. There
is __one__ real being of which atoms, things and persons are
mere superficial appearances, lacking genuine reality
entirely; 4. There is one great reservoir of "being"
from which stream forth persons, things and "ideas".
They are however, not ultimate. Reality is one; 5. There
is one supreme being who makes persons and things,
conferring on them a lesser kind of reality (if any at
all). 6. The persons and things of the world are only
manifestations of the "one" real "form", "idea" or
"essence". ---- All these matters have been discussed
under the heading: "the one and the many." There is in
addition the problem as to whether there is only __one__
__kind__ of entity, real or "apparent",- or many kinds.

It is the purpose of this project to state and
critically evaluate Whitehead's theory of "actual entities."
The implications of his discussion of "creativity"
and "the one and the many" have been indicated by us as
of a comparative reference to the work of other men, who
have dealt with these topics. The weaknesses found in
traditional formulations have been noted. An effort was

been made to determine whether or not Whitehead is ever
able to offer a genuine solution for any of these
problems.

The _criterion_ which has been used in evaluating
the work of Whitehead, and that of other thinkers, the
philosophy he seeks to correct, is that set up by
Whitehead himself.

Whitehead has stated,- the starting point of thought
is the _analytic observation of components of experience._
(i.e. the objects experienced and the act of experiencing.
"Metaphysical Categories are not dogmatic statements of
the obvious; they are tentative formulations of the
ultimate generalities" (1) discoverable in all actual
experience.-- Time after time, in his writings and in
conversation, Whitehead reperts the claim that his
philosophical categories are derived from an observation
of facts and functions discoverable in the ordinary
experience of unbiased "common sense" individuals.
Philosophical categories are statements (or descriptions)
of the "principles" (patterns) exemplified in all
experience. (2)

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(1)  A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_  p. 14
     Underlining mine.
(2)  When Whitehead scoffs at "common sense" notions
     ( Cf. A. N. Whitehead, _Nature and Life_, Chapter I ),
     he is referring to the "pseudo" common sense of those
     who have been corrupted by the seductive influence of
     metaphysics.

Thus Whitehead's position;- his criticism of other
thinkers and his constructive formulations, ---- is
evaluated on the basis of ordinary common sense experience
and the knowledge derived from it.

The "Thesis" which I would defend is this: Whitehead,
unlike many philosophers, formulates a metaphysics which
does justice to a number of common sense insights. (2)
He does not deny the reality of many ordinary experiences.
However, on the basis of his own criterion, his metaphysics
is open to considerable criticism. Whitehead's "categories"
do not seem to be applicable to (descriptive of) certain
phases of experience. There are, in addition, a number
of internal inconsistencies.

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(1) It is of course easy to note that "common sense"
and "ordinary" experience. It is true that much of
arrant nonsense has been so labelled. The common sense
of one generation is the "discredited mythology" of a
more enlightened age. Despite all this there is more and
more common agreement among all "normal" individuals
concerning certain facts, principles and types of experience.
In our non-ultra metaphysical moments we all live in a
common world, and agree in the use of a common universe of
discourse. Even the most hidebound "Rationalist" admits this.
Though in his opinion said experience lacks reality, he is
willing to recognize it, as "appearance".
(2) I.e. there are many real entities; which are
externally related (as well as internally); in a world
in which change (process) actually occurs. God is not
directly responsible for everything which takes place.

In the [illegible] of this [illegible] [illegible], though important matters have been dealt with: 1. [illegible] effort has been made to indicate the [illegible] of experiences which Whitehead analyzes in order to obtain the information which he uses in formulating his theory of reality. (i.e. of actual entities) [illegible]. In stating what Whitehead means by certain of his theories, care has been taken to correct a number of recent misinterpretation (of what he means by certain [illegible] in his writings. 3. An attempt has been made to indicate in what [illegible] Whitehead may be called a "panpsychist", and how he differs from most panpsychists. 4. Whitehead [illegible] relationships with Platonism, and the [illegible] of Bradley and James. An examination of this matter has been attempted.

# Chapter I
## Whitehead's Project and Method

"Philosophy, in one of its functions, is the critic
of cosmologies. It is its function to harmonise,
refashion, and justify divergent intuitions as to the
nature of things. It has to insist on the scrutiny of
the ultimate ideas, and on the retention of the whole of
the evidence in shaping our cosmological scheme. Its
business is to render explicit, and so far as may be co-
efficient, a process which otherwise is unconsciously
performed without rational tests. (1)

"If this cosmology be deemed successful, it becomes
natural to ask whether the type of thought involved be
not a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute
Idealism onto a realistic basis." (2)

These quotations from Process and Reality and Science
and the Modern World, indicate the general point of view
which Whitehead proposes to use in meeting the problems
of "creativity" and "the one and the many".

It is necessary to note the importance which
Whitehead attributes to insights (i.e. hints as to the

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World p.x
      (All references will be: The University Press,
  Edition Cambridge 1972, unless otherwise specified
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. xiii

ultimate nature of all reality, which are derived
from some particular experience. It is his opinion,
that, without some illuminating flash of insight
concerning the nature of things, metaphysics
degenerates into the "rational" juggling of concepts.
However, once the insights are given, rational
development of the implications of the "glowing" idea
is most necessary. In addition, things being equal,
rationalism takes the insight with which [...] had, washes
its face, combs its hair, clothes it in the modern
mode,- in short makes it presentable in the available
contemporary "universe of discourse". The rationalist
who refuses to respect insights is bowing down to the
"golden calf" of his own technical excellence. The
true rationalism must always transcend itself by
recurrence to the concrete in search of new inspiration.

self-satisfied rationalism is [...] and is [...]
anti-rationalism. It requires a fitting [...]
particular set of abstractions. (1) Thus, [...],
the "patents" of rationalism must realize its special
relationship with the "practical" values. [...] or
deal insights must be [...] rewarded by their full [...]
with the exact concepts of reason. Otherwise they [...]

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World
    [...] First Edition

sound and fury, signifying nothing.

Yet, despite Whitehead's stress on the limitations of rationalism, he b... professed faith in reason. "Faith in reason is the trust that ... the ultimate natures of things lie together in a harmony which excludes mere arbitrariness" (1); (1) the mind of man can conceptually grasp, more or less adequately, the nature of reality.

Throughout all Whitehead's cosmological speculation there is manifest that admirable lack of dogmatism which so graced the work of Plato. Whitehead frequently reiterates the fact that: "the elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and (that) the starting point for thought is the analytic observation of components of this experience." (2) "Metaphysical categories are not dogmatic ... of the obvious; they are tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities (discoverable in all actual experience)" (3) there is an ultimate inescapable vagueness in all our most profound thinking. We experience things which we cannot adequately conceptualise.

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World  p.
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p.
(3) Ibid  p.14         Brackets mine, also in (1) and (2)

Whitehead believed that no traditional type of philosophy has been able to do justice to the rich complexity of reality;- though all have some real value. His courageous crossing of philosophical boundaries in the search for adequate 'descriptive generalities', is indicated in one of the quotations set at the beginning of this section.-- This (Whitehead's) cosmology is a 'transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis." (1)

In Whitehead's opinion, previous philosophers have been unable to do justice to "process", 'individuality' and "permanence'. In order to correct the deficiencies of their positions, believing with due humility that such an undertaking is possible, he offers: " a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted."(2)

This stupendous schemata was formulated only after Whitehead had made a very careful study of the attempts of his predecessors. Indeed he regards his system as expressive of insights which other philosophers dimly envisaged but did not push to their logical conclusions. It is to be noted that in addition to his appreciation of

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. viii
(2) Ibid   p. 4

the wisdom of the past, Whitehead possessed a keen
understanding of the theoretical background of
mathematics and physical science.

From this complex blend of old and new is shaped
the "Philosophy of Organism";- an attempt to: (1) state
some of the basic doctrines of Absolute Idealism (of the
Bradley type) in realistic terms, and (2) to retrieve the
type of thought expressed by Bergson, James and Dewey
from the charge of anti-intellectualism.

## Criticism of substance

In Whitehead's opinion, the main emphasis in the
philosophical tradition has been placed on the doctrine
that the essential real entities in the universe are
static and self-sufficient. This point of view received
clear formulation in that phase of Plato's thought
wherein he stresses the unchanging perfection of the
realm of "ideas". The Aristotelian logic, with its
related theory of "substance" added impetus to this
tendency.-- the claim that the ultimate substances,
passively receiving qualifications, are in no essential
way related (theoretically) to other substances, produced,
or was the product of a logic which emphasized
substantives and adjectives to the neglect of propositions
and conjunctions. Descartes gave clear expression to the
implied body-mind dualism.

Locke applied the notion specifically to the field
Psychology. The "psychological metaphysicians" who
followed him carried the fatal cartesian dualism to its
logical conclusion. Locke was content with a "representation"
theory of perception. Berkeley reduced the world to a
flux of sensations and God. Hume dispensed with God.
Kant satisfied himself with a world, moulded by the mind
out of sensations ultimately derivative from the realm of
"Ding-an-sich".---The work of these philosophers reveals
the inescapable problems which confront those who take
the doctrine of "substance" seriously. In short,-this
theory cannot do justice to our ordinary experience of
real things, genuinely interconnected. Further, our
stream of mental experiences is not atomized, as was
claimed, by the metaphysical psychologists of the 17th
and 18th centuries.

Whitehead is particularly impressed by the
deficiencies of this theory when it is applied rigorously
in the field of physical science. Newton was responsible
for the firm foundation which the theory of substance
received in physics. He posited ultimate particles,
each with an absolutely definite place in space and time-
requiring (for the explanation of any of its essential
characters) no reference to any other particles or any
other regions of space and time. The lapse of time was

regarded as having no influence on the nature of these
substances. (1)

In Whitehead's opinion it is evident that the
philosopher, proceeding on the basis of certain assumptions,
is faced by insuperable difficulties in seeking to explain
certain phases of ordinary experience: 1. If there is no
inherent relation between particles of matter, induction
is day-dreaming, the formulation of laws, idle fancy.
2. Life and meaning can find no place in a physical
nature supposedly completely explained in terms of mass,
motion and shape. 3. The self-endurance of any entity is
an insolvable problem. Endurance can be explained only
by continual Divine creation (since there is no necessary
connection between the "being" of a particle at one
moment and the being of the so-called same particle at
the succeeding moment).

The Sources of Whitehead's Basic Insights

In the realm of physics, new developments have taken
place which have shaken the traditional doctrine to the
core. To these Whitehead turns for destructive criticism
of the doctrine of "substance", and for suggestions as to
how concepts must be remodelled so as to describe,
adequately, the true nature of reality. Also, proceeding

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(1) A. O. Lovejoy, The Revolt against Dualism p. 151
(critical discussion of "simple location")

to an examination of his own immediate experience,
Whitehead finds further data to aid him in this project.
The philosophy of organism can only be understood by
continually bearing in mind these two sources from which
its basic concepts are derived.

Whitehead points out that his philosophy consists
of an emphasis on ideas expressed by other thinkers, but
not properly appreciated by them. Frequent reference is
made to the great names of the philosophical tradition.
It must be noted, however, that this does not mean that
Whitehead is telling the same old story in barbaric
terminology. This point will be clarified in later
sections of the thesis.

It must be granted that the terminology is difficult.
However, an examination of the experience (and things
experienced)--from which it is derived,- renders it
clearly understandable. There is little justice in
D. C. Morley's charge: "He invents a new technical
vocabulary, translates everything, from the subtlest
refinements of logic and mathematical physics to the
most esoteric aspects of religious experience, into
terms of it, and then compresses his whole cosmology
into one volume with a minimum of illustration and
exemplification by way of translation." (1)

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(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1929-1930)

Types of Experiencing and Objects Experienced, which
Provide Whitehead with Basic Insights as to the Nature
of All Actual Entities

Recent investigations of "matter" have indicated
the untenability of traditional theories: 1. the erratic
behavior of matter has shown that parts are influenced
by the whole in which they find themselves. "The
electron blindly runs either within or without the body;
but it runs within the body in accordance with its
character within the body." (1) 2. Bacon's insight that
"all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense, yet
they have perception" (2) is at last being appreciated.
It is now asserted that the so-called material particles
are influenced by and "concerned with" each other. This
fact is made possible, in Whitehead's opinion, by the
nature of "physical" entities. Thus, "the modern point
of view is expressed in terms of energy, activity and
the vibratory differentiations of space-time. Any local
agitation shakes the whole universe. The distant effects
are minute but they are there. The concept of matter
presupposed simple location. Each bit of matter was
self-contained, localized in a region with a passive,
static network of spatial relations, carried into

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World p.
(2) Ibid p. 5?

uniform relational system from infinity to infinity and from eternity to eternity. But in the modern concept the group of agitations which we term matter is fused into its environment. There is no possibility of a detached, self-contained local existence. The environment enters into the nature of each thing. Some elements in the nature of a complete set of agitations may remain stable as those agitations are propelled through a changing environment. But such stability is only the case in a general, average sort of way. This average fact is the reason why we find the same chair, the same rock, the same planet enduring for days, or for centuries, or for millions of years." (1) Thus for physics, a "thing" is not an inert "mass" (after all mass is not a constant attribute, but changes with velocity) occupying a certain definite space. "The thing is what it does" (2) -a stream of influence which permeates to the utmost recesses of space and time. It is evident that: (A) when we speak of a thing being specifically located at a certain place, we refer only to its focal region; (B) the innumerable physical entities are in a sense superimposed. (3)

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(1)   A. N. Whitehead, Nature and Life  p. 16-17
(2)   A. N. Whitehead, The Adventure of Ideas
(3)   cf. A. O. Lovejoy, The Revolt against Dualism   p. 177

Whitehead regards mathematics[?] as being a fruitful source of data ... in the[?] problem of cosmology. (1) The philosophy of organism starts with a generalization of Descartes's account of mental operations.[?] (2) Despite his earlier 'representative' theory of perception, Locke, in the latter books of his Essay holds that all knowledge is founded on particular things. Locke "also holds that all qualities have in some sense a relational element in them -- that 'powers' are to be ascribed to particular existents

(1) It is to be noted that less what, in Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, to[?] the[?] extent to which Whitehead finds the key to the nature of reality by examining psychic or mental ... wrote: "I am continually conscious that the way in which his mind is working is essentially that ... (Cf. Emmet, p. viii) Expressive of this point of view is Miss Emmet's denunciation of Prof. Lloyd Morgan ( Cf. The Journal of Philosophical Studies July 1931) for not realising that terms such as "subjective aim", "mental and physical prehension", "satisfaction" when applied to "sub-living organism" (surely it is clear that Whitehead considers all actual entities to be alive-- cf. Nature and Life p.8) are divested of all their usual psychological meaning.--- as a matter of fact, Whitehead claims unmistakably that "feeling" in a non i.e. psychological sense is enjoyed by all subjects (actual entities). It is of course true that all actual entities are not conscious. But it is not necessary to be conscious (in Whitehead's sense of the term) in order to have "psychic" experience, i.e. subjective form, subjective aim, conceptual prehensions etc.
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 46

whereby the constitutions of other particulars are
conditioned." There is also Locke's notion of the
passage of time, i.e. something is perpetually
perishing. (1)

The philosophy of Kant contains the fundamental
conception "of an act of experience as a constructive
functioning". (2) This, in Whitehead's opinion is one
of the most basic insights which a philosopher can enjoy.

In the writings of Berkeley (Alciphron- Fourth
Dialogue) Whitehead finds a further illustration of a
type of experience in which "simple location" is denied.
Euphranor is pointing out to Alciphron that: "neither
the castle, the planet, nor the cloud, which you see here,
are those real ones which you suppose at a distance."
Referring to this passage, Whitehead expounds it thus:
"Note the idea of simple location has gone--- it is the
perspective of the castle over there, from the standpoint
of the unification (the perceiver) here.---It is
therefore, aspects of the castle, cloud and the planet
which are grasped into unity (of the percipient occasion
here. You will remember that the idea of perspectives
is quite familiar in philosophy. It was introduced by

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality   p. 112
(2) Ibid  p. 136

Leibniz in the notion of monas mirroring perspectives of the universe." (1) This Lite and seems to think that the perceiving of a castle etc. constitutes the literal presence of the castle (i.e. an "aspect" of it) in a locus different from its common sense spatial position. By its relations to other entities, any object is now considered to be in many loci. (2) There is a somewhat different basis for the denial of "simple location" in this argument, than that employed in the physical analogy. Using the "physical analogy", simple location is rejected because an object stretches out all over the universe. In the case of this psychical analogy, the theory is denied because of the relationship of perceiver and object. (According to Whitehead the act of perception takes place because of the presence of an aspect "here" of an object "over there".)

In Bradley's analysis of an "occasion" (moment) of experience, Whitehead finds a suggestion which aids him in formulating his theory of the nature of an "actual entity". It also provides a clue for the solution of the problem of "relations".

Bradley, having decided that an "abstract" or absolutely separate entity called a "relation" could not connect or relate equally separate "terms", reached the

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World . 7
            Underlining and brackets mine.
(2) Cf. A. O. Lovejoy, The Revolt Against Dualism . 195-

conclusion that this "unity" implies an underlying
unity and an inclusive whole. It will be remembered
that Bradley held that "feeling" is the basic activity
of experience. His analysis of a moment of experience
runs thus: "In my general feeling at any moment there
is more than the objects before me and no relation of
objects will exhaust the sense of living emotion." (1)
This experience is characterized as a "unity of many in
one". Proceeding on the basis of Bradley's analysis,
Whitehead substitutes different terms for those used by
Bradley. He states: "I analyse a feeling (or prehension)
into the 'datum' which is Bradley's 'object before me',
into the 'subjective form' which is Bradley's 'living
emotion', and into the 'subject' which is Bradley's 'I'. )
This procedure indicates the way in which Whitehead
works out his doctrine of actual entities. In ... ...
Morris aptly expresses this fact: "Whitehead's basic
procedure is to give a comprehensive description of an
experience and then to take this description as a key
to the nature of reality." (3) In other words, all
entities have the characteristics found by the analysis of
an occasion of "psychical" experience.

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(1) F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, p. ?
             (Underlining Mine)
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 197
             (Underlining Mine)
(3) C. W. Morris, Six Theories of Mind, p. 185

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Returning now to consideration of .... ... appeals to "feeling" to solve the problem ... ... verified emphasis answers to the effect ... The primitive form of physical experience is ... ... emotion— received as felt evidence in a... ... occasion and conformally appropriated as subjective emotion.— The primitive element is <u>sympathy</u>, that is, feeling the feeling <u>in</u> another and feeling conformally <u>with</u> another.[1]

In quoting, with approval from Descartes (2), Whitehead indicates that the object perceived is not present in the perceiver exactly as it is in the external world. Descartes expresses it thus: "Hence the idea of the sun will be the sun itself existing in the mind, not indeed formally, as it exists in the sky, but objectively, i.e. in the way in which objects are wont to exist in the mind."

"All explanations of the sociological functionings of mankind include 'mind' as an essential factor in explanation." (3) On this basis, Whitehead feels justified

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(1) A. N . Whitehead, <u>Process and Reality</u> p. 246
This emphasis on the importance of feeling as the basic mode of relationship results in a repudiation of the usual emphasis on clear sense as the fundamental element in perception. ( Cf. <u>Process and Reality</u> p. 514)
(2) <u>Works of Descartes</u> "Reply to Objections against Meditations" Vol. II p. 10 Translation by Haldane and Ross
(3) A. N. Whitehead, <u>Nature and Life</u> p. ...
Underlining mine.

in discarding the doma that life and mental functions
are not properly a part of nature.

Another striking factor in experience is that of
the "lure of possibilities". we long for an ideal state;
we consider how a living room may be best arranged.
These possibilities, not yet actual though nevertheless
real, lure us on to activity. It is Whitehead's opinion
that _all_ actual entities must have an experience of this
sort.

The type of analysis of human experience which serves
Whitehead as a key to the nature of all actual entities
is clearly exemplified in the following section in
_Nature and Life_: "I find myself as essentially a unity
of emotions, enjoyments, hopes, fears, regrets,
valuations of alternatives, decisions,- all of them
subjective reactions to the environment as active in my
nature. My unity- which is Descartes' 'I am'- is my
process of shaping this welter of material into a
consistent pattern of feelings. The individual enjoyment
is what I am in my rôle of a natural activity, as I
shape the activities of the environment into a new
creation, which is myself at the moment; and yet, as
being myself, it is a continuation of the antecedent
world. If we stress the rôle of the environment, this

process is ... ... ... the ...
immediate patterns of active enjoyment, this process is
self-creation. If we stress the effect of conceptual
anticipation of a future phase which is ... occurring
in the nature of the present, this process is the
teleological aim at some ideal in the future. ... aim,
however, is not really beyond the present ... ... .
the aim at the future is an enjoyment in the present.
It thus effectively conditions the ... to self-
creation of the new creature." (1)

A study of Whitehead's detailed ... ...
explanation of the nature of actual entities, and the
process of their origination will indicate very clearly
the value he places on the physical and ... ... ...
insights which have been noted in the preceding section.

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Nature and Life_ ... . ...

## Chapter II

Whitehead's Theory of the Nature of Entity

### Actual Entities

"Actual entities are the ... ... ... which the world is made up." (1)-- "There is ... ... ... leted set of things which are actual occasions. (i. ... "actual entities") (2)--- "any item of the universe, ... ever preposterous as an abstract thought, or however remote as an actual entity, has its own gradation of relevance--- in the constitution of any one actual entity. (3)

Whitehead's doctrine of the nature of an "actual entity" can be best understood by see Thing Bradley's analysis of a moment of experience; and Whitehead's analysis of "myself". (4)

What Bradley calls a "moment of feeling", Whitehead terms an "actual entity". It is to be noted, that in Whitehead's opinion, the characteristics which re found in that moment of experience are also found in all actual entities. The moment of experience (feeling) was analysed (by Bradley) into "object before me", "me", and 'living emotion'. Whitehead's corresponding

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_ p. 27
(2) Ibid p. 321
(3) Ibid p. 444
(4) A. N. Whitehead, _Nature and Life_ p. 47

terminology is: "datum", "subject", "subjective form".
Any actual entity, then, has these three distinguishable
aspects. More accurately, an actual entity is a subject
which feels certain data in a certain way (subjective
form). These data are provided by other actual entities.

Each actual entity manifests a "vector character".
It is the "enjoyment of emotion derived from the past
and aimed at the future." (1) In other words an actual
entity, or center of experience, not only feels other
actual entities but it also is felt by other actual
entities.

Whitehead states that "many" and "one" are among
the ultimate notions involved in the meaning of terms
'thing', 'being', 'entity'. In this he is referring to
the fact that the origination of a new entity is
achieved by the coming together of the many entities in
the universe in such a way as to form a new entity,
which is called a unity or one. This new "one" of
course takes its place among the other members of the group of
"many" actual entities in the universe, and so plays its
part in the origination of new entities ("ones").

In all this discussion of actual entities,
Whitehead apparently has in mind the experience of
"myself" (a typical actual entity) which he describes
as a unity of emotions, hopes, decisions, enjoyments---

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Nature and Life_  p. 24

subjective reactions to the <u>environment as active in
my nature</u>. My unity---is my process of shaping this
welter of material (1) into a consistent pattern of
feelings. "The individual enjoyment is what I am in
my rôle of a natural activity, as I shape the
activities of the environment into a new creation, <u>which
is myself at this moment</u>; and yet,as being myself,is a
continuation of the antecedent world.' (2) (The meaning
of this will be clarified by subsequent discussion.'

The "process of <u>concretion</u>" by which the actual
entities arise, by receiving <u>data</u> from other actual
entities, and in their turn pass away (just as moments
of psychic experience fade) and in doing so provide
data for other newly arising actual entities-- must
now be considered in detail.  One of the most important
of the elements in the complex situation is the realm of
"eternal objects".

## Eternal Objects

Eternal objects are synonymously designated 'are
Potentials for the specific determination of fact; or
orms of Definiteness'. (3)--- "Any entity whose

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(1)E.g. "sense". It is to be noted that sense or data of
any sort are regarded by Whitehead as members of the
class "feeling". (See page147-thesis)
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Nature and Life   p. 40 Underlining
(3) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. ??   mine.

conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world,- is called an 'eternal object!" (1)

Whitehead points out that by eternal object he means something similar to Locke's "object of thinking", "ideas" such as those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness etc. (2) Eternal objects are the intellectually apprehended "essences" which are "exemplified", "manifest", or "present" in concrete things, or persons. Because of this it has been claimed that Whitehead's doctrine of "eternal objects" is very similar to Plato's theory of "ideas". (3)

However, Whitehead stresses certain fundamental differences between his eternal objects and Plato's "ideas". (4) The Platonic theory of "Ideas" is deficient, in Whitehead's opinion, in that: 1. the

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality     p. 70
(2) Ibid     p. 84
(3) Cf.   Miss D. M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of
                        Organism      p. 107-179
(4) The reference is to Plato's theory of "Ideas" as expressed in the "middle period" of his activity,- Phaedo, Phaedrus and Republic.

"ideas" are abstract, having no necessary relation to each other or to the external world. They tend to set themselves up as sole reality. Concrete objects can only be classed as imitations.

It is Whitehead's concern to show that eternal objects have a "relational essence". The relationships of an eternal object "A" stand determinately in the essence of "A". They are internal relations. (1) In other words, if you try to consider an eternal object in absolute distinction from other eternal objects, you miss one of its characteristics, namely, that it _is_ related to other eternal objects- i.e. by links of implication. (This is the basis of the fact that in our experience when we see fire we _expect_ to see smoke above it-- since the eternal object fire has in its relational essence "smoke".)

Whitehead teaches that eternal objects, because of their presence in God's "primordial nature" (see discussion, page 51 thesis) have a locus in actuality and a tendency to be realized. Thus he states that in the essence of any eternal object there is a 'patience' for relationship to actual entities. Yet any eternal object is indeterminate as to _particular_ ingression. (2)

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Science and the Modern World_. 148
(2) Cf. Ibid p. 199

The relation between eternal objects and actual
entities is designated by various terms. Eternal objects
are said to: "have _ingression_ into"; "be _realized in_" (1);
"be exemplified in" (2) actual entities. In the case of
all these usages the meaning is apparently the same.

Eternal objects are not all of the "simple" type
mentioned in the "Locke" list. There are various
degrees of complexity manifested by eternal objects:
for example: "a definite finite relationship involving
the definite eternal objects of a limited set of such
objects is itself an eternal object." (i.e. a complex
eternal object) (3)

It is to be noted that eternal objects, derived
from a common group of "simple" eternal objects can be
arranged in an "abstractive hierarchy", their place in
the hierarchy being determined by grades of abstraction.
(i.e. the number of alternatives excluded)

An apparent problem arises when we find Whitehead
stating that "'sensa'constitute the lowest category of
eternal objects." (4) E.g. "definite shade of green" (5)
There are also references to the sensuous comprehension
of eternal objects. All this seems directly contrary to

(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_  p. 64
(2) Ibid  p. 64
(3) A. N. Whitehead, _Science and the Modern World_  p. 159-
(4) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_  p. 174
(5) A. N. Whitehead, _Science and the Modern World_  . 97

the previous doctrine that eternal objects are intellec-
tually apprehended- the objects of conceptual prehension.

This difficulty can be cleared up by noting that
Whitehead has been a little careless in his use of
language. What he really means to say is this: the
eternal object, as such, is conceptually (intellectually)
prehended. A particular exemplification of it is
sensuously apprehended (prehended). Thus when Whitehead
speaks of the sensuous apprehension of an eternal object
he should have said, more accurately, sensuous
apprehension of an exemplification. For example, we
conceptually apprehend "triplicity". We sensuously
apprehend, say, three mice. We conceptually apprehend
"greenness"; we sensuously apprehend, not the eternal
object "greenness", but its exemplification the patch of
green, present before our eyes as a visual sensum.

It is of course true that it is only with great
difficulty that we can think of eternal objects apart
from some sort of exemplification in imagination.--
When we concentrate on an abstract thought, it is
frequently accompanied by some image which exemplifies
it.

In the preceding discussion of actual entities,
three phases of the internal structure of these entities
were noted: "subject", "data","subjective form". It is

now necessary to note further complexities.--An actual
entity is very complicated. In general, an adequate
description of an actual entity must refer to its
component "prehensions" (feelings).

## Prehension

"A prehension reproduces in itself the general
characteristics of an actual entity". (1) Yet, while
an actual entity prehends the whole world (in some
sense), a prehension has reference to only a part of
the world. More exactly, an actual entity requires a
number of prehensions in order to react to the whole
world.

The statement that "every prehension consists of
three factors:-'subject','datum'and'subjective form'"(2)
would seem to indicate that a prehension is a lesser
sort of actual entity. The initial quotation in this
section would also seem to support such an interpretation.
However, it is evident on closer examination that when
Whitehead uses the term "prehension", he means
specifically "feeling of". (3) In other words a
prehension is not an entity, but a mode of activity which
is constitutive of an entity. It is true that a

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality    p. 18
(2) Ibid  p. 55
(3) Cf. Ibid  p. 66

prehension consists of subject, data and subjective form
but only in the sense that a prehension (feeling) of
data by a feeler, can't there be unless there are a t
to be felt and a feeler to feel. The "subject" referred
to in the case of any prehension is that of the actual
entity which has, as one of its components, this
particular prehension of some particular datum.

It is to be further noted that the subjective form
(characteristic attitude (1) of any prehension is
determined by the subjective aim (or purpose) (2) of
the actual entity in which the prehension takes place.
Thus it is, that by a number of prehensions, each
selecting a bit of relevant datum from the whole
environment to be the object of its affections (or
concern),--the new actual entity builds itself up
(just as a moment of psychic experience adds to itself,
self, content e.g. sense data, obtained from external
sources) and constitutes itself a new entity ('one')
among the previous 'many'.

Whitehead distinguishes various types of prehension
(prehendings): "Prehensions of actual entities, namely
prehensions whose data involve actual entities - are
termed 'physical prehensions'; and prehensions of eternal
objects are termed 'conceptual prehensions'." (3) All

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(1) Cf. Thesis   page   42
(2) Ibid          page   48
(3) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality    .
                    Macmillan Inc.

prehensions have subjective forms; ... eternal objects
may be responded to by an attitude of longing, or
disgust and rejection. In the process of "including"
physical data similar feeling-attitudes (and of course
others) are generated. (1)

There are also "hybrid physical prehensions": "A
physical feeling is here defined to be the feeling of
(i.e. a response to) another actuality. If the other
actuality be objectified by (the acts of) its conceptual
feelings, the physical feeling of the subject in
question is termed 'hybrid'."(2) In her discussion of
hybrid physical prehensions, Miss Emmet while stating
the theory correctly, is unfortunate in the example
which she uses. It is stated correctly, that a hybrid
physical feeling is "the feeling of an eternal object
felt by another actual entity." (3) The example is:
"If I feel the tree as green, I am feeling the tree as
prehending conceptually the eternal object green." In
this, Miss Emmet has overlooked the distinction between
the conceptual prehension of an eternal object and the
exemplification of an eternal object. Strictly
speaking, if the tree had only a conceptual prehension

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(1)Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 79-80
(2) Ibid     p. 377  Brackets mine
(3) Miss D. M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism

of "greeness", it would not be actually green in color.
The tree would not be green until it had exemplified
the conceptually prehended eternal object 'greeness'.
As such the eternal object is not colored, i.e. it has
not the sort of quality which is sensuously prehended.

An adequate example of a hybrid prehension is the
one mentioned by Miss Emmet: "in feeling eternal objects
we are having hybrid physical feelings of God." (1)
Another very interesting illustration (also suggested
by Whitehead) is the situation which arises in conversa-
tion when ideas (eternal objects) conceptually prehended
by (ego) "A" are prehended by actual entity (perceiving
ego) "B". Apparently, on occasion, this process takes
place with little or no direct physical mediation.
This is one of the events in ordinary experience which
make "mental telepathy" (freed from humbug) appear very
plausible to many who have vividly experienced it in
mild or more profound form.

A further distinction between prehensions is made
thus;- a positive prehension is one in which data are
accepted into the being of a new entity. A negative
prehension is one in which the proposed data are
eliminated from feeling. (It is to be noted that data

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(1)  Miss D. M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism
                                                    . 76

thus dealt with must be eternal objects since, by
definition, all actual entities are positively
prehended.' However, the subjective form, with which
data are felt "as excluded", makes its contribution to
the nature of the entity. Even in the case of data thus
excluded from feeling there is a bond of relationship,
in that, the data in question are 'held as imperative',
i.e. they are not completely banished from consideration.
A positive choice of certain patterns of activity
eliminates other possible patterns, yet there is also
a vague sense of the existence of the excluded
possibilities. This is the type of experience Whitehead
is trying to describe in his theory of negative
prehensions.

Actual entities, or more specifically, their
feelings or prehensions manifest a "vector" character.
"They feel what is there and transform it into what is
here."(1) Not only is this vector characteristic
illustrated by the relation of an actual entity to
other actualities present or past. Any actual entity
desires to (and does) make a contribution to the life of
actual entities which will arise in the future.

Whitehead's theory of 'positive prehension' is
based on a description of "communion with nature". c

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 177

... in ... a part of ... referred to in ... nature poetry, ... the immediate sense ... that ... experience in which a person ... to feel ... with nature.---The way in which an emotion I term of "anger" carries on from one occasion of experience to another, is likewise referred to by Whitehead as illustrating the prehension of one actual entity by a newly arising actual entity.---The spread and mutual interpenetration of the ultimate electronic entities, also illustrates this prehensive process. (1)

A key to the understanding of Whitehead's doctrine of "conceptual prehension" is provided by our "awareness of possibilities." (2)

It was noted previously, that while all actual entities are positively prehended:- only a selected group of the eternal objects is so dealt with,- the remainder being "excluded" by negative prehensions. At first sight it may appear that there is a problem here,- namely, how is it possible to "feel" an eternal object and then reject it? Does not the mere fact of feeling the eternal object make it a part of the new entity?

An objection of this sort overlooks a further

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(1) Cf. Thesis    page   10
(2) Ibid         page   15

complexity of the prehensive process, in terms of which the apparent difficulty is met.--there is a distinction between "initial data"- the world as it presents itself, and "objective data"- the content selected for use in the origination of a new actual entity. (1) thus it is that the mere fact of feeling data (initial data) does not thereby constitute them components of the finally determinate actual entities.

In illustrating the sort of experience he has in mind when referring to his distinctive or negative prehension, Whitehead mentions that of an artist. A painter, as he proceeds to diminish a form, thinks of various possibilities (initial data). Having done so he selects some and rejects others, holding before him (conceptually), that selected few to guide him in his work (objective data). However, the rejected possibilities remain in the background of the artist's experience. He is aware of their presence in a dim, confused sort of way. Thus Whitehead states: " A negative prehension holds its datum as inoperative in the progressive concrescence of prehensions constituting the unity of the subject." (2) This is more

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(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 337-
(2) Ibid p. 75 Underlining mine.

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The nature and function of Data in the process of

Physical prehension

    In describing the constitution of an actual entity
by means of prehensions of other actual entities,
Whitehead uses the terms "data" and "objectification".
The meaning of the former term should be fairly clear
from the preceding discussion.--- Other actual entities
provide material or "data" for inclusion in the new
actual entities which are continually arising. (It is
to be noted that the term "data" is also applied to the
eternal objects which are used in the self-creative
process of an actual entity.'--- "The functioning of
one actual entity (through the medium of data) in the
self-creation of another actual entity is the
"objectification" of the former for the latter actual
entity.--- 'Objectification' refers to the particular
mode in which the potentiality of one actual entity is
realised in another actual entity.' (1) *  Further, it

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality , 50; 34
    Underlining and brackets mine.
* however, it is to be noted that the term "objectif-
ication" is also used in a much narrower sense: 'The
prehension of one actual entity by another entity is the
complete transaction, analysable into: (a) the objectif-
ication of the former entity as one of the data for the
latter; and (b) the fully clothed feeling whereby the
datum is absorbed into the subjective satisfaction.'
    Ibid (1)  p. 52  brackets mine.

is to be noted that the process by which an eternal
object functions in the self-creative growth of an
actual entity, is not called 'objectification', but
rather 'ingression'. --- With reference to the details
of this process (of ingression), it is apparent that
before there is a genuine ingression of an eternal
object, there must first be a conceptual prehension of
the eternal object, as datum,--which is then exemplified
or ingresses. For example, if I cut three pieces of
bread, the eternal object 'triplicity' has ingressed
in the three pieces of bread. But before this took place
there must have been the envisagement of that possibility
and the decision to cut that many pieces. (A conceptual
prehension and subjective aim

The types of experience which provided Whitehead
with hints as to the nature of the physical prehensive
process have been already noted (the enjoyment of the
brooding presence of nature; the transfer of a feeling
tone of anger; the spread of an electronic discharge.
The nature of the prehensive process is further
clarified by a consideration of Whitehead's exact and
technical statement of the relation of 'data' to source,

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... ... ...

... ... ... ... actual entities.—" ... ... ... ... ... of some element of its own definiteness." [1] ... ... real component in the objectified entity ... ... rôle of being how the ... ... ... In the experience of the (new) subject." [2] * ... ... more specifically to ... entities "as ... ... from moment to moment," [3] ... ... ... ... "being continuous throughout the successive occasions of experience." [4]

Here again, it must be noted that Whitehead in proposing to describe the nature of all actual entities in terms of the experience of a self of the human sort—the only sort of actual entity which Whitehead claims to know accurately and fairly completely.

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality ... p. ...
(2) Ibid. p. 97 Brackets mine.
* "The primitive form of physical experience is emotion-blind emotion received ... felt elsewhere in another occasion, and conformally appropriated as a subjective passion." Process and Reality p. ...
(3) Ibid p. 174
(4) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas ... 6

There are certain passages in Whitehead's writing
which suggest a different theory of objectification and
prehension. It is suggested that the data are not
concrete components of the prehended actual entities
but rather, eternal objects.----It is true that in some
cases the data may be eternal objects (as in the case of
hybrid physical prehensions). The question under
consideration is whether or not data are _always_ eternal
objects.

Whitehead states, for example: "An eternal object,
when it has ingression through its function of objec-
tifying the actual world, so as to present the datum
for prehension, is functioning 'datively.'" (1) "The
eternal objects function by introducing the multiplicity
of actual entities as constitutive of the actual entity
in question." (2) Such passages as these have led
critics to hold that the _only_ bond between successive
actual entities is the eternal object which they have
in common; i.e. the new actual entity has as datum only
an eternal object, which objectifies the actual world.

This view is apparently supported by references to
the relational functioning of eternal objects, on which

(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_  p. 249
(2) Ibid  p. 98

the solidarity of the universe is based. (1) "....is one eternal object with two-way functioning, namely, as partial determinant of the objective datum, and as partial determinant of the subjective form. In this two-way rôle, the eternal object is functioning relationally between the initial data on one hand and the concrescent subject on the other." (2)

However, in considering such statements, it must be remembered that in all instances Whitehead is apparently discussing the transfer of feelings. It is therefore, not to be thought that the eternal objects are the most important elements in the process, or the only content of the bridge between actual entities. By virtue of the process of prehension, i.e. a genuine transfer of feelings, the same eternal object appears in two successive actual entities. The real connection between actual entities in most cases, is not due primarily to the fact of the presence of the same eternal object in the two actual entities, but rather to the transfer of feelings or content in which the eternal object is exemplified. In short,- the eternal object "determines" the actual entity (or some phase of it) not by any overwhelming might or right, but because

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality . 449
(2) Ibid p. 364

the actual entity decided to be determined by that
eternal object (i.e. in the sense that it- the actual
entity- exemplifies that eternal object).

Miss Emmet is of the opinion that Whitehead can-
not legitimately discuss the objectification of actual
entities in terms of the transfer of _feelings_.  She
holds this view, because, by previous definition: "It
is only objects and not events which can 'be again'." (1)
In answer to this objection it is to be noted that _one_
feeling (content or act) is not an _entire event_.
Therefore, in saying that a feeling is transferred from
a now dead actual entity to a novel actual entity,
Whitehead is not being inconsistent.  That is to say,
he is not claiming that a past actual entity endures,
_as such_.  Moreover, Whitehead believes that the
validity of his position can be substantiated by
reference to a certain sort of experience.  He holds
that on occasion, it is discovered that a feeling
which once formed part of a now dead and gone experience
(actual entity) may at the present moment, in all its
living immediacy, be a component of a new actual entity.
(An example which he offers is that of the transfer of
a feeling of anger from a past to a present occasion
of experience-actual entity).

(1) Miss D. M. Emmet, _Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism_
p. 159

Returning to the type of prehension which is characterized by a genuine transfer of feelings (physical prehension); it is to be noted that there is not an **(A)** exact or **(B)** complete transfer of content from the old to the new actual entity. (A) "The 'cause' (old actual entity) passes on its feeling to be reproduced by the new subject as its own----but the reenaction is not perfect." (1) Certain inhibitions, additions, weakenings or intensifications may appear due to the history of its production. (B) Only some feelings are transferred in the process of prehension. Other feelings in the original actual entities are dismissed, eliminated from the new actual entity. (2) "There are factors in the environment which are eliminated from any function as explicit facts in the new creation. The running stream purifies itself." (3)

An examination of moral and esthetic experiences provides Whitehead with evidence of the essential place of **this** process of selection and rejection in the life of an actual entity.

It has been seen that a novel actual entity derives data from **other actual entities** by physical prehensions, and envisages possibilities by conceptual prehensions.

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality   p. 362
                        by a etc. Ibid.
(2) Cf. Ibid    p. 321
(3) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas    p. ?  ?

(Thus Whitehead speaks of "real" and "ideal" (image)
potentiality). One further fact must be noted. In the
case of a physical prehension by actual entity "M" of
actual entity "N",- data for prehension into M are only
available after the internal existence of the actual
entity "N" "has evaporated,-worn out and exhausted." (1)
"The superject (datum, also called "the satisfaction" of
the actual entity) is not of the substance of the
subject." (2) This further emphasizes the fact that the
process by which an actual entity is objectified for
prehension into another actual entity, entails
continual elimination and loss. Actual entities
'perpetually perish' subjectively, but are immortal
objectively." (3)

It must also be remembered that the process of
objectification is not due entirely to the activity of
the newly arising actual entity. The actual entities
which provide data have a drive or urge to make
contributions to new actual entities. In a sense the
data are not _passively_ available. It is part of their
nature that they enter into new actual entities--
as it is part of the nature of some feeling element in

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_, p. 46
(2) Quoted by A. H. Johnson in conversation.
(3) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_, p. 47

experience to carry on into the next moment of experience.
The particular act of feeling is, of course, determined
ultimately by the intention (subjective aim) of the
subject experiencing.

In view of the preceding discussion of the nature
of prehension, documentable by an even more exhaustive
reference to Whitehead's work, it seems strange to
find Dr. Charles Hartshorne faced by a grave problem.
"Since it cannot be the eternal objects, nor the events
as constituted by them, which internally involve other
actual entities, therefore, the solidarity of the
world,with its corollary, the denial of simple location,
can only mean that the bare space-time locus of each
event involves reference to the loci of other events.
Qualitatively, events remain outside each other.  I
confess to a virtual certainty that this is not
Whitehead's meaning." (1)

Surely it is evident, as far as Whitehead is
concerned, that events internally involve each other
by a process of transfer of feeling.  Whitehead's
views concerning the solidarity of the world are aptly
summarized thus:  "the process,or concrescence,of any
one actual entity involves the other actual entities

(1) Charles Hartshorne, "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's
Philosophy", The Philosophical Review    July  1935 p. 36

among its components. In this way the objective solidarity of the world receives its explanation." (1)

Finally, it cannot be sufficiently emphasized that in this system of thought, "any item of the universe, however preposterous as an abstract thought, or however remote as an actual entity, has its own gradation of relevance, as prehended, in the constitution of any one actual entity." (2)

## The Subjective Form

"The 'subjective form' is how a subject that prehends that datum." (3) "There are many species of subjective forms, such as emotions, valuations, purposes, adversions (and) aversions (see _Process and Reality_ , consciousness etc." (4) Horror, disgust, indignation and enjoyment of a joke are other subjective forms. Like all other components of an actual entity, the subjective form is "selected from the multiplicity of pure potentiality" and does its share in providing definiteness. That is to say, the actual subjective form is first envisaged as an abstract possibility, and then realized in the life of a new actual entity.

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_ , p. 1?
(2) Ibid p. 21?    Underlining mine.
(3) Ibid p. ??
(4) Ibid p. 78    Brackets mine.

## Consciousness

It is to be noted that Whitehead uses the term
"consciousness" in a rather specialized sense, far
narrower than the usual meaning of "awareness".
Whitehead might be expected to claim that any conceptual
prehension has "consciousness" as a characteristic of
its subjective form. Such, however, is not the case.
In his opinion, "conceptual feeling, apart from complex
integration with physical feelings are devoid of
consciousness in their subjective forms." (1) Whitehead's
position is further clarified in the following quotation:
"Consciousness requires more than the mere entertainment
of a theory (complex eternal object or proposition). It
is the feeling of the contrast of theory, as mere theory,
with fact, as mere fact." (2) That is to say, for example
there is not mere physical prehension of data given
(any more than mere conceptual prehension of an eternal
object); there must be the feeling of these data being
confronted by a conceptual prehension, such that the data
are recognized as exemplifying a certain eternal object.
(This general situation would be an example of Categoreal
Obligation: "The Category of Conceptual Valuation". (3)

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(1) A. N. Whitehead in conversation.
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality   p. 16
        Underlining and brackets mine.
(3) Cf. Ibid  p. 39

The nature of this "contrast" must be considered in more detail. Whitehead states that: 'consciousness is the feeling of negation." (1) This type of feeling in its barest germ is illustrated by the perception of a stone as grey. That is to say, the fact (stone) is contrasted with the theory (this is grey). In such an experience there is implied the notion, this stone is grey and nothing else. The feeling of contrast, which is the basis of consciousness, reaches its full development when a negative prehension is involved, as for example in "perceiving this stone as not grey. The grey then has ingression in its full character of a conceptual novelty, illustrating an alternative.' (2) In Whitehead's opinion "the negative perception is the triumph of consciousness. It finally rises to the peak of free imagination, in which the conceptual novelties search through a universe in which they are not datively exemplified." (3) Such experience as this is the basis of art, and all other creative and spontaneous activities. (4)

It is to be noted that apparently Whitehead does not always emphasize the necessity of having conceptual

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_   p. 245
(2) Ibid  p. 245     Underlining mine.
(3) Ibid  p. 245
(4) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, _Adventures of Ideas_   p. 347

and physical feeling before consciousness is possible. For example: "all forms of consciousness arise from the integration of propositional feelings with other feelings, either physical feelings or conceptual feelings." (1) Thus it might seem that when a proposition is integrated with a conceptual feeling, there is no physical feeling in the situation. However, Whitehead is free from inconsistency since a proposition is "the entity forming the datum of a complex feeling derived from the integration of a physical feeling with a conceptual feeling." (2)

All conceptual prehensions have as their subjective form, "valuation". For example, in the final phase of a complex conceptual feeling, the subject is faced with various data which must be arranged in order of importance with reference to its subjective aim (intention). In terms of this standard, each eternal object is felt as important or as relatively unimportant. This process is termed valuation. In the case of a simple conceptual prehension, the one eternal object is regarded as desirable (and responded to with the subjective form of "acceptance").

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_, p. 291
(2) Ibid p. 291     Underlining mine.

It is to be noted that there are six factors in
complex subjective form: 1. there is the definitive
patterned way in which the various elements in the
'subject" are arranged. ... The various quantitative
intensities of these elements form a pattern. 3. The
entire subjective form may manifest several qualities
such as joy, distaste, aversion. It is also true that
parts of the subjective form, may at different times
manifest different qualities. An examination of an
enjoyment of music will reveal these factors. A note
has a certain patterned relationship to its overtones,
each of which has its individual intensity- hence a
pattern of intensities. In addition the tone may
provoke various feelings, and the overtones may give
rise to feelings which the note as such does not
conjure up. (1)

In so far as enrichment of subjective form is
achieved by a proper balance of qualitative pattern
and intensity through contrast (effected by the
positive conceptual prehensions of relevant alternatives),
an actual entity will enjoy an increased richness of life.
In this way the "ultimate creative purpose" of the
universe is adequately exemplified.

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(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_, p. 355

... to all, so set, little less in the top 'subjective form' is also ... because ... that ... and are in the preceding section (i.e. how _subject_ _models data_ datum'. In _Adventures of Ideas_ there is reference to the fact that "the qualitative content of the object prehended enters into the qualities exemplified in the subjective form of that prehension ... the _subjective form_ conforms to the objective datum." (1)

It is quite true (on the basis of the previous exposition' that there may be continuity of subjective form from one occasion to another; but does it follow necessarily, that the other qualitative contents of previous actual entities _are_ also part, _not_ of the _subject_, but, of the _subjective form_ of the new actual entity? What conforms to the objective data is not the subjective form but the subject. This seeming confusion is somewhat mitigated by observing that apparently Whitehead is using the term subjective form in a different sense from that usually employed. The subjective form is the _immediate subject in that state_ of subjective feeling (... datum." (2)

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Adventures of Ideas_ ... ...
Underlining mine.
(2) Ibid. p. 317     Underlining and brackets mine.

## The Subjective Aim

One of the next essential elements in an actual
entity, as in a human person, is its purpose, or
subjective aim. In Whitehead's opinion, it is not an
external fixed end, used by a creator as a pattern to
guide him in the construction of an actual entity.
The subjective aim is rather a teleology imminent in
each actual entity. It is, in effect, an ideal self
which when envisaged: "defines what 'self' shall rise
from the datum; and the ideal is also an element in the
self which thus arises." (1) In short, there is a
subjective aim operative in an actual entity because
the subject has a conceptual prehension of a definite
proposition (or a complex eternal object). This
proposition is prehended with the subjective form of
"purpose to realise it in that process of self-
creation." (2) More specifically, it is to be noted
that, whatever particular subjective aim an entity may
have, every entity has as its aim the "ideal of itself
as individual satisfaction and as transcendent creator."
(i.e. a center of novel experience not absolutely
determined by the past; making its contribution to
newer actual entities' (3)

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality . .46
(2) Ibid  p. 87        Underlining mine.
(3) Ibid  p. 130

The subjective aim does not remain constant
during the "epoch" required by the genesis of an
actual entity. "This subjective aim ... with its
modifications, remains the unifying factor." (1)
Whitehead indicates as an illustration of what he means,
the experience of an artist who in particular ...,
has in mind a basic plan, the minute details of which
are modified in the process.

The subjective aim is determined by the available
data, in the sense that only certain types of aim are
normally applicable to certain types of data.

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality , p. 343
                        Underlining mine.

## Chapter III
## God

The fact that Whitehead devotes a whole section
of God (apart from a few scattered references to the
last short section of *Process and Reality*, is an
indication of the importance of this actual entity in
his cosmological scheme. God, one actual entity among
others, ("God is an actual entity, and so is the most
trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space." (1) )
serves as "the foundation of order", "the goal toward
novelty" and makes possible a solution of the basic
moral and aesthetic problems.

Like any other actual entity, God has conceptual
and physical poles. These are also referred to as the
primordial and consequent natures of God. ("God is not
to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical
principles. He is their chief exemplification." (2) )
"The 'primordial nature' of God is the concrescence of
a unity of conceptual feelings, including among their
data all eternal objects." (3) "The 'consequent nature'
of God is the physical prehension by God of the
actualities of the evolving universe." (4) God also

(1) A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* p. 18
(2) Ibid   p. 51
(3) Ibid   p. 134     Underlining mine.
(4) Ibid   p. 134

ing ... subject": ... list ... ... ... to be
used in the self-... ... ... of other ... ...
entities.

## The Primordial Nature of God

Whitehead has seen fit to discuss the 'nature'
of God separately. By a distinction of reason, God is
first considered in the abstraction of a primordial
actuality. (1)

In their process of self-creation (2), actual
entities require the lure of possibilities, to stimulate
their activities and at the same time offer a pattern
for the guidance of their on-going process of
development. It has been previously noted that eternal

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(1) It is unfortunate, that on occasion Whitehead
almost suggests that those "factors in God", "deficient
in actuality" are as a matter of fact actualities in
their own right.---Thus Whitehead refers to "non-
temporal actualities", "conceptual actuality" ( cf.
Process and Reality p. 524 ) and even "primordial
actual entity" ( Ibid p. 64 ). This use of language
seems strange when it is born in mind that an actuality
(actual entity) must have both physical (temporal) and
conceptual (non-temporal) poles.

(2) Cf. Thesis   p. 102

objects fulfill this function. However, which eternal
objects are experienced and interrelated, they will
provide little practical guidance. For example, the
eternal objects "fire" and "burn" are the more effective
in the experience of a person (actual entity), if they
are conceptually prehended as related, that is, if they are
prehended as components of a more indivisible, a
broader terms of eternal object.

In order to account for the actual interrelation
and patterns of relations of eternal objects, Whitehead
feels that it is necessary to refer to an agent which
is responsible for this arranging. Thus in answer to
the question, "In what sense can unrealized forms of
forms be relevant"--he states: "All real togetherness
is togetherness in the formal constitution of an
actuality." (1) (This is, of course, a variation of the
ontological principle . (2)

In accounting for the establishment of an order
of relevance among eternal objects, Whitehead writes
it, more technically, thus: the various conceptual
prehensions which refer to God's primordial nature are
controlled by their several subjective forms so that
the eternal objects are organized to be "relevant lures

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. 48
(2) Cf. Ibid    p. 75

of feeling severally appropriate for all realizable
basic conditions." (1)  In this way is manifest God's
subjective aim "the evocation of intensities." (2)

In this exposition, Whitehead is, as usual,
drawing on human experience for his model.  It is as
though a person, faced by a number of alternative
possibilities, reacted to them individually, with a
certain feeling, i.e. subjective form of acceptance
or rejection, so that, by this process they were
thence forth graded in order of relative importance.
In this way patterns of mutual interrelationship
were set up (this is what Whitehead terms "valuation").
This "chart" of the patterned relationships of eternal
objects is to be regarded as part of the available
equipment for the self-creation of any person.(actual
entity)

A careful consideration of this general situation,
reveals the fact that all so-called conceptual
prehensions of eternal objects, are in reality derived
from, or based on, hybrid physical prehensions of God.
This is evident from the fact that since the eternal
objects are present as a part of God's primordial
nature, they can only be made available by a hybrid

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality   p. 134
(2) Ibid  p. 161

physical apprehension of God's primordial nature. (1)

Thus God's primordial nature fulfills two
functions: 1. It provides for the relevance of eternal
objects to each other (i.e. the patterned relationships
which they manifest) and also 2. G od makes these
eternal objects, in their mutual relationships,
available for  the use of novel actual entities.  They
are made available because God's primordial nature, in
which they are contained, is objectified in the newly
arising actual entities.  "Apart from God, eternal
objects unrealized in the actual world would be
relatively non-existent for the concrescence in
question." (2)

In addition to this, there is another phase of
God's primordial nature which requires consideration.
He has a desire that this work of his be used by other
actual entities.  There is a "yearning after concrete
fact-no particular facts, but after some actuality." (3)

Implications of the Primordial Nature of God

This view of God (as primordial) has certain very
important philosophical implication:   . God (like every
other actual entity) conditions creativity.  That is to
say, God provides data for the self-creativity of actual

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(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p.347; 382
(2) Ibid   p. 46
(3) Ibid   p. 50

entities. "It (an actual entity) derives from God its basic conceptual aim ------ with indeterminations awaiting its own decisions. This subjective aim, in its successive modifications, remains the unifying factor governing the successive phases of interplay between physical and conceptual feelings." (1)

It is very easy to misunderstand the import of the preceding statement and find an apparent inconsistency in Whitehead's position. If the activities of an actual entity "are merely the outcome of the subjective aim, which is initially derived from God, it is difficult to see where the original decision of the actual entity, as self-creating, lies." (2)

Such a criticism overlooks the fact that while God provides a possible pattern (eternal object) which may serve (when realized) as a subjective aim; each actual entity is entirely responsible for the possible subjective aim which it actualizes in its life. "Thus an originality in the temporal world is conditioned, though not determined by an initial subjective aim supplied by the ground of all order and of all originality." (3)

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality    p. 343
                        brackets mine
(2) D. C. Moxley, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
                        1933-1934
(3) Ibid (1)        p. 164

Whitehead's position with reference to this point is clarified by noting his discussion of God's purpose (in so far as it can be considered with reference to his primordial nature). God's purpose or one phase of it (subjective aim) is the seeking of intensities in actual entities. (1) This apparently paradoxical statement can be understood when it is recalled that God's primordial nature is incomplete (being only conceptual). There is an urge to attain completeness. This can only be attained by God's physical prehension of data provided by other actual entities. The richer the life (intensity) of actual entities, the richer the data available for inclusion in God's consequent nature. Thus, in a sense the purpose of God is the attainment of value (self-creative activity) in the temporal world (2); yet all this is only "an intermediate step toward the fulfilment of his own being". (3) However, it must be again emphasised that God does not "coax" any particular actual entity into being, nor is he concerned with particulars as such.--"He (God), in his primordial nature, is unmoved by love for this particular, or that particular; for in this foundational process of creativity, there are no preconstituted

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(1) Cf. Process and Reality, A. N. Whitehead  p. 161
(2) Cf. Ibid  p. 160
(3) Ibid (1)

particulars. In the foundations of being, God is
indifferent alike to preservation and to novelty.' (1)
In this sense there is a certain inexorableness in God's
nature. (2) God is the creator of each temporal actual
entity only in the sense that he provides the initial
subjective aim. The ultimate creativity is not to be
ascribed to God's volition. Creativity is manifest in
all actual entities, including God. (3)

With reference to this general metaphysical
situation, it is interesting to find other critics,
(instead of trying to claim that God is ultimately
responsible for all creative activity and novelty)
denouncing Whitehead for separating God entirely from
the creative process. Thus E. W. H all (4) states:
"This particular actuality is not only _outside_ the
creative process, comprising all other actualities; it
is also entirely independent of the latter." This
statement, purporting to be a logical interpretation
of the short passage, God's primordial nature "is not
directly related to the given course of history" (5) is
evidently based on a total disregard of the fundamental
postulates of his system, noted above. It is in

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_  p. 160
                     Brackets and underlining mine.
 (2) Cf. Ibid    p. 373
 (3)  Cf. Ibid    p. 343    also  Cf. Thesis  p.  74
 (4) L. W. H all,  p. 39  in _Journal of Philosophy_, 1950
 (5) Ibid (1)     p. 70

addition a profound disorder in line of those who which he had adopted. Indeed its meaning is clearly indicated in the following paragraph. Whitehead states: "An eternal object is always a potentiality for actual entities; but in itself, as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression in any particular actual entity of the temporal world." (1) Thus God (or his component eternal objects) is not directly (necessarily) related to the given (specific) course of history. To claim that Whitehead regards God as an "entity independent of the creative process comprising all other actual entities" (2) is quite inexcusable in view of Whitehead's repeated explicit denials of this interpretation. For example, God is "with all creation" (3) -----"But of course, there is no meaning to 'creativity' apart from its 'creatures', and no meaning to 'God' apart from the creativity and the 'temporal creatures', and no meaning to the temporal creatures apart from 'creativity' and 'God'." (

It is evident that from an examination of the status of God in the self-creative process of actual entities, he, by his conceptual prehensions, cannot

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_    p. 70
                    Underlining mine.
(2) op. cit. p. 57 (4)
(3) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_    p. 521
(4) Ibid    p. 344

have what is called complete foreknowledge.(1) While
it is true that God consciously prehends all possibilities
and their consequences, he cannot tell, in any particular
instance, what possibility will be realized. However,
when a "decision" has been made by an actual entity,
God knows completely its consequences in so far as
abstract relationships of possibilities are concerned.
Yet, again, it must be noted that he cannot know
whether or not these implied consequences actually will
take place.

Whitehead states: "Every eternal object has
entered into the conceptual feelings of God." (2)
Certain critics find a woeful muddle in his thought
at this point. E. W. Hall (3) believes that Whitehead
cannot decide whether or not eternal objects are phases
of God or have independent status. Miss Stebbings
claims that "Whitehead makes the multiplicity of

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(1) It is of course true that God creates (i.e. is
responsible for) the relationships between eternal
objects. That is to say, the relational essences of
eternal objects are determined by God's conceptual
envisagement. E. P. Stallknecht finds it difficult to
understand how this creative act can legitimately be
called "eternal". (Cf. Studies in the Philosophy of
Creation p. 156) Perhaps the use of the term 'eternal'
is a little strange. What Whitehead apparently means
is that God's changeless act of conceptual evaluation,
of all eternal objects, is one of the enduring (in this
sense changeless) factors in the universe.
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 384
(3) E. W. Hall, "Of What Use Are Whitehead's Eternal
            Objects" Journal of Philosophy 1930
            P. 36

potentials, etc. by placing it in a non-temporal
actuality." (1) She apparently overlooks the fact that
an actual entity may conceptually prehend a "possibility"
(eternal object) without thereby giving it an actuality.
(e.g. A person may think of "wisdom" without thereby
becoming wise). With reference to the status of eternal
objects, Whitehead specifically states: "He (God) does
not create eternal objects; for His nature requires them
in the same degree that they require him." (2) This does
not mean that eternal objects can dwell apart in
absolute abstraction from actual entities. Such a
situation would reduce them to a condition"indistinguish-
able from nonentity". In other words the eternal
objects are real potentialities, and required by God's
nature; yet it is necessary that they at all times
take their place as essential components in the self-
creative process as actual entities. This does not
imply, as Hall suggests that "they are simply aspects
of actual entities with no status of their own, or by
themselves." (3)

It is true that eternal objects are not actualities
and therefore are not real things; but they have the
status of real possibilities, an essential feature in

(1) Miss Stebbings, "Review of Process and Reality,"
Mind 1930
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 392
Brackets and underlining mine.
(3) E. W. Hall, "Of What Use Are Whitehead's Eternal Objects"
Journal of Philosophy 1930 p. 57

the collection of components which constitute the nature
of an actual entity. Hall's statement that eternal
objects have no status by themselves is correct, in
the sense indicated (i.e. eternal objects are only a true
components in the life of actual entities) but this
does not mean that they are merely aspects (adjectives)
of actual occasions. They are distinct components of
actual occasions. Any actual occasion is a grouping
together of such components (and others).

In justice to Hall (1) it must be noted that he
points out that Whitehead does offer, also, a negative
answer to the question: "Are not eternal objects
simply aspects of actualities with no status of their
own." Yet Hall misunderstands the quotation he uses
for this purpose. He refers to "the many, which are
the universe disjunctively, (which) become the one
actual occasion." (2) He thinks that the "disjunctive
multiplicity" refers to eternal objects, which subsist.
Actually, in Whitehead's opinion, disjunctive
multiplicity, in this case, is a characteristic of
actual entities.

Two other related questions arise: (?) Why call

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(1) Op.Cit.
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 21
Italics to mine.

the opposite, ... the type of ... as indicated, that (1) an ... , having a primordial nature (conceptual pole) of such a sort, exists.

It is to be recalled that Whitehead is claiming to describe or interpret factors and entities which are _experienced_. In his opinion, the behavior of the actual entities can only be explained or interpreted in a certain way. They must be referred to in terms of the categories or principles _discovered_ to be operative, or _derived_ by (descriptive) _generalization_.

According to the "ontological principle": "everything must be somewhere.------- accordingly, the general potentiality of the universe must be somewhere." (1) (i.e. in some actual entity . Thus the actual entity, God, exists to provide in his primordial nature (conceptual pole), a locus for eternal objects, so that they may have proximate relevance to actual entities. That is to say, there _must_ be a God to account for the experienced proximate relevance (i.e. patterns of contrasts and relations of eternal objects) of eternal objects, which guides  the development of

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_  p. 7?

... ... for this agent, which makes
below us, there could be no lines of internal
interconnection. The "principles of concretion" would
be available as patterns to guide the concrescences of
actual entities. Also, as was noted above, because the
eternal objects are present in the experience of one
actuality, God,- they are thereby available for
objectification in other actual entities. Whitehead's
foregoing argument for the existence of God can be
summarized by a simple statement of his own: "The
general character of things requires that there be
such an entity." (1)

Whitehead also offers a more direct proof of the
existence of the primordial nature of God. He claims
that we have direct feeling (prehension) of the "time-
less source of all order". This feeling "acquires the
'subjective form' of refreshment and companionship at
which religions aim." (2) Therefore, this entity, which
(in its conceptual pole) is the timeless source of all
order, is called God.

It is to be noted that (the primordial nature of)
God is presupposed in the formulation of the Category
of Conceptual Reversion, although Whitehead does not
specifically say so when the principle is first
introduced.

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Science and the Modern World_  p. 116
(2) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_  p. 47

The "second phase initiation of conceptual feeling"
(1) of data diverse from initial conceptual data, can
only be explained by the presence of these relevant
eternal objects in some actuality,- i.e. God.  In
Whitehead's opinion they cannot just stray about in the
universe and "fluke in" from nowhere for no reason.
The fact that eternal objects are envisaged in degrees
of relevance, also points to an actual entity which
acts as "organizer".

## The Consequent Nature of God

Whitehead's discussion of the consequent nature of
God is most woefully condensed, being confined, for all
practical purposes to the last ten pages of _Process and
Reality_.  The task of interpretation is not rendered
any easier by the glorious literature which is packed
into this short space.  The usage of conventional
religious terms is not an unmixed blessing.  Yet,
through it all, there shines a basic insight which
perhaps could not have been expressed more adequately.

Whitehead's consideration of the consequent nature
of God grows out of:  1. a logical development of his
system which holds that God, being an actual entity,
like any other actual entity must have not only a

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_    p. 80

conceptual pole (God's primordial) but also in its physical pole (God's consequent nature); there is also, the need to do justice the basic intuition of religion, that there must be a process in which reality does not entail loss. As Whitehead sees it: "The ultimate evil in the temporal world is deeper than any specific evil. It lies in the fact that the past fades, that time is a 'perpetual perishing'. Objectification involves elimination. The present fact has not the past fact with it in any full immediacy." (1)

Whitehead feels that the basic intuitions of religion can not be mistaken. It cannot be that the glowing values of the present pass away into nothingness and are lost forever. Whitehead offers "nothing in the nature of a proof". Yet, in the light of his system, he believes that at least a probable solution is possible; one which can be considered as a genuine 'elucidation of somewhat exceptional elements in our conscious experience-----religious and moral intuitions." (2)

Against this background of thought, Whitehead formulates his theory of the consequent nature of God. As was noted previously, God's consequent nature "is

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_  p. 517
(2) Ibid  p. 521

the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the
evolving universe. (1) These actualities however are
directed by the all-inclusive conceptual aim of his
primordial nature. That is to say, the internal process
of God's self-creation is guided by an instinct which
is based on the complete envisagement of all eternal
objects and their interrelationships.

In view of these specific statements and the
general tenor of his work, it is strange to find
eminent commentators misinterpreting this phase of
Whitehead's philosophy. For instance, as D. M. Emmet
has pointed out (2), Miss D. Emmet considers the
consequent nature of God to be, not the physical
prehensions of many actual entities by one actual
entity, but merely, the progressive realization of
the realm of possibilities in the temporal world. (
"The incoming of the order of eternal objects, which
constitutes the Primordial Nature of God into the
temporal course of even̩ts is called the Consequent
Nature of G od." (4) She apparently overlooks the fact
that Whitehead has introduced the consequent nature of
God to overcome the evil which rises from the fact, that-
although the eternal objects contained in God's

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 134
(2) D. J. Foxley Proceedings of the Aristotelian
                  Society 1934-5
(3) Miss D. M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism
                  p. 259
(4) Ibid p. 259

conceptual prehensions, we need by reason the entities in
question to be realized in their subjective aim; yet
these actual entities are still mutually obstructive.
God's consequent nature is required to effect the
change from "disjointed multiplicity, with its diversities
in opposition, (the actual entities composing the world)
into concrescent unity, with its diversities in
contrast." (i.e. the "perfected" actual entity God) (1)
Thus the mere use of God's primordial nature is not
enough to solve the problem of evil,--this is not what
Whitehead means by God's consequent nature.--- God is an
actual entity. His consequent nature is constituted by
his physical prehensions of the actual world, which
it "saves". (2)  In justice to Miss Emmet, it must be
noted that she occasionally refers to God's consequent
nature as though she regarded it as the pole of an
actual entity (not merely the ingression of eternal
objects into the temporal world.)  For example:  "He
(God) holds the actual entities of the past as objec-
tively immortal in the immediacy of His own nature,
somewhat as in memory the present actual occasion knows
itself as arising from its past occasions, the quality

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_  p. 348
        op. cit.  p.c.
(2) Cf. Thesis  p.    58-59

of which it holds as contributors to its own nature." (1)

Dr. Charles Hartshorne also seems to "nod" when dealing with God's consequent nature. In summarizing points of interest in Whitehead's system of thought, he refers to the "differentiation between the primordial nature and the endless series of consequent natures of God." (2) He omits to note that Whitehead nowhere expressly formulates the doctrine that God's consequent nature is anything other than physical prehensions (of other actual entities) by an actual entity which does not cease but continues forever. If God were a "society" (3), each member of which exemplified the primordial nature and then "passed on", providing data for another such actual entity-- this whole series being called "God as consequent"-----the most essential characteristics of God's consequent nature would be lost (i.e. the retention of immediacy and creative advance). This is evident from the fact that the process of objectification within the social series, necessitates elimination and loss of mutual immediacy of the component elements. Despite the difficulties presented by an actual entity which

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(1) Miss D. M. Emmet, <u>Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism</u>
     p. 263
(2) C. Hartshorne, "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's
     Philosophy" <u>Philosophical Review</u> July,1935 p. 343
(3) Cf. Thesis   p.  168

continues to exist, ... reduce it to a God
rocket," in which ... handling of components is
lost.

God's "consequent nature" demands notice. As
the term implies, it "is consequent upon the creative
advance of the world." (1) Yet there is a "consequent-
ness" of the consequent nature in another sense, namely,
that of "unison of immediacy". The meaning of this
phrase must be carefully considered.

In the experience of the ordinary actual entity,
the past is not present in full immediacy. The
process of time veils the past below distinctive feel-
ing--- the past is present under an abstraction. (2)
Only in the specious present is there vivid immediacy.
This is due to the fact that ordinary actual entities
rise and pass away- drops of experience--creatures
of a short epochal duration. They exhaust themselves
and pass off the scene, leaving new efficient cause data
for the self-creation of a new actual entity. In this
sense the temporal process is a "perpetual perishing". (3)

In striking contrast is the nature of another
sort of actual entity called God. In His nature, as

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. 524
(2) Ibid  p. 517
(3) Ibid (1)   p. 517

that in God's consequent nature there is entertained (1), a contention that must be qualified, that is, that God is an entity which [...] never perishes; his content never becomes old; [...] entity, abstracted from his being and received into a [...] entity from his now concluded life. In other words, the precious present is never added [...] set in their glow of immediacy. God [...] taking in new content but the old content retains its vividness and lustre. In this sense, then, God [...] does not perish. The contents of his nature are not, as such, lost, by being objectified in some other actual entity, at the demise of God. In this way Whitehead offers theoretical support for the [...] of religion, that

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(1) Referring to "everlastingness" [...] of God's consequent nature, [...] interpretation which should be corrected. [...] exception noted on page 67 [...] consequent nature as the "impression" of those possibilities (eternal objects) into the world of becoming. ([...] Whitehead's Philosophy of [...]; brackets mine) She claims that God's consequent nature (interpreted in this sense) is able "to do fuller justice to the reality of the things which are temporal". Ibid p. [...]. In so far as they actualize eternal objects, at the same time they partake of their nature of everlastingness.

An examination of what Whitehead means by the consequent nature of God has disclosed the fallacy of this interpretation. (Cf. Thesis p. 66 ) This attempt to account for the "everlastingness" of actual entities is equally fallacious. Actual entities, by nature, [...] eternal objects. The only everlasting entity in the

_____ this _____ life.

It is evident that _____ once more _____ temporal (1) _____ in the temporal _____ fades; it is no longer vividly before _____ an actual entity's attention. God retains the past in living immediacy.

There is room for misunderstanding in considering the process whereby acts are absorbed into the growing entity God (i.e. into his consequent nature). In D. W. Hall's opinion, Whitehead holds that "all occasions are conserved (in God) in their very immediacy of occurrence." (2) This interpretation is based on the argument that God's consequent nature combines creative advance and the retention of mutual immediacy. (3) However, in this case at least, as Hall indirectly admits, Whitehead is discussing, not the immediacy of other actual entities as such, but the

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universe is God. The only real immortality actual entities enjoy is in God's nature. God everlastingly retains those things of now vanished actual entities which he considers worthy of "salvation".

(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_, p. 71
(2) D. W. Hall, "Of That Nature Whitehead Wrote", _Journal of Philosophy_, 1959, p. ___
(3) Cf. Ibid (1) _____ p. ___

...... of ......, ........ .......... ...... provided ... (1)

In the last section of _____, Whitehead is considering the "final opposites", two of which are "God" and the "World". Whitehead points out that these "opposed elements stand ...... mutual requirement." (2) The universe, ...... ...... ...., reveals there two factors, both essential elements in the creative process, both making contribution to each others natures.

The essential element in God's nature .. the permanent unity of vision (the conceptual realization of eternal objects), seeking physical embodiment. The essential element in the world (or actual entities) is the volatile multiplicity of finite actual entities seeking a perfected unity. These two elements in the universe grow, since they are "creatures", (3)

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(1) It is true that other statements made by Whitehead seem to bear out more strongly, the point which I all have raised. For example: "The consequent nature of God is composed of a multiplicity of elements with individual self-realization. It is just as much a multiplicity as it is a unity." (_Process and Reality_, p. ...).
(2) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_, p. ...
(3) Or, more accurately, in the case of God, ......... composed of creatures.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] of [illegible] (external objects)
i.e. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the
external world. (In t[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]).
This [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] God's consequent nature which [illegible] [illegible] of
the [illegible] (that is to say, the [illegible] [illegible] entities
in their physical finitude', the [illegible] multiplicity
of volatile entities [illegible] [illegible] (on the basis of a
unifying [illegible] is derived from God's consequent
unity." That is to say, a new actual entity emerges.
This new actual entity becomes 'one" among the "many"
other actual entities. This is apparently what
Whitehead means when he says that it is [illegible] into
the multiplicity of the [illegible] [illegible]. (1) On
the strength of this [illegible] of [illegible] Whitehead claims:
"It is as true to say that God is one and the world
many, as that the world is one and God [illegible]." (3)

This [illegible] analysis has been undertaken to
show that Whitehead's "[illegible]" claim, [illegible] "the
consequent nature of God is composed of a multiplicity
of elements with individual self-realization" (4) is an

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_ [illegible] [illegible]
(2) cf. ibid p. [illegible]
(3) Ibid p. [illegible]
(4) Ibid p. [illegible]

overstatement of the interrelations of God and the
actual entities composing the world. The fact of this
interrelationship should have been expressed in the
more exact terms of previous sections of *Process and
Reality*.

While in a certain sense it is true to say that
"the consequent nature of God is composed of a multi-
plicity of elements.----It is just as much a multi-
plicity as it is a unity." (1) This idea might have
been more accurately stated thus: God's consequent
nature is "the physical prehension of actualities-----
of the evolving universe." (2) "Each novel actuality
in the temporal world contributes such (not all)
elements as it can" (3) to the unity of God's being.
That is to say, many entities make a contribution to
the new actual entity God. God has many prehensions
(i.e. prehendings). He is in this sense "many". Yet
surely God is more of a unity than a multiplicity,
since he is one entity feeling other entities in
various ways-- a unity of many feelings.

Relevance to Religious Insights

In the universe of discourse used by religion,
certain terms are applied to God. He is called:

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* p.
(2) Ibid p. 134
(3) Ibid p. 134

"patient"; "the great companion", who "loves". He is
referred to as "exercising a tender care". Religious
devotee [...] Whitehead [...] before
believes that [...] of these terms is to attribute
and proceeds to employ them.

It is evident that in taking these [...] seriously,
Whitehead is [...] his back on most ill-rounded
religious notions. There are many counter strains of
thought which "Wishes God in the [...] of an imperial
ruler, in the image of a personification of moral energy,
in the image of an ultimate philosophical principle." (1)
These [...] Whitehead [...]. He [...] his
attention to the [...] exhibited in the [...]
origin of Christianity, [...] which [...] the
ruling of Caesar, or the ruthless moralist, or the
unmoved mover. It dwells upon the tender elements in
the world, which slowly and in quietness operate by
love." (2)

Guided by the subjective aim provided by his
primordial nature, God apprehends every actuality for
what it can be in a perfect system---"its sufferings,
its sorrows, its failures, its triumphs, its immediacies

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality [...]. [...]
(2) Ibid. p. [...]0

of joy-woven by rightness of feeling into the harmony of
the universal feeling." (1)  "No element in fact is
ineffectual: thus the struggle with evil is a process
of building up a mode of utilization by the provision of
intermediate elements introducing a complex structure of
harmony." (2)  It is to be noted that this "aesthetic"
hypnotization in God's nature is not to be equated
with the superficially similar doctrine of Absolute
Idealism.  In God's consequent nature all distinctions
are retained.  Good and evil are not transmuted into
colorless perfection.  In God, good and evil elements
are seen in their proper status, given their "position"
by reference to the scale of values provided by God's
evaluative process.

It is to be noted that all elements, made available
by actual elements, are not retained (in God's consequent
nature) unchanged.  There is a process of transmuting
(as to degree of import etc); and elimination.  "The
revolts of destructive evil, merely self-regarding, are
dismissed into their triviality of merely individual
facts." (3) (i.e. "transformed" or "transmuted")—Each
novel actuality in the temporal world contributes such

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(1)  A. H. Whitehead, Process and Reality   p.  45
(2)  Ibid  p.  517
(3)  Ibid  p.  346

elements as it can to a realization in God." (1) (not
all elements are present in God)  Thus, in terms of the
familiar doctrine of objectification,--while there is no
elimination within God's nature as such,- there is of
course elimination of some of the data available for
inclusion in God's nature.

Against the background of the preceding discussion,
it is possible to grasp Whitehead's meaning when he
states:  God <u>exercises a tender care</u> "that nothing be
lost------<u>that can be saved</u>." (2)   Thus God "saves"
the world, having judged it worthy of inclusion in the
everlasting immediacy of his own life.

It is very important to note the exact nature of
this "<u>salvation</u>":  an actual entity creates itself.
It dies, and in "passing on" provides data.   Some of
these data are prehended by God and retained in his
"life". Other data are lost forever. This then is
the salvation which God confers on actual entities.
Thus he exercises his tender "aesthetic" care --saving
those data which, in his life, will be "free from
inhibitions of intensity by reason of discordance." (3)

The "patience" of God is exemplified in the fact

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(1) A. N . Whitehead, <u>Process and Reality</u>  p. 124
                    Underlining mine.
(2) Ibid  p. 525
(3) Ibid  p. 105

that, as it were, God w its, and 'picks up the pieces',
as they fall from the dead actual entities. These
pieces (data) are fitted together (as fast as they are
available) in the "perfected system" of the supreme
ever enduring actual entity (God). God cannot force
any actual entity to proceed in any specific fashion.
Each actual entity is ultimately "causa sui". This
however, does not mean that God can only wait (exercise
patience) for actual entities to provide data for
inclusion in his nature. God also provides data.

Thus God, like any other actual entity, can
exercise efficient causation by providing data for
inclusion in new actual entities. This however, is
not the final causation. Nor does the fact that God
provides the patterns for the actual subjective aim of
any actual entity, constitute God the ultimate creator
of all actual entities (1). God's greatest power lies
in the fact that his primordial nature acts as a
stimulus to the internal activity of actual entities.
As Whitehead expresses it, God leads " it (the world)
by his vision of truth, beauty and goodness." (2)

Like all actual entities, God desires to make a

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(1) Cf. Thesis   p. 102
(2) A. N . Whitehead, Process and Reality   p. 526
Brackets mine.

contribution to the life of other actual entities. It is desire, on the part of God, to add to the intensity of other actual entities is called the "love" of God.

Since God shares the experiences of other actual entities, and contributes to theirs, he is designated as the "great companion ------ the fellow sufferer who understands." (1)

## Comparison of Primordial and Consequent Natures of God

Various attempts have been made to distinguish, aptly, the two poles of God's nature. A. D. Ritchie (2) points out that God is not only the "score" of the orchestra (God as primordial); but also the "conductor" (God as consequent). Whitehead, himself refers to God's "primordial nature" as, "free, complete, eternal" (since no data come in from outside to be added to his conceptual pole-- all eternal objects being already present). God as primordial is "primordial" since it is from God's conceptual envisagement of eternal objects, that the actual entities, arising in the world, get their lure, or urge, to grow. From the eternal objects conceptually preherded by God, other actual entities derive patterns which are actualized by them as their

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. 532
(2) A. D. Ritchie, "Review of Process and Reality"
        Philosophy  1931

subjective form. (Conceptual envisagement of eternal
objects is 'primordial' in God's nature in the sense
that this is his most distinctive base. (1) )

God's primordial nature is 'actually deficient'
because an actuality requires a physical pole if it is
to be complete. God's primordial nature is "unconscious"
because consciousness requires the confrontation of fact
with alternatives (conceptual data). God, as primordial,
is concerned only with eternal objects. Apart from his
consequent nature, God has no physical feelings of facts.
Without such feelings consciousness cannot arise. (2)

Whitehead's claim that God's conceptual pole, is
as such, unconscious has exposed him to considerable
criticism. One of the most fair and constructive is
that offered by N. P. Stallknecht: "The primordial
nature of God cannot be "unconscious" prehension of
possibility in general, because it involves a special
type of valuation which is necessarily conscious. For
God, evaluation amounts to a comparison of the forms
contemplated with himself, for God is his own archetype
of perfection. Now, when we see that a comparison and
contrast of the object evaluated with himself, is

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. 27 Cf.
(2) Cf. Ibid  p. 34

essential to God's appraisal of any object, we realize that such action is for God the very quintessence of consciousness, a comparative recognition of self and not self. --- Whitehead has not expressed this doctrine explicitly. Still, reflection upon his ideal of aesthetic intensification should make clear that the doctrine is consistent with his system." (1)

This argument, an attempt at correction, is based on a misunderstanding of Whitehead's conception of God's evaluation of eternal objects. God does not have before him, as an ideal, "himself", which serves as the pattern, in accordance with which he appraises the relative worth and status of all eternal objects. In the first place, God's primordial nature is constituted by his conceptual prehensions of all eternal objects. It does not exist prior to these acts of prehension. Secondly, the relationships of all eternal objects are not determined in accordance with some previous pattern, a complex eternal object. These relationships are established by the fact that God prehends the eternal objects concerned with various types of subjective form, i.e. degrees of relative acceptance and rejection. This

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(1) N. P. Stallknecht, Studies in the Philosophy of
Creation    p. 177
Underlining mine.

inclusion in God's primordial experience provides the patterned relevance which all eternal objects have.(1)

Stallknecht's attempt at reconstruction is also inconsistent with Whitehead's general position in that, in the evaluative process, there is no provision made for physical feelings. (Yet these physical feelings, as has been noted, are essential for the existence of consciousness.)

God's "consequent nature" is "determined" (i.e. receives data from other actual entities'. In this sense it is "consequent" (i.e. dependent on the growth of other actual entities which provide data for it' and "incomplete" (continually grows by using these available data in its reconstruction). God's consequent nature is "everlasting" in the sense that actual immediacy of content is retained in his life. The "past" within his nature never fades. The statement that God as consequent is "fully actual" is not exactly correct. What Whitehead apparently means is that, because God, the actual entity, has a physical pole (consequent nature' he is fully actual. (Not that the physical pole, as such is fully actual— since actualities must have both poles.) This

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(1) Cf. Thesis  p. 51

some general criticism applies to the statement: 'The consequent nature of God is conscious.' In reality, God is conscious when he has both physical and mental poles, so that fact, present by physical prehension, can be confronted by alternatives (conceptual prehensions). In short, the mere fact of a physical pole as such, does not render God conscious.

On a basis of a careful examination of the writings under discussion, one can find little justification for Miss Stebbing's righteous indignation, voiced in these pathetic words: "Prof. Whitehead's indefensible use of language becomes nothing short of scandalous when he speaks of God. He says that God is a term used for creativity, Aristotelian matter and modern stuff." (1) As a matter of fact, Whitehead says no such thing. Apparently Miss Stebbing has been misled by the opening phrase of Process and Reality, Part I, Chapter 5, (2) paragraph two. Here it is stated that "'creativity' is another rendering of the Aristotelian 'matter' and of the modern 'neutral stuff'." The use of the phrase "another rendering", following a paragraph in which the consequent nature of God was being discussed

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(1) Miss L. S. Stebbing, "Review of Process and Reality" Mind 1930
(2) Underlining mine.

night have led Miss Stebbing to think that God was still being discussed (i.e. in terms of creativity etc. . .

<u>Evaluation of Whitehead's Concept of God</u>

On the basis of consistency, and the avoidance of some of the traditional problems, there is much to be said for Whitehead's concept of God: 1. Within certain limits (1), God is not an exception to the metaphysical principles which are applicable to the rest of the universe. He is describable in the same general terms as all other actual entities. We are not reduced to a "confession of ignorance" nor a distant "first cause" whose existence we are aware of but whose ways are not our ways. 2. Whitehead is not faced by the problem of explaining how a static, "real" God has any causal connection, or connection of any kind, with an "unreal" changing world. In his opinion God needs the world as much as the world needs God. God is merely one actual entity in self-creative interaction with other actual entities. 3. Whitehead's stress on the historical aspect of God (his growth), and his genuine intercourse with other self-creative creatures, saves Whitehead from the fallacies of Absolute Idealism, though his reference to the aesthetic nature of God's consequent experience might suggest a similarity. It is true that his

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(1) Cf. Thesis   p.   98

"subjective aim prehends every actuality for what it can be in such a perfected system." (1)  This, however, does not deny that suffering or pain are any less real. 'God prehends pain or evil with the subjective form of tragedy.  God is noble in that he endures the evil experiences, present in his nature, bravely." (2)  It is to be noted that just because God experiences the "evil" of others, in a genuine fashion, this does not imply that his nature, as such, is evil.  "God has in his nature the knowledge of evil, of pain, and of degradation, but it is there as overcome with what is good.  Every fact is what it is, a fact of pleasure, of joy, of pain, or of suffering. ----Its very evil becomes a stepping-stone in the all-embracing ideals of God." (3)  Thus Whitehead refuses to follow the English Absolutists who lose "good" and 'evil' in the "perfection" of the Absolute.  The reference to "being overcome with what is good" looks suspiciously like idealism.  On closer examination it is seen that Whitehead is only claiming that these facts of evil are seen in their proper perspective, not as the ultimate facts, but as the "real", painful, goods

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality   p. 717
(2) A. N. Whitehead in conversation.
(3) A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making   p. 3 .
                        (Macmillan, New York  1926)
                        Underlining mine.

which spur one on to higher levels of achievement. That
is to say, particulars are not to be considered apart
from their place in the totality of real things. Thus
while Absolute Idealism regards "particular things" as
ultimately "appearances", as such, eternally present in
the envisagement of the Absolute; Whitehead considers
them to be real components which emerge in time and
are appropriated, as novel elements, into the growing
life of God's consequent nature. It is to be noted
that God's consequent nature is not prior in temporal
existence or in reality, to(some) other actual entities.[1]

### Comparison of Whitehead's Position with that of Bradley

At this point it is well to note the drastic
differentiations which distinguish Whitehead's position
from that of Bradley. This is particularly important
in view of Whitehead's statement: "though throughout
the main body of the work I am in sharp disagreement
with Bradley, the final outcome is after all not so

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(1) It is of course prior to those actual entities
which have not yet completely emerged. But the very
being of God's consequent nature depends on the self-
creation of some actual entities, in the past, which
have provided data for God's physical prehensions.

greatly different." (1)  In fact these differentiations
are so marked that one wonders at the last phrase in
the quotation.

Bradley bases his philosophy on the "rationally
approved" principle that the "real" must be self-
consistent and all-inclusive.  As a result of observation
he reached the conclusion that "experience" is the
same as reality.  "To be real is to be indissolubly
one thing with sentience.  It is to be something which
comes as a feature and aspect within one whole feeling;
something which except as an integral element in such
sensations has no meaning at all." (2)

It is to be further noted that:  "If, seeking
reality, we go to experience, we certainly do not find
a subject or an object, or indeed anything whatever
standing separate and on its own bottom.  What we
discover, rather, is a whole in which distinctions
are made, but in which divisions do not exist." (3)

Thus, on the basis of a direct examination of
immediate experience, Bradley is led to conclude that
there is no ultimate plurality of reals.  Reality is
one.  This position is further substantiated, in

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. vii
(2) F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality p. 145-6
(3) Ibid  p.   459

Bradley's opinion, by the realization that art is real
must be all inclusive, and self-consistent. If there
were a plurality of reals (so-called), the mere fact of
plurality would invalidate the claim of any one ( or
all) of these particulars to real. This follows from
the principle that a part, since it is not the whole
(all inclusive) cannot be real. Also, if there were a
plurality of reals, they would be related to each
other in various ways. But, in Bradley's opinion, no
reality can be found in a relation since a piece by
the "inconsistency" of "relationship". (1)

On the basis of such reasoning this, the
common sense world of autonomous, concrete, persons
and things which we find about us, is dissolved by the
subtle alchemy of Bradley's thought into a timeless
unity of feeling. Our "common sense" world is branded
as mere "appearance". For in reality, according to
Bradley, time (change) is an illusion. It implies
incompleteness. Reality must be complete. We refer
to distinct selves. In reality "we can hardly say that
the Absolute consists of finite things, when the things,
as such, are there transmuted and have lost their
individual natures." (2)

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(1) Cf. F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, p. 619
(2) Ibid  p. 469

It is true that Whitehead derives from Bradley the hint as to how the internal unity of an actual entity may be explained, i.e. an an inclusive whole of feeling. Here, however, all similarity stops. Bradley has only one whole of experience, tirelessly dissolving all apparent particulars into its "real" unity. Whitehead holds that there is an infinite multiplicity of centers of feeling, each autonomous and genuinely distinct. They "feel" other centers of life which are equally autonomous.

There is a place for "timeless unity" in Whitehead' cosmology. God's consequent nature, though it grows, is timeless in the sense that none of its component contents fade. It differs from Bradley's Absolute in that it (God's consequent nature) holds within its life, phases of other actual entities, only after these actual entities have, as such, passed out of existence. God's consequent nature does not deny the reality of evolving actual entities. Indeed, God's consequent nature could not exist without the data provided by other actual entities.

It is to be noted that because God is timeless, it does not necessarily follow that the reality of time must be denied. The self-creative process of

ordinary actual entities is genuinely temporal, i.e.
actual entities arise and then perish. There is
perpetual perishing. The agents in this process are
genuinely autonomous. Indeed God aids in these separate
centers of life in their self-creative struggle, by
suggesting plans of action and providing data for
physical prehensions.

With reference to Bradley's trust in a logical
criterion, Whitehead would probably make the rejoinder
(which is applicable to any rationalistic system which
either forces experience into its moulds or denies its
reality): "The only logical conclusion to be drawn,
when a contradiction issues from a train of reasoning,
is that at least one of the premises involved in the
inference is false." (1) Thus, in regard to Bradley,
the fact that a situation involves contradictory
elements (in the eyes of a rationalist) does not
thereby baptize it with the bitter waters of dis-
"appearance".

Bradley's observation of his immediate experience
was decidedly myopic. He saw a unity of feeling, with
merely apparent diversities. He made the mistake of

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 15

supposing there could be only one such unity, dis-
regarding the inescapable experience we have of others.
That mistake Whitehead corrects, together with the false
implications which Bradley drew from an inaccurate
analysis. In opposition to Bradley, Whitehead (1)
points out that "relations" relate.

By his doctrine of "cause sui" (with reference to
the creation of temporal actual entities) Whitehead
places himself in complete and utter opposition to
all forms of non-temporal, "particular denying"
Absolutism. This denunciation is applicable to the
"Great Self", an all inclusive "Experience" or the
logical essence "Being" from which lesser essences
are deductively derived (but no particulars are
genuinely accounted for).

Whitehead's doctrine of actual entities makes
possible an explanation of the "individuality" of
entities in the physical and psychical realms. This
was a very difficult problem on the basis of Lucretius'
theory of atoms, Descartes' undifferentiated extensive
continuum, and the created "beings" which were puppets
of the divine providence. In the case of Aristotle,
reference was made to some factor (form i.e. individual

(1) A. Whitehead, _Adventures of Ideas_   p. 301

essence or "matter", as the critics (my decide) which is
supposed to differentiate one entity from another.
However, there was no reference to the individual
selective self-creativity which (however indirect it may
seem when given wider application) does enable
Whitehead to do justice to the individuality of human
persons.

By this emphasis on the reality of actual entities
(not eternal objects in abstraction from living entities)
Whitehead supports our deepest insights against those,
who like Brigens and Spinoza reduce reality to logical
essence.

The feeble Plotinian attempt to merge and fuse
the _many_ things and persons of our ordinary experience,
into the life of the _one_ being - just as the light of a
multitude of candles is fused into one great light- is
confronted by the _genuine_ separateness (independence) of
actual entities and the real externality of relations.(1)
His theory of the self-creativity of distinct actual
entities stands in striking contrast to the Bergsonian
reference to the "many" as droplets falling (for no
good reason) from the artesian fountain of "life".

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(1) Cf. Thesis, p. 133

Berkeley's God, ultimately, "holds" all so-called
finite selves as his own ideas. Whitehead retains
within his nature, other actual entities,
only after they have passed on. As has been noted,
their independent being is not denied by their inclusion
in God. The inner life of actual entities having faded
out (in a normal fashion),-some remnants are saved, in
the experience of God.

## The Function of God in Creation

The function of God in the process of _creation_ is
to be particularly noted. He is not relegated to a
place of unimportance by the "downward drsi" of
Lucretius' atoms. He is not the "Unmoved over" of
Aristotle, or the "Supreme Artisan" of Plato. He is
not the "Ultimate Essence" from which all other
essences (but no particulars) are deducible. (Spinoza)
God is not a mere flux of "Vital Process" from which
things and persons appear for no reason and by no
agency. (Bergson and Plotinus) God does not create the
world by generating sense impressions. (Berkeley) He
does not usurp the perogatives of Bradley's Absolute,
and deny all genuine reality to the world of "appear-
ance"; nor does God create matter, and then by an
"immanent" or "external" teleology build a world and
"keep it going". (Descartes and Aquinas) Finally,

Whitehead's view of God differs from Leibnis's in that
Whitehead's "monads" (actual entities) create themselves
by interaction with the external world (they have windows).
Also, **God** is not the ultimate source and establisher of
**the** sort of interactions which take place between
components of the universe.  God's primordial nature
provides for the possibility of many "orders"; but the
actualities of the world and God, as _fully actual_,
determine what the actual order of the universe will be.
In this way the problem of divine immanence is solved
in a way which was impossible for most philosophers of
**religion.**  As has been evident from the previous
exposition, in Whitehead's opinion,- God's primordial
**nature** is present to all actual entities as a source
of patterns of activity.  God's consequent nature is
**intimately** related to the world in that he is concerned
to save all that is of worth, as actual entities perish.
Further, it is God's function to provide data for use
by self-creative actual entities.

God is one self-creative agent among other self-
creative agents.  Creation is continually going on.
It is absurd to speak of the _first_ day, or days, of
creation.

In opposition to Lucretius' claim that a "huddle"

of atoms can produce the entire universe, and if there
be Gods they are absentee non-interferers,- white c
finds that God performs an essential, though not all
important function in the universe. However, this
status is not guaranteed by making him an "Unmoved
Mover", so taken up with a consideration of thinking
that he can have no concern with the common sense
world. Nor is the fact of essential relationship,
which Whitehead stresses, to be explained in terms of
the analogy of an artist shaping his somewhat plastic
material. The relation between God and other entities
is delineated in terms of mutual interaction. With
reference to human beings, at least, this is a more
accurate description of what seems to happen, than
the doctrines of Aquinas and Augustine. They traced
everything to the providence of God and gave no
initiative to human beings. God creates and conserves.
Since God is alone responsible for the existence and
activity of all persons and things, they are thereby
relegated to a position of little or no importance or
reality.

While Whitehead may apparently go to extreme
lengths in stressing the inner life of all actual
entities, he is at least concerned to allow inter-

connection between things, persons and things, and between persons and persons; this was more than Descartes with his theory of "substance" legitimately could do. Also, Descartes' stress on the inclusiveness of space and the unreality of any differentiation of it, is corrected by Whitehead's "interacting to inds".

The absurdity of Newton's "watchmaker God" coming in occasionally to clean and repair (1), is replaced by Whitehead's more accurate emphasis on the intimate and ceaseless function of God in the creative process. ( ) (Newton's attempt to account for a closer relationship by regarding the world as God's sensorium, while reas a more plausible, does not seem very probable).

For the great churchmen, God is the supreme, even the only "being". For Whitehead, God is only one among many self-created entities which have become actual by a process of mutual interaction. In the opinion of Augustine and Aquinas, God is changeless, perfect, all-wise, and omnipotent, with no shadow of evil in his experience. Whitehead, as has been noted, refuses to attribute any of these characteristics to God, when regarded as fully actual. (3)

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(1) H. Hoffding, History of Modern Philosophy Vol. I
Cf. p. 412
(2) Cf. Thesis    p. 110
(3) Cf. Thesis    p. 51- ; p. 64-

Whitehead's emphasis on God's _subjective aim_ and on the place of "aim" in the creative process of all actual entities seems nearer the truth (if one were not to posit "aim" in certain of the lowest forms of existence) than the suggestion of Bergson and Montague that there is no plan manifest in the creative process.

In Whitehead's thinking, Berkeley's denial of the so-called material world is rejected, not by proving the existence of matter, in the sense in which Berkeley denied it. Rather, Whitehead discovers low grade psychic entities (actual entities) where Berkeley could only find the "ideas" of high grade psychic entities (human selves). Whitehead, though his position may be open to objection, at least tries to account for the experienced autonomy of the external world without denying it by a reduction to content in the mind of God.

With reference to Leibniz's position, it is to be noted that Whitehead avoids many of his mistakes. Since actual entities are not substances, Whitehead is not faced by the problem of "created substances". Relations between substances are provided for without bringing in God, in such a way that the monads apparently lose all individuality. Leibniz had tried to escape from the perplexity of a complete yet

striving monad,- a monad who denied his creative power
to other monads. In the opinion of Whitehead, all
entities are striving, incomplete. The fact that God
as primordial (i.e. in so far as God alone) is not
interested in particular things, as "individuals",
constitutes a further denial of the doctrine of pre-
established Harmony and individual Providence.

## How God Differs from Other Actual Entities

Because of certain functions which God alone
performs (which have been noted) he necessarily differs
from other actual entities. Some of the most striking
of these differences must now be considered:

(A) Ordinary actual entities cannot manifest both
"creativity" and the retention of "mutual immediacy".
God must be differently constituted so as to (or since
he does) perform this feat. In his nature the past
never fades. God's physical pole is non-temporal.
The physical prehensions of all ordinary actual entities
are temporal in the sense that they endure only for an
epoch, then perish and lose their immediacy. In the
never ending experience of G od, there is no loss of
content, once it is accepted.

(B) It is to be noted that while the subjective
aim of an ordinary actual entity undergoes change (1);

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(1) Cf. Thesis  p. 48

God's subjective in, i.e. his eternal envisagement of
eternal objects and his interest in the maximum rich-
ness of life for all actual entities, remains un-
changed.

(C) There is another fundamental problem: "An
actual entity has 'perished' when it is complete,' (1)-
(it extends over a limited epochal duration of time )
God has "the property of combining creative advance
with the retention of mutual immediacy," (2) and is thus
never complete. Hence he never perishes. It seems
rather difficult to apply the common name "actual
entity" to things which differ so fundamentally.

(D) There is a further problem: although God is
supposed to provide data for objectification into
other actual entities, yet he never perishes; therefore,
according to the usual doctrine of objectification,
he <u>can never provide</u> data for other actual entities.
This is evident from the fact that data are only
available after the internal existence of the actual entity
has evaporated. (3)

(E) Whitehead, himself, points out that "God
differs from other actual entities in the fact that

(1)   A. N. Whitehead, <u>Process and Reality</u>   p. 136
(2)   Ibid  p. 524
(3)   Cf. Ibid p. 336

Hume's principle, of the derivative character of con-
ceptual feelings, does not hold for him.' (1) That is
to say, God's primordial nature is composed of all
eternal objects; they are everlastingly present. He
does not have to "grope about" seeking _one eternal_
objects, as is the case with ordinary actual entities.

(2) It is to be noted, that while God's primordial
nature remains unchanged, his conceptual nature grows
with the advance of the world. As D. C. Howley points
out, this concept is reminiscent of the repudiated
notion of "substance". (2)

These then are some of the considerations which
lead one to believe that the actual entity, God,
differs radically from other "ordinary" actual
entities, in certain essential characteristics.

However, in justice to Whitehead (granted his
assumptions) these differences can still be expressed
_in terms of_ our own experience (i.e. the experience of
an actual entity), _though such experiences are denied_
_to us._ For example, our knowledge of our specious
present, gives us an idea of what an eternal specious
present would be like, i.e. the continual retention of

(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_   p. 174
(2) Op. Cit.  p. 55 (2)

immediacy and creative advance.

Finally, in all this discussion of God, a in any consideration, one cannot expect a absolute certainty of thought. Clarity is at it indeed only a simplification of what is more profound and fundamental. Whitehead prefers the Platonic attitude, which recognizes the limitations of the intellect, - to the clear erroneous certainty attained by the rationalism of medieval scholasticism.

## Chapter IV

## Some Implications of Whitehead's

## Theory of Reality

There remain certain implications of Whitehead's
cosmology which require discussion at somewhat greater
length than was possible in the preceding sections.

### Actual Entities Are Self-Creative

It must be emphasized that Whitehead's exposition
of the nature of an actual entity, stresses the fact
that all actual entities are self-created. In form-
ulating this doctrine, Whitehead is apparently think-
ing of the way in which a self, in a moment of exper-
ience, builds up the content of its experience (in this
sense itself) by responding in certain ways to the data
which it allows to enter the focus of its attention. (1)
Whatever the basis of this doctrine, Whitehead specif-
ically states that every actual entity is "causa sui".
By this he means that "the process of concrescence is
its own reason for the decision in respect to the
qualitative clothing of feelings." (2) New actual
entities select as data,-phases of other actual entities

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(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Nature and Life  p. 48
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. 135

and eternal objects,- as they see fit. In this sense
novel actual entities are "externally free". However,
any actual entity is "internally determined" by the
subjective form which it has decided to adopt, (i.e. it
is a freely selected determination).

A further point with reference to this "self-
creating subject" character of actual entities must now
be considered. In most philosophical discussions, which
use the term, the "subject" is given the place of prior
importance. It is assumed that the "subject" has
feelings of various sorts (subjective forms) and feels
various things (data). This "substance-attribute" form
of thought is one of the metaphysical blunders which
Whitehead denounces. (1) Consequently we find him
stating his position in constant opposition to the
traditional "substance" theories. "The philosophies
of substance presuppose a subject which then encounters
a datum, and then reacts to the datum. The philosophy
of organism presupposes a datum which is met with
feelings, and progressively attains the unity of a
subject." (2) This same idea is expressed in terms of
feeling: "The feeler is the unity emergent from its
own feelings; and feelings are the details of the

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(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p.viii
(2) Ibid  p. 234

process intermediary between this unity and its many
data." (1) It is to be noted that there is apparently
no _initial center_ of feeling to start with. As elow
"the feeler is the unity emergent from its own feel-
ings." (2) In any case it is clearly evident that
Whitehead would heartily agree with the realists who
repudiate the Kantian doctrine which holds that the
objective world is "a theoretical construct from
purely subjective experience." (3)

Whitehead's discussion of the nature of actual
entities presents a further contrast with other
theories of the nature of reality. It has been claim-
ed that the ultimate reality (or realities) is timeless
_or_ temporal. Rarely or never has it been claimed that
a real entity is _both_ temporal _and_ non-temporal. "Every
actual entity is 'in time' so far as its physical role
is concerned (i.e. the data of the physical prehensions
are temporal; that is to say, they rise and pass away)
and is 'out of time' so far as its mental role is
concerned," (4) (i.e. the data of the mental prehensions
are _eternal_ objects).

Novelty

A recent evaluation of Whitehead's philosophy calls

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_  p. 136
                    Underlining mine.
(2) Ibid  p. 136
(3) Ibid  p. viii
(4) Ibid  p. 380   Parenthetic mine.

attention to what, on the face of it, seems to be a
rather strong criticism, with reference to the problem
of "novelty" (1) If there are no new eternal objects, and
if all eternal objects, in their multiple relationships
are completely visualized in the primordial nature of
God,--how can there be genuine novelty? There is a
further problem: might there not be an exact repro-
duction of a complex fact (past event) in the future?
Realizing that Whitehead does not intend to espouse
such a position, Emmet asks if the problems noted
above, can be avoided, if his premises are accepted.

It is to be noted that, even if one grants that
there is a complete general determination of relation-
ship between eternal objects, that does not imply that
novelty is impossible. In fact such a determinate
relationship is a pre-requisite, if mere undifferen-
tiated chaos is to be avoided. After all, eternal
objects do not impose their forms of definiteness
arbitrarily on developing actual entities. Ultimate
authority and autonomy is vested in the actual entity;
but it is a necessary "condition" for orderly
development (concrescence), that if one possibility is

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(1) Cf. Miss D. M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of
                                               Organism
    Cf. W. E. Hocking,     Proceedings of the Sixth
                                        International Congress of
                                        Philosophy v. 116-

actualized (one form of definiteness assumed by an
actual entity), that other possibilities will be opened
up as relevant or excluded as incompatible. Since each
actual entity (or group of actual entities) is in a
sense absolutely unique, it is quite impossible that
any historic situation could be exactly reproduced.
Each actual entity is influenced by its environment.
In a hundred years (let us say) the environment has
changed. An actual entity in 1957 cannot possibly
reproduce the exact character of an actual entity of
1857.

## The Paradoxical Nature of Actual Entities

There is the paradox that actual entities are
the only real things in the universe; yet an actual
entity "is always in the process of becoming and
perishing and never really is." (1) In other words,
an actual entity is either constituting itself by
taking in data, and is thus not yet a complete or
determined actual entity;--or having reached its final
and complete form it immediately dies (i.e. the glow
of its subjective immediacy ceases) and a whole of it
passes into a new occasion of experience. For example,
my present moment of experience is not yet complete;

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. 116

yet as I write about it, it passes on into a new
experience, and is present, not in all its vivid
immediacy but with some factors eliminated. In this
sense an actual entity is not an enduring entity. It
is either coming or going.

It has been evident, from Whitehead's exposition
of the development of an actual entity, that it requires
a duration or epoch to effect its concrescence. The
self-creation of an actual entity is not instantaneous.

The Relation of the Future to the Present

Whitehead believes that the "Philosophy of Organism"
must have a specific doctrine which deals with the
relation of the present immediate fact to the future.(1)
This is succinctly stated in Adventures of Ideas (2):
"It is now possible to determine the sense in which the
future is immanent in the present. The future is
immanent in the present by reason of the fact that the
present bears in its own essence the relationships
which it will have to the future. It thereby includes
in its essence the necessities to which the future must
conform. The future is there in the present, as a
general fact belonging to the nature of things. It

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas  p. 250
(2) Ibid   p. 250-1

is also there with such general determinations as it
lies in the nature of the particular present to impose
on the particular future which must succeed it. All
this belongs to the essence of the present, and
constitutes the future, as thus determined, an object
for prehension in the subjective immedicy of the
present. In this way each present occasion prehends
the general metaphysical character of the universe,
and thereby it prehends its own share in that character.
Thus the future is to the present as an object for a
subject. It has an objective existence in the present.
But the objective existence of the future in the present
differs from the objective existence of the past in the
present. The various particular occasions of the
past are in existence, and are severally functioning
as objects for prehension in the present. This
individual objective existence of the actual occasions
of the past, each functioning in each present occasion,
constitutes the causal relationship which is efficient
causation. But there are no actual occasions in the
future, already constituted. Thus there are no actual
occasions in the future, to exercise efficient
causation in the present. What is objective in the
present is the necessity of a future of actual

occasions, and the necessity that these future occasions
conform to the conditions laid out in the nature of the
present occasion. The future belongs to the essence of
present fact, and has no actuality other than the
actuality of present fact. But its particular relation-
ships to present fact are already realized in the
nature of present fact." (1)

## The Use of Terms and Extent of Knowledge

For ordinary purposes, the terms: "actual entity",
"event" and "occasion" are regarded as synonymous.
However, the term "occasion" is never applied to God.
In later writings Whitehead tends to use the term "society"
for a "nexus" or group of actual entities. (2)

Whitehead believes that a finite human intellect
cannot expect to have complete knowledge of any actual
entity, because of the intricate interconnections of
each actual entity. These interconnections constitute
facts which must be known if a full knowledge of the
nature and function of an actual entity is to be
attained. It is to be noted that this doctrine does
not mean that in order to know a thing, we must know
all about its most tenuous effects and implications.

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(1) Conclusion of (2) page 127, Thesis
(2) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 113-4;

there is such a thing as finite truth.

Creativity

The construction of Whitehead's use of the
concept "creativity" has been the subject of much
discussion. Whitehead's doctrine at this point may,
for the purposes of this thesis, be expounded by means
of a critical evaluation of the recent exposition
presented by D. Bidney. (1) In Bidney's opinion,
Whitehead "believes that some such entity or process,
change, or becoming is the underlying reality which
serves as the bond of relation between the various
events or occasions which comprise in time the
cosmic process." (2) This interpretation seems to be
based chiefly on a passage in _Science and the Modern
World_: "In the analogy with Spinoza, his one substance
is for me the one underlying activity of realisation
individualising itself in an interlocked plurality of
modes. Thus, concrete fact is process. Its primary
analysis is into underlying activity of prehension,
and into realised prehensive events." (3) Bidney also
refers to the statement in _Process and Reality_: "The
philosophy of organism is closely allied to Spinoza's

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(1) D. Bidney, "The Problem of Substance in Spinoza and
     Whitehead", _Philosophical Review_
     November 1936
(2) Ibid  p. 585
(3) A. N. Whitehead, _Science and the Modern World_  p. 67

scale of thought. But it differs by the abandonment
of the subject-predicate form of thought------------
morphological description is replaced by description
of dynamic process." (1)

It is true that an examination of the two passages
which Kidney mentions, might be expected to lead one to
suppose that Whitehead was essaying a linguistic
monism. However, reference to many other statements,
chiefly in Process and Reality and Adventures of Ideas,
as well as an examination of the general tendency of his
work- seems to indicate the fallaciousness of this
interpretation.

In Process and Reality, Whitehead, discussing the
"Category of the Ultimate", refers to "creativity" as
"the universal of universals characterising ultimate
matter of fact." (2) Thus in broadly Platonic
language, "creativity" is an "idea" (essence or form)
which is exemplified (present) in matters of fact
(i.e. particular actual entities). Conversely, the
creative process, whereby one actual entity appropriates
data provided by other actual entities, and so con-
stitutes itself,-is an exemplification of the "idea"-
"creativity".

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. 10
(2) Ibid  p. 71

That creativity (process, passage or activity) is not "one fundamental substrate of which all things are modes" (1),(2), is indicated by reference to Adventures of Ideas: "Each event, viewed in its own true individuality, is a passage between two ideal termini, namely, its components in their ideal disjunctive diversity passing into these same components in their concrete togetherness ...... ...there is nothing in the universe other than just ages of this passage (i.e. actual entities) and components of these instances." (3) In short, there is no creativity apart from actual entities. Creativity is a process of interaction (passage) between and constitutive of actual entities. "The creativity is not an external agency with its own ulterior purposes. All actual entities share with God this characteristic of self-causation." (4)

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(1) Cf. Pidney op. cit. (p. 119 (1)) p. 163
(2) It is interesting to find other philosophers holding the same sort of statement. For example: ... Taylor, Commentary on Plato's Timaeus. ...... not it to : "Creativity itself is simply pure, formless 'activity" which has in urge "towards the individualization of itself into many actualities, which 'are called 'creatures' and towards the growing together of these creatures into new unities." (D. . Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism p. 75. Underlining mine.) N.P.Stallknecht seems to hold a similar notion: "In esthetic creativity, which is for Whitehead the substantial stuff of things, eternal objects are united and particular things, creatures, emerge. (N.P.Stallknecht, Studies in the Philosophy of Creation p. 130. Underlining mine.)
(3) p. 505 Brackets and underlining mine.
(4) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 339

Indeed, this fact is indicated in one of the
quotations on which Bidney draws and which Bidney's
'modes' may become the discernment. Bidney... ...one of
of them does not lead us to any hidden truth of real-
ity." (1) This statement stands in Bidney contrast
to Bidney's interpretation of Whitehead's position:
"He believes that to each entity ... process, change
or becoming is the ultimate reality." (2) As a matter of
fact, Bidney in expounding Whitehead's position, cannot
legitimately apply the term "entity" to "process".
"The general activity is not an entity in the sense in
which occasions and eternal objects are entities." (3)
"Apart from the experience of subjects (actual entities)
there is nothing, nothing, bare nothingness." (4)

It is further clear that Whitehead was not forced
to posit some underlying substratum to account for
"the bond of relation between various events." (5) He
states: "the process, or concrescence, of any one
actual entity involves the other actual entities among
its components. In this way the obvious solidarity of
the world receives its explanation." (6)

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 19
          Underlining mine.
(2) Cf. Bidney op. cit. (p. 110 (2))
(3) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World p. 70
(4) Ibid (1)  p. 254
          Brackets mine.
(5) Ibid  (2)
(6) Ibid  (1)

It may be said with reference to this attempted correction of Lidney's interpretation of Whitehead's position; granted that there are passages in his (Whitehead's) works which support the view that "creativity" is not an entity or an ultimate substrate, how can one deal with the passages which Lidney has quoted? There are, for example, the following: "In the analogy with Spinoza, his one substance is for me the one underlying activity of realisation, individualising itself in an interlocked plurality of modes. ------Each event is an individual matter of fact issuing from an individualisation of the substrate activity." (1) There is also the statement: "The philosophy of organism is closely allied to Spinoza's scheme of thought." (2)

Indeed, it seems that if these are to be taken literally, and as quoted, they imply that "creativity" is to be regarded as an "ultimate substrate" It would appear, then, that Whitehead thinks of "creativity" in two distinct and contrary senses. However, I believe that this conclusion can be denied on the basis of a more careful examination of the passages in question.

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Science and the Modern World_  p.87-8
(2) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_   p. 9

In _Process and Reality_ the problem of creativity
is discussed in a more thoroughgoing fashion, than in
_Science and the Modern World_. I shall refer to the
passage quoted from the former, first. Whitehead is
discussing the "incoherence" which certain philosophies
manifest. That of Descartes, who posits two (perhaps
three) substances when by definition there can be only
one, is cited as an example. Whitehead notes, with
approval, Spinoza's reference to one Substance only.
Like Spinoza, Whitehead posits only one sort of
metaphysical entity; but this is as far as the simila-
rity goes. The one real Substance, of Spinoza, is
replaced, in the thought of Whitehead, by many, real,
dynamic actual entities (each of which exemplifies the
universal of universals, "creativity"). "The 'modes'
now become the sheer actualities---analysis of them
does not lead us to the discovery of any higher grade
of reality." (1)

With this, and the preceding discussion in mind,
I think that it is possible to grasp the meaning of the
debatable passage in _Science and the Modern World_. For
Spinoza, the ultimate real is the one Substance, God.

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_  p. 10

For Whitehead, the ultimate real things are actual
entities. When Whitehead speaks of "each event as an
individual matter of fact arising from an individual-
isation of the substrate activity" (1) (creativity) and
states that creativity is a 'character which underlies
all occasion" (2), he apparently means that the universal
(essence, principle) "creativity" is exemplified
(manifest, present) in particular actual entities (i.e.
in the process whereby actual entities are objectified
in each other, in the act of self-creation).

Another apparently troublesome phrase---referring
to all actual entities as "the ultimate creatures
derivative from the creative process" (3), on examination
is seen to imply Whitehead's basic doctrine that actual
entities are "causa sui". That is to say, the creative
process referred to is the process by which an actual
entity creates itself.

Unfortunately Bidney (4) and Miss Emmet seem to
think that "creativity---produces as a primordial fact
an ordering of possibilities." (5) In justice to Miss
Emmet it must be noted that she is not entirely satis-
fied with this explanation. She wonders if the

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World  p.69
(2) Ibid  p. 240
(3) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality   p. 124
            Underlining mine.
(4) Op. cit. ( p.110 (3))
(5) Miss D. M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism
            p. 273; 116  Underlining mine.

distinction between creativity and its creatures may not be a logical one. She considers the possibility that "creativity and the Primordial Nature of God are complementary sides of the same thing." (1) However, in any case, Miss Emmet apparently misses the point that "creativity" as such, is not a distinct entity, but rather is a characteristic (eternal object) exemplified in all actual entities. Apart from actual entities there is no actual creativity. Actual entities are creatures of creativity only in the sense that they create themselves by self-creative action.

This discussion should serve to clarify the problems presented to D. C. Moxley (2) by the relationship of "creativity" to God. Moxley asks: how can Whitehead consistently say that: (A) "creativity" is a universal (eternal object); (B) apart from God any eternal object is "indistinguishable from non-entity"; yet (C) God is a creature of creativity. These apparent paradoxes can be solved by bearing in mind the fact that the term "creativity" is applied to "creativity as essence" (in this sense creativity is the universal of universals) and to "creativity" as exemplified in

(1) Miss D. M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, p. 252

(2) D. C. Moxley, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1934-1935   p. 168

the self-creative process of an actual entity. The
phrase which refers to God as a 'creature of creativity'
is using the term "creativity" in this second sense.
That is to say, God is the "creature" or outcome of his
own self-directed process of self-creation.

We find Stallknecht wrestling with the same problem.
He states: "God is not creativity. He is the unity of
uncreated value, immanent in creativity." (1) Strictly
speaking, Whitehead means to say that God is as much
"creativity" as any other actual entity. In other words,
in his self-creative activity God exemplifies the eternal
object "creativity" as much as any other actual entity.
Also, it should be realized that God cannot be
adequately designated as "a unity of uncreated value".
Such a view of God disregards his consequent nature
entirely.

Moxley calls attention to the problems created by
Whitehead's comparison of "creativity" and Aristotelian
matter. (2) ("Creativity is another rendering of
Aristotelian matter." (3)) That creativity is not to
be thought of as a passively receptive substratum, is
explicitly indicated by Whitehead: "It (creativity)

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(1) N. N. Stallknecht, Studies in the Philosophy of
                    Creation  p. 177
(2) Cf. Moxley, op. cit. (p. 117 (4)) p. 169
(3) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. 46

is divested of the notion of passive receptivity, either of 'form', or of external relations." (1)  The only point they have in common is the general characteristic that each is without character of its own in the concrete sense.  In other words, as an essence or eternal object, "creativity" has a distinct meaning; but this essence has, of course, no particular concrete character until it is actualized in some actual entity or other.  In this sense it is "without a character of its own'.

A further confusion is likely to arise unless one notes carefully, another slightly different usage of the term"creativity".  Whitehead sometimes refers to "God and the actual world jointly constituting the character of creativity for the initial phase of the novel concrescence." (2)  By "character of creativity', in this case, Whitehead apparently means that God and the actual world provide the data which are used in the concrete process of self-creativity by which a new actual entity arises.  In a short discussion of creativity in Adventures of Ideas, he states: "this factor of activity (the actual world relative to that 'new' occasion) is what I have called 'creativity'."(3)

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality   p. 46
              Brackets mine.
(2) Ibid  p. 374     Underlining mine.
(3) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas   p.130
              Brackets mine.

Here again, data used in the creative process are called "creativity".

The problems relating to the temporal origin of the universe and the relative importance of the various beings and things which appear in it, have provided the basis for much cosmological discussion. Whitehead's approach is refreshingly sound. Basing his position on an appeal to the experience of men, and refusing to indulge in flights of fancy, beyond the limits of experience, Whitehead states that there is no sense in talking about the temporal beginning of the universe. He believes that metaphysicians should concentrate on the entities, factors and processes at present operative in the world and forget events which by their nature are beyond our possible experience and understanding. As he aptly expresses it: "There was no "first day"(1) of creation." The self-creative process of actual entities is <u>now</u> going on, and will probably continue to do so in the future.

In Whitehead's opinion, as far as we know,--<u>the metaphysical situation has always been as it is now</u>: actual entities, including God (with both primordial and consequent natures) and eternal objects, interacting

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(1) A. N . Whitehead in conversation.

creatively in the process whereby new actual entities
arise through their own self-creation.

The fact that God's consequent nature is mentioned
last in _Process and Reality_, does not mean that for a
long time God's primordial nature was deprived of his
consequent nature and that it only arose after actual
entities created themselves. All these factors are not
temporal emergents but distinguishable phases which are
ever present.

Whitehead also handles the problem of the priority
of "being" or "things" or "persons" in a unique way.
Instead of following the common custom of regarding
God as pre-eminently real, and all other actual entities
(things or persons) as the creation of his will or
intellect, enjoying lesser reality, if any at all,—
Whitehead frequently stresses the fact that God and the
other actual entities are mutually complementary.
Without each other, they are not themselves; nor (as
has been noted) does God confer reality on any actual
entity. Each actual entity is its own self-creative
agent. God provides data for any actual entity and any
actual entity provides data for God. God's only claim
to primacy lies in his function of providing for the
relevance of eternal objects. Thus God is brought to

the same level, as far as actuality or reality is concerned, as any other actual entity. Whitehead thus denies the claim of Augustine and Aquinas that the more important is the more real or actual.

This discussion also throws light on another problem raised in a recent criticism by Bidney. It is the question as to the relation between "potentiality" and "actuality". In Bidney's opinion, Whitehead, like Bergson and Alexander, starts with an "ultimate substrate (which) is indeterminate potentiality or feeling lacking any natural powers and characteristics," (1) and is faced with the problem of accounting for the origin of change and the differentiation into finite nodes. The utter fallacy of this interpretation will be evident by reference to the preceding paragraph. It is based on Bidney's mistaken notion that "creativity" is a substrate from which temporally emerge,- God's primordial nature, other actual entities and finally God's consequent nature.

In addition, Whitehead's emphasis on the 'ontological principle' shows most unmistakably that there is no potentiality apart from actuality. "Every condition to

(1) Cf. Bidney op.cit. (p. 110 (1)) p. 587

which the process of becoming conforms in any particular
instance, has reason either in the character of some
actual entity in the actual world of that concrescence,
or in the character of the subject which is in process
of concrescence." (1)

For Whitehead, "potentiality" is not an "indetermi-
ate flux of feeling". It is both: "(a) the 'general'
potentiality, which is the bundle of possibilities,
mutually consistent or alternative, provided by the
multiplicity of eternal objects, and (b) the 'real'
potentiality which is conditioned by the data provided
by the actual world." (2)

## Purpose    Design

With reference to the presence of "purpose" or
"design" in the universe, Whitehead states that it is
the supreme task of the creative process (as it manifests
itself in actual entities) to transform "disjointed
multiplicity, with its diversities in opposition,
into concrescent unity, with its diversities in con-
trast." (3)  There is a similar reference to "the
complete adjustment of the immediacy of joy and suffer-
ing" (4) as being the final end of creation.  The same
point is made by Whitehead in discussing the subjective

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality   p. 76
(2) Ibid  p. 102      Underlining mine.
(3) Ibid  p. 528
(4) Ibid  p. 530

sin of God. It is of course evident that God himself
has no absolute power to bring this purpose to final
realization, except in his own experience. Outside of
God's immediate life, the battle rages. The warring
factions of actual entities fight on. There is no
peace for an actual entity until the fight is over,
peace in the everlasting experience of God. Once
again it must be noted that each actual entity is its
own final cause. "The 'subjective aim' at 'satisfaction'
constitutes the final cause, or lure, whereby there is
determinate concrescence." (1)

It is therefore evident that Whitehead's philosophy
does not support the traditional postulate that there
is an ultimate structure or order manifest in all
experience, which is the result of God's purposive
agency in promoting an all-inclusive and final end.
The so-called "laws of nature" are descriptions of the
dominant characteristics of dominant societies of
actual entities. "The laws only come into being by
reason of the analogous characters of the members of
the society (group)." (2) It is to be further noted
that "a system of 'laws'----gradually rises into

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality   p. 124
(2) Ibid  p. 139    Brackets mine.

In order to understand Whitehead's theory of 'time'
one must recall his doctrine of the 'concrescence' of
an actual entity.  In this process, the actual entity
prehends data from God's consequent nature and from
other actual entities of the actual world.  This actual
world is a provider of so-called "real" potentialities.
It is also referred to as the 'extensive continuum'
which is atomized by the emergence of a new actuality.
The process of concretion by which an actual entity
creates itself, exemplifies what Whitehead calls
"epochal" time.  That is to say, within the duration
or epoch required for the growth of an actual entity,
there are no hard and fast distinctions between
supposedly absolutely discrete moments of time, as in
the usual theory of "physical" time.  "The actual
entity is the enjoyment of a certain quantum of
physical time.  But the genetic process is not the
temporal succession; such a view is exactly what is
denied by the epochal theory of time.  Each phase in
the genetic process presupposes the entire quantum."(1)
Thus, while an actual entity may prehend a temporal
succession of events which are <u>apparently</u> absolutely

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_   p. 434

discrete (for Whitehead the absolute separateness of
moments of physical time is only an abstraction,
achieved by co-ordinate analysis) it does so, not as
discrete elements, but in the mode of a genuine and
ultimate interconnectedness within its own life.  In
the same sense an actual entity spreads out over an
extensive spatial region.  This region provides "the
determinate basis which the concrescence presupposes,"(1)
(i.e. from which it derives its "real" potentiality. )

As was noted above, Whitehead refers to the
"atomization of the extensive continuum" by new actual
entities, "thereby make (ing) real that was ante-
cedently merely potential." (2)  By this he apparently
means that the "potentiality" (real) constituted by the
nexus of actual entities (which is the extensive
continuum) is used by the novel actual entity, which
by its appearance as a new unit, thereby, in a sense,
atomizes the extensive continuum.

## Freedom

One of the most unjustified criticism of Whitehead's
cosmology is that advanced by H.W. Moore, who claims that
since the universe is an organism, therefore, there is

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. 474
(2) Ibid  p. 112    Brackets mine.

no room for contingency.* In the previous discussion of
actual entities, it was noted that the basic character-
istic of an actual entity is that it is "causa sui".
The process of concrescence is its own reason. "It
is finally responsible for the decision by which any
lure for feeling is admitted to efficiency." (1) No
datum, actual or possible, can force itself into the
experience of an actual entity. There are efficient
and final causes at work in the world but these effic-
ient and final causes are found not in one supreme
actual entity (God) but in all actual entities. Thus
each actual entity is autonomous in that it is free to
select from the data provided, in whatever possible
way it sees fit. It is to be realized, of course, that
an actual entity cannot "conjure up" data which are
not available. In the sense that an actual entity
can only use data available and react to it in certain
determined possible ways (though there is a wide range
of choice)--it is limited and conditioned by that data.
"There is no such fact as absolute freedom; every
actual entity possesses only such freedom, as is
inherent in the primary phase 'given' by its stand-
point of relativity to its actual universe." (2) All

* Cf. E.M. Moore, "Mr. Whitehead's Philosophy"
                    Philosophical Review  1931,  p.46.
(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality       p.135
(2) Ibid  p. 202

this must be born in mind when one reads Whitehead's
statement:  "the _freedom_ inherent in the universe is
constituted by this element of self-causation (of actual
entities)." (1)

With reference to this general problem, it is
necessary to consider Whitehead's provocative theory
of the "complete contemporary freedom" of actual
entities.  The situation in which complete contemporary
freedom is manifested, arises when two (or more)
entities are _not_ in a direct relation of efficient
causation (i.e. do not immediately physically prehend
each other).  To some critics this seems impossible
because of Whitehead's avowal that all actual entities
prehend each other.  Yet, on the basis of Whitehead's
metaphysics, this doctrine is perfectly reasonable,
when it is remembered that if actual entity "A" is to
be objectified in actual entity "B", actual entity "A"
must be "_past_" with reference to actual entity "B",-
past and gone, otherwise no data would be available
for a physical prehension.  It is therefore impossible,
on the basis of Whitehead's system, for two actual
entities which are contemporary, i.e. each _in the_
_process_ of self-creation, to provide data for each other.

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_  p. 135
                     Underlining and brackets mine.

the general sort of criticism which is usually
advanced against Whitehead's position at this point,
has been noted: "The unqualified inclusiveness of
prehension (always excepting universals in relation to
particulars, and earlier in relation to later events
in time) is required by his system as a whole.' (1)
That is to say, contemporaries cannot be excluded from
the bonds of direct prehension.

Hartshorne further holds that "external relations'
(in the sense of contemporary freedom-designed to retain
the autonomy of actual entities) between co-existent
monads would destroy their individuality and bring
upon us "Bradley's vicious regress of relations between
things and their relations." (2)

In opposition to this objection, it is to be
noted that actual entities are not enduring monads.
They "never really are"; for at any moment an actual
entity is either creating itself or passing away.
They don't "sit about" in completed perfection. The
very nature of Whitehead's system, as has been noted,
requires that contemporary actual entities do not have
direct causal relations, indeed they cannot. This does

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(1) C. Hartshorne, "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's
            Philosophy"  Philosophical Review
                           July, 1935  p. 324

(2) Ibid   p. 324

not mean that actual entities are exposed to the 'Bradley' refutation. Each actual entity is related to its past and makes a contribution to the future. In this sense the unity or wholeness of the universe is maintained. Indeed as Whitehead points out: "Indirectly, via the immanence of the past and the immanence of the future, (even) the (contemporary) occasions are connected." (1)

This discussion provides an answer to the problem raised by C. W. Morris. (2) He states: "It would appear, then, that----------some actual entities and some eternal objects are not prehended by any particular actual entity." It is true that so-called "contemporary actual entities, cannot and do not directly prehend each other, because in literal truth they are not yet actual entities in the full sense of the term. Since they have not reached the superject stage, they cannot provide data. Yet in a genuine sense all actual entities do make a contribution to each other,-as they pass on. Morris seems to claim that because "givenness' (objectification) implies elimination and exclusion, therefore not all actual entities are related to each

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas   p. 198
             Prospects nine.
(2) C. W. Morris, Six Theories of Mind    p. 188

other. He overlooks the fact that what is eliminated is some non-essential phase from the new subject's point of view of every actual entity in the world, in a process whereby allowing for "degrees of relevance ------ every actual entity is present in every other actual entity." (1)

The quotation (referred to by Morris): "What is 'given' might not have been 'given'; and that what is not 'given' might have been 'given'," (2) refers not to the objectification of actual entities but to eternal objects. It is simply a restatement of the familiar doctrine that any eternal object is "neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression in any particular actual entity of the temporal world." (3) (As to the nature of the bond provided by a negative prehension, which in the eyes of many critics is a complete lack of connection, see previous discussion of negative prehensions (4))

Finally, it is to be noted that in Whitehead's philosophy, the freedom of "contemporary" or any other actual entities does not depend on whether or not data come from a certain source, but the inalienable freedom

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 70
(2) Ibid p. 70
(3) Ibid p. 70
(4) Cf. Thesis p. 28-32

of each actual entity is constituted, ultimately, by its internal power of self-creativity. Its power to choose its own subjective aim and actualise it.

## Internal and External Relations

Concerning "relations" Whitehead states: "It is evident that if the solidarity of the physical world is to be relevant to the description of its individual actualities, it can only be by reason of the fundamental internality of the relationships in question. On the other hand, if the individual discreteness of the actualities is to have its weight, there must be an aspect in these relationships from which they can be conceived as external, that is, as bonds between divided things." (1)

All actualities are positively prehended, directly or indirectly, by various different processes of objectification (i.e. the data prehended are different). All eternal objects are either positively or negatively prehended (in either case there is a genuine contribution to the new actual entity). It would seem, therefore, that all actual entities have internal relations to all other actual entities. However, as has been reiterated, an actual entity is

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_, p. 470-1

not entirely determined or constituted by these internal
relationships. The essential self-hood of any actual
entity lies in the fact that it is an autonomous center
of life. It feels all these other actual entities, as
it sees fit, in a unique and individual fashion (with-
in certain wide possibilities of experience). In this
sense any actual entity is genuinely "other" as far as
every other actual entity is concerned; other in the
sense of an independent center of life, which communi-
cates from outside.

Whitehead is able to formulate this theory of
internal and external relations because he refuses to
accept the usual alternatives. It is customary to say,
with Bradley or Hegel, that if relations are internal,
if finite things are genuinely related to each other,-
this can only be explained in terms of their inclusion
in a whole (as phases of one "experience" or the
logical species of so-called "concrete" universal) in
such a way that their essential individuality is lost.
Failing this, finite persons or things are regarded as
hopelessly sundered from each other, without the
slightest possibility of interconnection.

As long as the category of "substance" was
accepted, explicitly or implicitly, this was a genuine

difficulty. A substance, by definition being self-sufficient, could not interact with anything else. Whitehead's denial of substance, and his description of an actual entity as constituting itself by its relations with other actual entities (while remaining an autonomous center of life) provide for an internally related plurality of reals.

## Relations

There is no "problem" of relations for Whitehead. The pseudo-problem so aptly stated by Bradley, was based on a false analysis of experience and a clever exercise in logic chopping. (1) It is an empirically observable fact that autonomous actual entities are mutually inter-related. Relations relate. There is no need to (a) bring in an absolute thinker, before whose timeless gaze all things are present as a related system of content; (b) equally unnecessary is a reference to a unity of "experience" with apparent differences. Whitehead's justification of pluralism and his repudiation of monism, in various forms has been discussed at length. (2)

It is very interesting to note that Whitehead provides a theory of "internal relations" which is more thoroughgoing than that presented by most

(1) Cf. Thesis      p. 86
(2) Ibid          p.86-93; 102-106; 133-139; 110-123

idealistic philosophers.

The idealistic doctrine of internal relations may
be stated: "Everything is present to everything else,
in one vast instantaneous co-implicated completeness.---
Nothing can in any sense, functional or substantial, be
really absent from anything else, all things inter-
penetrate and telescope together in the great total
complex." (1)  The whole in which the parts are co-
present may be the timeless experience of the "great
thinker", "the unity of feeling" ("experience"), "the
ultimate logical essence" from which lower (in the
hierarchy) essences are deducible, yet always logically
present as implied.  In all these cases, since genuine
particularity is denied, and the sole ultimate reality
of the "one" is stressed, the only way in which
particulars could be related is as elements in the
inclusive whole.  Since each particular is what it is
because of the Absolute, it naturally, cannot be what
it is without a necessary relationship and reference to
all the other "particulars" (so-called), of similar
"apparent" status, which are phases of the Absolute.
In this sense then, any particular is internally

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(1) William James, <u>A Pluralistic Universe</u>   p. 82

related to any other particular. It is to be noted that
the particulars in question have no "say" in the matter.
They are in no way, as such, responsible for their so-
called internal (or more exactly, imposed and necess-
ary placement in degrees of adjacency to other particu-
lars) relationships.

In Whitehead's philosophy the situation is different.
In so far as there is an internal relationship, it is
due to the mutual interaction of the particulars
concerned. It is a genuine internal relationship; not
an imposed arrangement of puppet content in one Absolute
experience. Thus Whitehead is able to do justice to
the types of "internal relations" designated: " a
relation essential to its terms"; "some kind of genuine
unity between its terms". His position also explains
how "relations can be grounded in the nature of the
terms" and how "relations make a difference in the
terms".

Even in the case of philosophers who are willing to
give a place to "external relations" (1), the fact of
internal relations is not explained primarily by
reference to the mutual interaction of actual entities.

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(1) W. E. Hocking, Types of Philosophy  p. 368

Interest is centered on the supposed presence of an
"enveloping field" (the Absolute again) or the fact
that one term logically involves another. (Here is the
old fallacy of confusing logical essence with actual
existence.)

The familiar form of the doctrine of internal
relations, used by idealists who are epistemologically
inclined, is free, in one sense, from the foregoing
criticism. One term is _active_, i.e. the subject is
responsible for the appearance of the object (esse
est percipi). However, it is evident that this is not
a genuine internal relationship between two terms.
Within the frame work of the suppositions involved,
the being of the object depends on the act of the per-
ceiving subject. In short, the relationship is
asymmetrical. The object is not active in the process.
It is not a real entity in active inter-relationship
with another real entity.

It might be objected, in opposition to Whitehead,
that if the "terms" happen to be logical essences, they
can be externally related (by logical implication)
without all the paraphernalia of living centers of self-
creative process, mutuallyinteracting. While this is
true (since logical essences are not actual entities)

Whitehead would point out that ultimately the fact that
eternal objects are linked, internally by logical
implication (relational essence), is due to the activity
of God's primordial nature. He arranges the otherwise
unsorted mass of pure potentialities.

## Organism

Whitehead's philosophy is termed the "philosophy
of organism". It is both interesting and important to
discover exactly what he means by "organism". Whitehead
summarizes his use of the term thus: "The community of
actual things is an organism; but it is not a static
organism. It is an incompletion in process of product-
ion. Thus the expansion of the universe in respect to
actual things is the first meaning of 'process'; and
the universe in any stage of its expansion is the
first meaning of 'organism'. In this sense, an
organism is a nexus.--------Secondly, each actual entity
is itself only describable as an organic process. It
repeats in microcosm what the universe is in macrocosm.
It is a process proceeding from phase to phase, each
phase being the real basis from which its successor
proceeds towards the completion of the thing in question."
(1)  In brief, the term "organism" is applied both to an

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_  p. 327
Underlining mine.

actual entity, and the inter-related group of actual entities which form a _nexus_.

Value (positive)

Concerning the nature of "value", Whitehead states: "'Value' is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event -------Realisation therefore is in itself the attainment of value --------Value is the outcome of limitation." (1) Whitehead hastens to indicate that all this is true only if reference is also made to a "standard of value". (One of the chief arguments for the existence of God's primordial nature was that a standard of value must be provided.) More particularly, Whitehead is saying that value is actualised in the experience of an actual entity when it guides its experiences in accordance with a _certain_ sort of subjective aim, derived from God. In a valuable life (of an actual entity), certain characteristics are evident: (A) There is an enjoyment of the past, though the actual entity must not find its final satisfaction there, otherwise it will become inert. (B) The actual entity must enjoy its full character, which is its own immediate self-creation reaching out to one of the

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Science and the Modern World_, p. 116

conditioning factors of the future. Thus, in so far as an actual entity exercises its function as an autonomous being actualizing its prehended subjective aim, eliminating all things irrelevant to the realization of that experience enlarging aim, and thus providing rich new data for other actual entities,---to this extent an actual entity is valuable.

It is evident that by "value" Whitehead means, more exactly, positive value. Also, apparently the terms "value" and "good" are to be used synonymously. Thus: "Its (an actual entities') _good_ resides in the _realization_ of a strength of many feelings fortifying each other as they meet in the novel unity (entity)." (1)

Evil

In the preceding discussion of God's consequent nature it was noted that evil "lies in the fact that the past fades, that time is a 'perpetual perishing'."(2) This situation goes back ultimately to the fact that the "characters of things are mutually obstructive. Thus the depths of life require a process of selection." (and elimination) (3) Each actual entity strives to realize its unique satisfaction. This produces that

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Adventures of Ideas_ p. 355
Brackets and underlining mine.
(2) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_ p. 517
(3) Ibid p. 517 Brackets mine.

discordance between actual entities (and in actual
entities) which is responsible for evil. The fact of
evil is due to the autonomy of actual entities. It is
a necessary component of the metaphysical situation.
Even in the experience of God, as was noted, evil
remains as a recognizable element. It does not lose
its character of brute fact in some aesthetic harmony,-
beyond good and evil.

## Identity and Permanence

Considerable discussion has arisen concerning
Whitehead's treatment of the problems of: "identity",
"permanence", "abstraction" and "potentiality". An
apparent vacillation has been discovered, and
emphasized by several critics. (1) For example, Hall
points out that in Whitehead's earlier writings,
Concept of Nature and Principles of Natural Knowledge,
the enduring permanent things were eternal objects.
Events perish and are devoid of potentiality. Eternal
objects only are potentialities. The exclusive
universality and abstractness of eternal objects is
also evident. In later books (e.g. Process and Reality),
his critics claim, Whitehead discusses the "identity"

(1) Cf. E. W. Hall, Journal of Philosophy    1930
    Cf. Miss Stebbings, Mind    1930
    Cf. Miss D.M.Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism
        p. 128

and "permanence", of a personal society, in terms of the objectification of data from one actual entity to another.* A sort of "universality" is provided by a more or less permanent background (of societies) for the activities of a new actual entity. Every actual entity is now designated as a "potential" for some other actual entity. Data are regarded as "abstractions" (from the complete being of the actual entity of which they are a part).

As a result of this survey, Hall states: since "all characteristics supposedly peculiar to eternal objects are shared by actual entities, why not dispense with eternal objects altogether." (1) The absurdity of such a suggestion should be rather obvious. It is not simply a fact to be recognized and accepted, that the "identity" manifest by an eternal object is a different sort of "identity" than that manifest (or exemplified) by a "personal" society of actual entities. (2) It is not simply the case that the "essence" (eternal object) "identity" is exemplified in two different types of entity,-i.e. eternal objects and societies of actual

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* In addition to this, "permanence", in another sense, is provided for in that some phase (datum, feeling) of a past actual entity, is preserved, with undiminished lustre in the experience of a novel actual entity.
(1) E. W. Hall, "Of What Use Are Whitehead's Eternal
        Objects." Journal of Philosophy 1930
        p. 36
(2) Or data transferred from one actual entity to another.

entities.  It is then ridiculous to say, that because
societies of actual entities exemplify "identity",
therefore, eternal objects are not required as exempl-
ifications of it.  In actual experience it is found
that both eternal objects and actual entities, manifest
the essence "identity".

## Philosophy of Organism and "Substance" Theories Contrasted

In several scattered passages, Whitehead very aptly
summarizes the points of difference between his philosophy
of organism and the traditional doctrine of "substance".
"The organic philosophy interprets experience as meaning
the 'self-enjoyment of being one among many, and of
being one arising out of the composition of the many'.
Descartes interprets experiences as meaning the self-
enjoyment, by an individual substance, of its qualifi-
cation by ideas." (1)  "The operations of an organism
are directed towards the organism as a 'superject',
and not directed from the organism as a 'subject'." (2)
In short, "The unchanging subject of change is completely
abandoned." (3)  "The ancient doctrine that 'no one
crosses the same river twice' is extended.  No thinker
thinks twice,----no subject experiences twice." (4)

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality   p. 220
(2) Ibid  p. 228
(3) Ibid  p. 43
(4) Ibid  p. 43

This point of view is of course concomitant with recent trends in physics, in which static stuff is replaced by fluent energy. Yet, "such energy has its <u>structure</u> of action and flow, and is inconceivable apart from such structure." (1)

The positive side of Whitehead's position is expounded in the "subjectivistic principle" which states that "the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of the experience of subjects." (2) "Apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness." (3) Whitehead hastens to point out that his stress on "subjectivism" does not expose him to the usual objections. His theory avoids the "solipsism of the present moment", by stressing the fact that an ego (actual entity) feels the <u>body</u> as functioning. It also feels the <u>world</u>, as past. (4)

In opposition to Hume's atomism of impressions, Whitehead claims that we have a direct intuition of "inheritance" from the past (memory). Hence, we have a direct intuition of "<u>causation</u>". (5) Both Hume and

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, <u>Process and Reality</u>   p. 471
                        Underlining mine.
(2) Ibid  p. 252
(3) Ibid  p. 254
(4) Ibid  p. 125
(5) It is to be noted that this is not 'causation' in the old sense of a mysterious interaction between "distinct" substances which by definition, could not possibly interact.

Descartes are involved in the "fallacy of simple location". Individual independence of successive temporal locations, makes it necessary to bring in an external "deus ex machina" to explain endurance and repetition, or else it is left as an unsolved mystery. (1) In Whitehead's opinion, "The actual entity, in virtue of being <u>what</u> it is, is also <u>where</u> it is. It is somewhere because it is some actual thing with its correlated actual world. This is the direct denial of the Cartesian doctrine --'an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist'. It is also inconsistent with Aristotle's phrase, 'neither asserted of a subject, nor present in a subject'." (2)

This "reformed subjectivism" corrects the two great mistakes of the "substance" philosophy: "<u>One</u> is the concept of vacuous actuality, void of subjective experience; and the <u>other</u> is the concept of quality inherent in substance." (3) (In their proper character, as high abstractions, both of these notions are of the utmost pragmatic use.)

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(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, <u>Process and Reality</u>  p. 207
(2) Ibid   p. 93
(3) Ibid   p. 253

Feelings ------ Whitehead A Panpsychist

In the interests of clarity, an apparent dual (1)
use, by Whitehead, of the term "feeling" must now be
noted. In Whitehead's doctrine of "positive" pre-
hensions, the terms "prehension" and "feeling" are
seemingly synonymous. "Each actual entity is con-
ceived as an act of experience arising out of data.
It is a process of '<u>feeling</u>' (prehending) the many
data, so as to absorb them into the unity of one
individual 'satisfaction'." (2)

However, the term"feeling" is also used in the
<u>substantive</u> sense, and applied to the datum which is
"absorbed into the subjective satisfaction." (3) Thus
Whitehead states: "The objective datum is another
<u>feeling</u> entertained by the latter actual entity." (4)
Indeed the whole discussion of positive prehension is
based on a continued reference to the transfer of
feelings or "throbs of emotional energy". (5) In short,

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(1) Cf. Thesis p. 177 for a triple use of the term
"feeling". On closer examination however, it will be
seen that they can be reduced to two: 1. <u>data</u> or
2. <u>prehensive process</u>. (i.e. the (a) <u>act</u> as such or the
(b) <u>quality</u> (subjective form) manifested)
(2) A. N. Whitehead, <u>Process and Reality</u> p. 65
                               Brackets and underlining mine.
(3) Ibid p. 82
(4) Ibid p. 361      Underlining mine.
(5) Ibid p. 178

here is the familiar distinction between <u>act</u> and <u>content</u> (object). An actual entity feels (act) a feeling (content), but what is felt (the feeling) is not necessarily an act (though it may be). For example, there is a difference between the feeling (that which is felt) anger, and the <u>act</u> of feeling it.

The exact <u>metaphysical nature</u> of all <u>data</u> prehended--ultimately of all things in the world--must now be noted. It is Whitehead's opinion that "sensa" must be designated as "feelings" (i.e. that which is apprehended as concrete content, of whatever sort, is always called a feeling). Sensa are <u>qualifications of affective tone</u>. "Sensa are the definiteness of emotion: they are emotional forms." (1)

In the case of smell, for example: "Our developed consciousness fastens on the sensum as datum: our basic animal experience entertains it as a type of subjective feeling. The experience starts as that smelly feeling, and is developed by mentality into the feeling of that smell." (2) A similar expression of the same general idea is the following: the red patch we see in the external world, is veridically there,

(1) A. N. Whitehead, <u>Process and Reality</u> p. 174
(2) A. N. Whitehead, <u>Adventures of Ideas</u> p. 315

only if it qualifies the affective tones of the
actualities which in fact make up that region. (1)

It is evident that Whitehead is prepared to describe
the "external world of things", in terms analogous to
those used in describing our own inmost, so-called,
psychic experience.  His justification for this
procedure can be outlined in this fashion:  "An
occasion of experience which includes a human mentality
is an extreme instance, at one end of the scale, of
those happenings which constitute nature.-----Any
doctrine which refuses (as Whitehead does) to place
human experience outside nature, must find in descript-
ions of human experience factors which also enter into
the descriptions of less specialized natural occurr-
ences." (2)

More specifically, Whitehead argues that since the
experience of our own mind (ego) occasions is the only
direct experience of an actual entity we have,- there-
fore we must base all descriptions of actual entities
on the assumption that all actual entities are of the
same sort.  This procedure is not, however, arbitrary
by any means.  We are aware of our bodily occasions

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(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas   p. 315
(2) Ibid   p. 237         Brackets mine.

quite directly. These are only a little less clearly prehended than our preceding ego occasions. Like them they appear as "emotional" and in fact generally similar in every way. While we prehend the external world rather indirectly, yet here also we can trust the experience we have of it, mediated through the body. In any case, since the body is one object among other "natural" objects and we are acquainted with the body, we therefore know about the nature of other physical objects. This, in brief outline, is the basis of Whitehead's argument that all things in the universe can ultimately be described in terms of actual entities. These actual entities are feelers (self-created by their own feelings of data) feeling (act) in a certain way feelings (particular content- e.g. sense data such as: spatial shapes, patches of color, smells, anger tone or eternal objects).

In this sense then, Whitehead is a "panpsychist". Each actual entity has (or is, its) feelings of other actual entities and of possibilities (eternal objects). By far the greatest number of these actual entities do not have the highest forms of "mind"-consciousness or high-class self-hood.

The Relation of Whitehead to James

In the course of the foregoing exposition of Whitehead's position, comparisons and contrasts with the thought of other philosophers have been indicated. At this point, it might be well to summarize some of the most important implications of Whitehead's cosmological speculations, by reference to one of the "aims" which he expresses in the Preface of Process and Reality. Herein he acknowledges his indebtedness to Bergson, James and Dewey, and states that he proposes to "rescue their type of thought from the charge of anti-intellectualism, which -----has been associated with it." (1)

The similarity between Whitehead and these men is evident. In Whitehead's philosophy there is emphasis on "creativity" (process), "plurality of reals" and the refusal to bow to the dictates of "rationalism". That he is able to retain his trust in the intellect, and the reality of its objects, and at the same time make "creativity" one of the ultimate categories, is one of the most striking achievements of A. N. Whitehead.

William James is typical of the others in his criticism of the "intellect". Indeed he is frequently

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. vii
            Underlining mine.

fairer. For example there are his eulogistic statements
that: (A) "both theoretically and practically, the
power of framing abstract concepts is one of the
sublimest of the human prerogatives" (1) and (B) they
give increased vision and power in concrete human strife.

However, James hastens to indicate the almost
habitual transition from useful instrument to meta-
physical monstrosity. Concepts are treated as a
"superior type of being, bright, changeless, true,
divine and utterly opposed in nature to the turbid,
restless, lower world." (2) Worse still, concepts are
used as the vile instruments by which the autocratic
intellect dictates what properties a concrete object
(supposedly) can or cannot possess. Concepts become
the "procrustean beds" into which things must fit.
Thus it becomes customary to deny to any object,
qualities which cannot be logically deduced from the
concept, of it. Thus it is claimed, if you say that
a thing is distinct or independent, you are thereby
barred from attributing interconnection or relationship
to it. This follows because by definition "independence"
does not include the notion of "connection". The

(1) William James, A Pluralistic Universe   p. 217
(2) Ibid    p. 218

intellect further deludes itself by holding that if a
certain concept is applicable to an object, no others
are applicable. An exponent of this extreme sort of
intellectualism, who said: "A is a horseman", would,
logically, refuse to admit that A could ever walk,
i.e.: "A is a pedestrian." (1)

James' basic criticism of concepts (echoing
Bergson) is that "concepts are all discontinuous and
fixed." From this position many difficulties arise.
The only way in which we can conceptually grasp "life"
is arbitrarily to assume that it is broken up into
static distinct parts. Having done this, it is evident
that the intellect cannot do justice to the "flow" of
our immediate experience. Since moments of time are
infinitely divisible, by the intellect, no moment of
time can ever pass. Similarly motion from one point
to another is proved impossible by the intellect,
since any distance in infinitely divisible.

These then, so its critics claim, are some of the
most glaring deficiencies of the "intellect". On this
basis Bergson denies to our concepts any ability to
reveal the nature of reality. James, more fairly,
admitted that concepts may give knowledge about things,

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(1) William James, A Pluralistic Universe   p. 154

but we can only genuinely know reality by sympathetic
acquaintance with it. "The only way to apprehend a
reality's thickness is either to experience it directly
by being a part of reality oneself, or evoke it in
imagination by sympathetically divining someone else's
inner life." (1)

The fact that Whitehead sets out to offer a
"coherent, logical, necessary, system of general ideas
in terms of which every element of our experience can
be interpreted' (2) indicates that he has more respect
for the intellect than James could muster. This does not
mean that Whitehead is suffering any delusions. As
vigorously as James, he points out the deceptive nature
of words and concepts. He denounces those who once
thought that 'by determining the meaning of words they
could become acquainted with the facts." (3) Yet, there
is the basic belief that man is justified in trying to
formulate "first principles'. Concepts are applicable
to observed components of experience. Metaphysics is
not a mirage but 'a description of the generalities
which apply to all the details of practice." (4)

It is of course true that Whitehead agrees with

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(1) William James, A Pluralistic Universe      p. 257
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality        p. 4
(3) Ibid  p. 18
(4) Ibid  p. 19

James, that the best way to know other things (actual entities) is to have a "sympathetic acquaintance" with them. (i.e. physical prehension). Knowledge by concepts only "touches the surface". However, Whitehead advances far beyond James in the value he places on conceptual knowledge. Concepts provide a genuine awareness of the nature of reality, i.e. actual entities are objectified by eternal objects (concepts). A conceptual prehension may not be a complete prehension of a real thing (actual entity) but it is a genuine prehension of some phase of a real thing.

Whitehead's discussion of the "relational essence" of eternal objects, indicates his refusal to accept James' theory of the exclusiveness of concepts. In a genuine sense, Whitehead claims, eternal objects imply each other in varying degrees of relevance. Further, Whitehead's theory of the relation of eternal objects to actual entities shows how a "rationalist" (i.e. one who values concepts as such) can avoid the mistake of trying to force reality into conceptual "moulds". Each actual entity, as will be recalled, determines what concept (eternal object) shall be exemplified in its concrete life. No concept as such, determines what the actual entity shall be.

The essential place of concepts (eternal objects) in the life of an actual entity is indicated by the doctrine of conceptual prehensions. Concepts are not metaphysical monstrosities to be avoided, but essential elements in the normal experience of a real "thing".

In all this, Whitehead claims to be reporting the experience of ordinary men. On this basis he outlines the function of the intellect and its concepts. James points to misuses of the intellect (and its concepts). Having done so he tends to condemn it. Whitehead provides a more balanced perspective, more true to the observed facts. When a person uses a concept, he does not ordinarily intend to cut the living "flow" of experience into parts. Rather, he describes the living flow of concrete experience by means of this static "logical" concept. There is no death-dealing potency in the concept. As static, it enables us to discuss, intellectually, entities which are not static. That is a fact of our normal unmetaphysical experience.

Despite his evident debt to James, there are other phases of the thought of the great pragmatist, which Whitehead cannot accept. In his opinion, James does not sufficiently account for the "individuality" of things and persons. Persons are supposedly generated

by the compounding of elements (of consciousness). One
looks in vain for any emerging "individual" center of
actuality- a self-creating actual entity. This dis-
regard for the individuality of actual entities is even
more strikingly manifest in James' discussion of "things"
in the physical world. For Whitehead, they are societies
of actual entities. These actual entities are autonomous
centers of life, contributing their data to other actual
entities. They are real matters of fact, active in the
life of an observer or user, through the medium of
contributions made to the inner life of the observer.
In James' scheme of things, the situation is startlingly
different. "We carve out constellations" (1) to suit
our human purposes (by naming them!). "We break the
flux of reality into things, at our will". (2)---For
Pragmatism, reality is still in the making, and awaits
part of its completion for the future." While it is
possible to claim that the mind adds something to a
total situation by naming a constellation of stars, it
is difficult to justify the extreme claim that "we
break the flux of sensible reality, into things, at our
will." As a matter of fact, the real things we experience
in the world do not submit to this cavalier treatment.

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(1) William James, Pragmatism  p. 253
(2) Ibid    p. 254

It is true that the world is still in the making. Certain features of the future depend on our activity. But many other features will <u>be</u>, quite apart from anything we can do. These general insights are honored in Whitehead's philosophy and disregarded in that of James.

As has been noted, Whitehead like James, rejects the Absolute. However, this position in Whitehead's case was based neither on a series of arguments to show essential weakness in the concept itself ( as in <u>A Pluralistic Universe</u> p. 126; 192; 296 ) nor in an appeal supported by a reference to the individual's need for freedom and religious and moral values. Whitehead accepts a pluralistic world view, ultimately, because he finds the universe to be pluralistic.

<u>Plato and Whitehead</u>

In her interesting book, <u>Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism</u>, Miss D. Emmet devotes considerable space to developing the thesis that there are striking similarities in the thought of Plato and Whitehead. It is at least possible that she has been too enthusiastic in advancing this theory.

Generally speaking, both are interested in a search for "the forms in the facts". Both believe that

'things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal' (1)* There are further apparent similarities: (A) There are the two well-known passages in Plato's _Sophist_, in which the 'stranger" suggests that 'anything which possesses any sort of power to affect another or to be affected by another, has real existence." (2)  and the oft quoted question, "Can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with absolute being?'(3) These, Miss Emmet claims, are very like Whitehead's statements concerning his actual entities. (4)  (B) A.E. Taylor points out that Whitehead's view of 'the becoming of temporal actualities through the ingression of forms is to be connected with the view in _Philebus_ (5), of temporal actualities as $\gamma\epsilon\nu\epsilon\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $o\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\nu$, i.e. processes

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_   p. 63
*   In order to make this similarity more plausible, the later Plato, of the _Philebus_ and the _Sophist_, is here considered; the Plato who has left behind him the 'real' transcendent "ideas" of the _Republic_ and the _Phaedrus_. He has formulated a theory which ascribed reality to members of the "mixed class"; saw no problem in the relation of "idea" to thing; and regarded all ideas as mutually implying each other. This is the Plato of the period before the reduction of ideas to numbers.
(2) Plato, _The Sophist_   247e
(3) Ibid   249a
(4) Cf. Miss D. M. Emmet, _Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism_
                        p. 133
(5) Plato, _The Philebus_   25-26

of development, or approximation toward a right proportion." (1)

On close examination, such Platonic passages as these really seem to be rather poor grounds on which to posit fundamental similarities between Plato and Whitehead. In the _Philebus_ discussion, Plato is apparently concerned with the ordering or use of things _already in existence_, in order to produce a certain condition in the universe or a person's body. As far as one can judge, he was not concerned with the creation of the ultimate realities of the universe. Yet, after all Whitehead's theory of actual entities was formulated to deal with that problem.

The sections from the _Sophist_ undoubtedly seem more like Whitehead's work. However, a few scattered phrases like these, without critical exposition and support, distinctive because of the infrequency of their appearance, lead one to wonder if they can be taken as the epitome of Plato's final position. While these passages may suggest Whitehead's doctrine of actual entities, they certainly, in no sense, show any evidence of regarding all real entities as "feelers

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(1) Cf. Miss D. M. Emmet, _Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism_   p. 226

feeling feelings". Plato's chief concern in dealing
with concrete particulars (in the period under discuss-
ion) seemed to be: to deny that they were mere imita-
tions of ideas, and to show that 'ideas" were really
manifest or present in them, and that particular
things were real. That seemed to be as far as he
cared to go. At any rate when Plato came to define
the ultimate components of physical things (in the
Timaeus) he referred to geometrical forms being imposed
on "empty space", (or something similar to what that
term implies to us) by an artisan creator. There is
no reference to self-creative centers of feeling or
life. Plato's doctrine of the soul, as a divine
product enjoying rebirths, is also very different from
Whitehead's analysis of "myself" at a moment of self-
creative experience. Thus, despite the apparent
similarities in the passages quoted from Plato, the
differences which distinguish Whitehead's work from
that of Plato are far more fundamental. It is true that
Miss Emmet does not intend to identify Whitehead with
Plato: "I wish to show how certain general ideas
suggested by Plato are worked out in a new form by
Whitehead!(1)However she does tend to overemphasise the

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(1) Miss D.M.Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism
p. 104

the very general similarities which do exist.

This interpretation of Miss Emmet's procedure is
further substantiated by an examination of her comp-
arison of Plato's and Whitehead's theories of God.
According to Miss Emmet, they have this in common, that:
"the reason there should be a 'process of becoming' at
all is to be looked for in the 'goodness of God'." (1)
Yet, there is this fundamental difference, that while
Plato conceives God as an artisan, building through
intermediaries, a "good world", as much like himself,
as is possible; Whitehead's God is only effective as
a lure, by reason of the "good' (i.e. adequate) organ-
ization of eternal objects, which provide patterns
(and other data if the consequent nature is considered)
to guide the self-creative action of actual entities.

Miss Emmet professes to find a striking analogy
between Whitehead's theory of the determination of
creativity "through participation in the forms"
(eternal objects) and Plato's doctrine of the
"persuasion of $\mathring{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\kappa\eta$ by $\nu\circ\widetilde{\upsilon}s$". (2) As has been
noted, her interpretation of the nature of "creativity'
(which inaccurately she here identifies with $\mathring{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\kappa\eta$ )

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(1) Miss D.M.Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism
p. 222
(2) Cf. Ibid p. 230

is entirely fallacious. The creative process of any
actual entity which guides its developing life by
reference to eternal objects envisaged in God's
primordial nature, is in no way analogous, as far as
the created particulars are concerned, to the production
of art objects by a great artist. In the opinion of
Plato, God imparts "form" (idea patterns) to a
recalcitrant "matter" (material) as best he can.
According to Whitehead, self-creative actual entities
prehend such forms as they care to use in their own
self-creative process. There is no formless stuff
stubbornly resisting use in the creative process.

There is a further important distinction between
the positions of Plato and Whitehead with reference to
God. In the thought of Plato, God "looks to" the
"ideas", arranged and inter-related, ready for use.
Whitehead believes that it is God's primordial function
to take an otherwise chaotic useless mass of eternal
objects within his conceptual envisagement and thereby
establish their relational essence. The "ideas" are
for Plato's God, external data to be used as required.
Whitehead's eternal objects are essential components
of God's primordial nature. It is formed by God's
conceptual prehension and evaluation of these eternal

objects, which he absorbs into the immediacy of his life.

Thus, it is true that Whitehead stands in the "Platonic tradition", if that term is so defined as to be elastic enough. Actually, in particular doctrines there is little in common. Plato and Whitehead share many of the fundamental insights of mankind. However, the mode of expression is so different, the point of view so divergent that even in the most favorable cases, apparent similarities, on closer examination, are discovered to be rather nebulous.

## Eternal Objects

In answer to those who claim that the theory of eternal objects is difficult, dangerous and unnecessary, Whitehead simply points to certain ordinary sorts of experience. We are aware of definite possibilities (intellectually apprehended) which do not seem to emerge from experience. "No explosion of any star can generate the multiplication table by any genetic-functioning." (1) There was a danger, in the case of Plato, that eternal objects might be set up as supreme reality, implying a denial of all reality to the temporal world. The way in which Whitehead avoids all this has been noted. (2)

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, "Remarks" Philosophical Review
March, 1937    p.  179
(2) cf. thesis,  p. 21

Whitehead believes that a reference to eternal
objects is necessary to explain the fact that a quality
(intellectually apprehended) which is exemplified at one
place (the exemplification being sensuously apprehended)
may also be exemplified at another locus. Otherwise,
the observed similarity cannot be accounted for. Two
patches of red must have "redness" in common.

In discussing eternal objects, Whitehead notes a
distinction between the 'objective species' and the
"subjective species". This differentiation is made on
the basis of the mode of ingression of eternal objects
into actual entities. An eternal object is 'objective'
if it is an element in the definiteness of some actual
entity (or nexus) which is (or provides) the datum of a
feeling. An eternal object is 'subjective' if it is an
element in the subjective form of some feeling. In its
function as an agent(factor)in the process of objecti-
fication (note the nature of this function, thesis p. 32
an eternal object can only be an object, i.e. it is
always exemplified in data. It is never exemplified in
a subjective form,-for the simple reason that data are
not subjective forms.

This simple, matter of fact, distinction has led
critics to claim that Whitehead is setting up a hard and

fast distinction between two types of eternal objects.
As a matter of fact the distinction is only functional,
i.e. an eternal object is "objective" if it is exempli-
fied in a datum; an eternal object is "subjective" if
it is exemplified in a subjective form. It is strange
to find Miss Emmet suggesting that only the 'objective
species""bear any possible analogy to the Platonic
Ideas." (1)   Her recoil from "Whitehead's unrestricted
immigration policy" in allowing eternal objects for
modes or feeling (subjective forms) is hardly necessary.
Surely a mode of feeling can be the exemplification of
an eternal object. Incidentally such eternal objects
have as much right to be conceptually envisaged in
God's primordial nature as the eternal object of "mud"
or the eternal object of "beauty",- that is to say,
they are all possibilities which are conceptually
prehended by human minds.

Once again, it must be noted that the distinction
between subjective and objective eternal objects is
functional. As Whitehead states it:  "The (any) eternal
object can function both subjectively and relatively
(objectively). It can be a private element in a
subjective for, and also an agent in the objectification."
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(1) Miss D. M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism
                      P. 155
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality   p. 446
                     Underlining and brackets mine.

## Categories

It is sometimes asked why Whitehead has eight Categories of Existence; twenty seven categories of explanation; and nine Categoreal Obligations. His answer is delightfully simple. He believes that the entities referred to and the functions described are discoverable in experience. These categories are simply statements of the observed facts. As Miss Emmet aptly expresses the matter: "It (the table of categories) is not a dictatorial or a priori assertion of first principles, but a formulation of general ideas which have been wrought out of a long series of critical inquiries." (1)

It will have been noted that in the course of this thesis no separate discussion has been accorded to the various categories. Illustrations of some of them have been noted. After all, the special names and numbers which Whitehead applies to the principles exemplified in the behavior of the universe are of minor importance. The basic matter is to note and evaluate these basic principles, in terms of which Whitehead seeks to do justice to every event which occurs.

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(1) Miss D. M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of
Organism    p. 145-146
Brackets mine.

Chapter V

Societies of Actual Entities:

The World of "Every Day"

Persons and Things

## Societies of Actual Entities

The preceding discussion has apparently had little bearing on the ordinary "physical" objects of everyday experience. Considerable reference has been made to human experience, accompanied by the claim that a moment of so-called "mental" experience (e.g. feeling of"anger" content,or apprehension of a possibility i.e. an eternal object) might be regarded in its structure of experience, as a typical actual entity.

Yet this difficulty presents itself: actual entities incessantly rise and pass away. How can one explain the evident permanence of observed physical objects and the apparent continuity of our felt self-identity. In order to meet such questions, Whitehead formulates his theory of "societies". In this way he explains how the everyday world of common sense can be accounted for in terms of really real things,- actual entities.

The fact that societies arise is due to the

fundamental metaphysical situation of the immanence of
all actual entities in each other, in the sense
described in the theory of prehensions. When the actual
entities in any selected group are interrelated, only
in this general sense,- the group is called a "nexus".
A "society" is the result of a more specific, intimate
sort of interrelationship called "social order". This
situation is described thus: "A nexus enjoys 'social
order' when there is a common element of form illustrated
in the definiteness of each of its included actual
entities, and this common element of form arises in
each member of the nexus by reason of the conditions
imposed upon it by its prehensions of some other
members of the nexus, and these prehensions impose that
condition of reproduction by reason of their inclusion
of positive feelings involving that common form. Such
a nexus is called a 'society', and the common form is
the 'defining characteristic' of that society." (1)

In order that these qualifications be met, it is
evident that a society must involve "antecedents and
subsequents' (2), or temporal contiguity. A purely
"contemporary" group of actual entities could not form
a society since as such they could have no direct

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas   p. 261
(2) Ibid  p. 261

interrelations. However, (as has been noted) there is
an indirect type of relationship enjoyed by contemporary
occasions, which is based on the fact that the pasts
of the actual entities in question have something in
common. Hence each inherits from its past similar
elements. In this sense "the interrelations of the
present are derived from a reference to the past." (1)
This state of affairs is called spatial contiguity.

"Endurance" in the universe is accounted for by
the function of societies. An actual entity only
becomes, and perishes; but a temporal or linear
succession of actual entities, in a sense, "carries
on": (A) the same defining characteristic continues
to be exemplified; (B) There is a mutual immanence
(objectification) of the successive occasions. Such
a temporal serial succession of occasions of experience
is called a "personal society". Roughly speaking, a
molecule,- a single historic route of occasions- is
an example of such a personal society. It is of course
evident that some other type of society must exist to
account for the more complex interrelations of actual
entities. For example, an animal body can only be

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas   p. 260

thought of as a society involving, not a single linear
temporal sequence of occasions, but rather a vast number
of occasions spatially and temporally coordinated. Here
(in an animal body) the emphasis is specifically on
spatial coordination, in a present moment, and extending
back to the past and forward to a prospective future.
An animal body, at any moment is composed of a vast
group of contemporary occasions, coōrdinated by the
extremely tenuous linkage which is all that is available
for contemporary actual entities. (1)

It is evident that "each living body is a society,
which is not personal." (2) "but most of the animals,
including all the vertebrates, seem to have their
social system dominated by a subordinate society which
is 'personal'. --------------but the lower forms of
animal life, and all vegetation, seem to lack the
dominance of any included personal society. A tree is
a democracy." (3)

The nature of the "dominance" exercised by the
personal society is worthy of note. The "personal
society", or more accurately, the component actual

(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas  p. 262
(2) Ibid   p. 264
(3) Ibid   p. 264

entities (1) cannot _force_ any line of activity on the
spatial society in which it finds itself. It can only
provide data and trust that this data will be taken
into the being of the actual entities forming the
society called the animal body (or at least some parts
of it). (2)

Whitehead has much of interest to point out, with
reference to the human personality. The "ego" set on
a pedestal by Descartes turns out, in Whitehead's
opinion, to be, not an enduring entity but a series
of occasions. (3) The ego or mind is the final route
of presiding "percipient ----occasions ----perhaps some
thread of happenings wandering in 'empty' space amid
the intersticies of the brain. ----by reason of the
body, with its miracle, of order, the treasures of
the past environment are poured into the living occasion.
--------In its turn, this culmination of bodily life,

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(1) The society is not itself a distinct entity, being
only the name for a series of actual entities. To put
it more bluntly,- at any one moment a personal society,
so far as present existence is concerned, is _one actual_
_entity_, which has arisen, chiefly by prehending another
actual entity, quite similar in nature, having shared
a common eternal object as defining characteristic.
(2) Cf. .. R. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_ p. 166
(3) Cf. Ibid p. 116

transmits itself, as an element of novelty throughout the avenues of the body. Its sole use to the body is its vivid originality: it is the organ of novelty." (1)

Concerning the ancient hope of "immortality", Whitehead says: "How far this soul (a personal society of occasions) finds a support for its existence beyond the body is- another question. The everlasting nature of God, which in a sense is non-temporal and in another sense is temporal, may establish with the soul a peculiarly intense relationship of mutual immanence. Thus in some important sense the existence of the soul may be freed from its complete dependence upon the bodily organism. ------But it is to be noticed that the personality of an animal organism may be more or less. It is not a mere question of having a soul or of not having a soul. The question is, How much, if any?" (2)

Finally, (and this justifies the procedure in focusing attention on actual entities and paying relatively little attention to so-called common sense objects of the physical world) any quality or character- istic manifested by an organism or society, must be, without remainder, based on the experiences of (i.e. be found in) a component actual entity of that society or

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality   p. 516
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas   p. 267
          Brackets mine.

organism. Thus NO novel qualities emerge, applicable to the organism or society _as such_, i.e. which are not found in some of the component actual entities. Thus, it is evident that a "society" (as was emphasized previously, thesis, p 171-) is not a distinct entity with autonomous powers equal or greater than an actual entity. All that a society is or can do is explicable, without remainder in terms of the component actual entities.

# Chapter VI
## Criticism

In the course of this exposition of Whitehead's philosophy, certain "apparent" inadequacies of expression have been noted. It was also pointed out that the various, rather striking, differences between ordinary actual entities and God (1), raise at least the shadow of a doubt, in one's mind as to the justice of Whitehead's claim that: "God is not an exception to all categories." (2) However, the sense in which this is true was noted. (i.e. God may not be exactly like all other actual entities, but concepts applicable to our experience can be applied to God's.)

It is also surprising to find Whitehead apparently opposing his usual view of actual entities in the following quotation: "It is evident that------no single occasion can be called living. Life is the coördination of the mental spontaneities throughout the occasions of a society." (3) As has been very evident, Whitehead habitually ascribes life to any actual entity, as such. For example, "The notion of life implies a certain

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(1) Cf. Thesis, p. 98
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality   p. 521
(3) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas   p. 266
            Underlining mine.

absoluteness of self-enjoyment, ---rising out of this process of appropriation. I have termed each individual act of immediate self-enjoyment, an 'occasion of experience' (actual entity). I hold that these----- are the really real things." (1) Apparently Whitehead is using the term in two senses.

All this criticism moves in the circle of Whitehead's formulated principles,- those stated in the "Category of the Ultimate"; the eight Categories of Existence; twenty seven Categories of Explanation; and the nine Categoreal Obligations. Whitehead, himself, would be the last one to claim that there was any "categorical obligation" to accept all these categories. He, of course, believes , in Platonic language, that his position is the "most likely story" (i.e. has a greater proportion of truth).

Since Whitehead's philosophy is (or has many elements in common) a form of panpsychism (2), the type of criticism now to be attempted, falls in some-what conventional lines.

However, before proceeding to this matter, it might be well to gather together Whitehead's various

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Nature and Life  p. 25-26
                        Underlining and brackets mine.
(2) As defined, Cf. Thesis,  p. 147

theories which indicate his "panpsychistic" basis.
There is for example, his analysis of the nature of
an actual entity. It is composed of feelings (pre-
hensions, or acts of awareness) of data (which are
also called (a) feelings). This latter point is to be
particularly noted. Data, for example the so-called
"sense data", are ultimately "emotional". Charles
Hartshorne (1) expresses the matter thus,- the exper-
ienced qualities of color, sound, or smell, are
properly describable as (b) feeling. These data are
prehended with a certain subjective form which is
also called a (c) feeling. This is a third usage of
the term,-incidently, the most usual one. Feeling in
this sense means, emotional response, such as pleasure,
pain, acceptance, rejection, disgust and consciousness.
It is to be noted that Whitehead does not claim that
all actual entities have consciousness. The essential
"psychic" element is for him not "consciousness" but
"feeling".

In Whitehead's discussion of various problems, we
find further evidences of the panpsychistic point of view:

1. He refers to the fact that recent developments
have shown us that matter can no longer be regarded as

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(1) Cf. C. Hartshorne, "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's
Philosophy" Philosophical Review
July, 1935   p. 329

static and lifeless. The emphasis is now on energy and life.

2. Whitehead also point to the so-called 'Principle of Continuity". This theory stresses the fact that it is difficult, if not impossible to discover a level of existence in which life, or feeling, is not found,- at least in some tenuous or vague form.

3. There is reference to the claim that,- since we are in closest touch with reality in our own inner experience, this provides the best, indeed the only, legitimate key to the nature of _all_ reality. Whitehead is able to substantiate this theory more fully than most panpsychists. This is due to the careful way in which he works out the details of his claim that there is a literal presence of (phases of) other actual entities in the experience of any actual entity. Thus it is possible to know other things directly, in a sense, and so examine their natures.

4. One of Whitehead's chief emphases is the fact that his theory of actual entities makes possible a solution of the old problem of interaction between entities. By the abandonment of the traditional doctrine of substance, the way is cleared for a formulation by which interaction is accounted for in

terms of the transfer of feelings from one feeler to
another. This process is not a mystery, but a condition
of the being and existence of the entities concerned.
In this way the ground work for a solution of the
problems of Dualism,- body-mind and mind-object,- is
laid.

5. The usual panpsychistic emphasis on the freedom
of entities from absolute determination in accordance
with fixed laws,- is evident in Whitehead's theory of
the autonomy of actual entities. This is even more
strongly apparent in his claim that particular laws
depend on the self-creative activity of societies.

6. The "problem" as to how consciousness arises
from lower levels, is explained without difficulty.
It is not stated that it is a "function of sensations"
(1); rather, "consciousness" is a possible subjective
form (selected from the realm of eternal objects)
which is actualized by a certain complex type of
actual entity.

This reference to eternal objects and their
exemplification, indicates a characteristic of
Whitehead's position which is not very evident, if

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(1) Cf. C. A. Strong, The Origin of Consciousness

at all, in the thought of most panpsychists. One gets
the general impression that since feelings are the
ultimate elements in the universe, the less said about
"essences" and "eternal objects", the better. (1)
Whitehead, however, stresses the importance of eternal
objects. He claims that every actual entity has
conceptual prehensions (of eternal objects). Thus,
for Whitehead, "feelings" (in one of the three senses,
Cf. Thesis, p. 177) are not the ultimate components.
There are eternal objects AND feelings (constitutive of
actual entities).

With reference to the eternal objects, it is to be
noted that their primordial envisagement, in God,
provides a fixed pattern, which in general outline,
all feelers must follow. Thus, while any 'feeler" may
choose various particular activities, certain general,
basic, types are necessary. They are "necessary"
because they are the only available pattern to guide
the activity of an actual entity. In this way
Whitehead avoids the claim that laws (i.e. uniformities
in nature) are the mere arbitrary whims of fluxes of
feeling.

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(1) Cf. C. Hartshorne, "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's
              Philosophy" Philosophical Review
              July, 1935

For Whitehead, the ultimate components of the universe (apart from the eternal objects) are not bits of feeling or "mind stuff" careening about in a haphazard fashion. All feelings are feelings of (or by) a feeler, in accordance with a certain pattern (eternal object). An actual entity must follow some pattern. Only certain patterns are provided, for choice, by God's primordial nature. Therefore, there is no purely accidental order manifest in the world.

This emphasis on the fact that the basic real things in the universe are actual entities (selves, in the sense indicated) differentiates Whitehead from those who, while claiming to account for selves, believe that the ultimate elements are "feelings" (sentience) which somehow compound themselves. (It is to be noted that the outcome of this process would be a mere aggregation, not a genuine unity.)

There is the further difference, that while most panpsychists regard the data of sense, as the "external appearance" (1) of feelings, which are the real things; Whitehead regards sense data as feelings- genuine components of actual entities- not to be relegated to

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(1) Cf. C. A. Strong, The Origin of Consciousness

the limbo of mere appearance.

This is however, a difficulty connected with Whitehead's theory, that: the "feeler" is an emergent from its process of feeling. This would seem to imply that while, during most of the process of feeling, a subject as a center of feeling, is adding data to itself (thereby creating itself), yet in the initial stages of the development of an actual entity there is no subject prehending. There are only prehensions (by no subject), which somehow generate a subject; and then, as the process goes on, this subject adds to itself (or as Whitehead says 'creates itself"). On the basis of this interpretation it might be objected that Whitehead, like Strong is apparently assuming that ultimately the self is generated by the compounding of feelings. In this process, at one stage, there is as yet no self--acting as agent (or unifier). It seems then that one might object that Whitehead's analysis of an actual entity into, self, subjective form, and data should be enlarged to note this detail of the process.

Whitehead's probable answer to criticism of this sort might well be expressed thus:  At any moment of observation we find an actual entity to be composed of a self in process of self-creation.-- How the self could

arise out of "selfless' feeling is a dialectical
question which need not concern us anymore than we need
worry about the origin of the world (in the old 'first
moment of creation" sense).   Actual entities always
seem to have the 'subject" phase.  There it is.----It
is not worth while racking one's brains trying to
figure out, how,- what actually is, --is possible (i.e.
in the sense of trying to convince ourselves that it
is logically or metaphysically possible).  After all,
metaphysics for Whitehead, and most of us in our non-
"pseudo-rationalistic" moments, is a matter of
descriptive generalities.  We observe and describe
the universe.  Only in our dogmatic moments, do we
try to claim that because a bit of experience doesn't
fit our categories, therefore, it must be denied reality.

It is now necessary to turn to the usual criticisms
of panpsychism.  They are reducible to the distressingly
simple statement:  "panpsychism simply isn't so."  Its
exposition is attractive; it apparently solves many
problems, yet it has an air of charming humbug about
it which renders the position incredible.  The theory
is not validated by experience.

Exponents of any form of epistemological dualism,
object that we do not have exact knowledge of other

things in the direct way (i.e. transfer of content)
which Whitehead claims.

Other objectors to panpsychism might suggest that
since (for various reasons) we do not have real know-
ledge of what we call our "selves" (Hume: I never meet
my _self_ - only sensations), it is absurd to interpret
other entities in these supposedly valid terms, which
in reality are only suppositions. However, most critics
would admit that the "so-called" self has, or is
composed of, feelings.

It seems to the writer that the crux of the discussion
as to the validity of panpsychism centers about the
legitimacy of arguing in _a priori_ fashion; since I am
a real entity and my nature is of a certain sort,
therefore, all other real entities must have the same
general sort of nature. If this principle be accepted,
any doubt as to how we shall interpret the evidently
non-mechanical behavior of the ultimate elements of
so-called matter, will be set at rest. (1) Whitehead,
on occasion, uses the argument under discussion.
However, the essential spirit of his philosophy is on
the side of an appeal to common sense experience.

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(1) One would not even need to appeal to Whitehead's
claim that by objectification, other entities are present
in our experience and available for direct observation.

It must be remembered that, ultimately, Whitehead believes all principles (categories) are only "descriptive generalities", descriptions of the general characteristics manifested by components of the universe, as noted and recorded by ordinary men, uncorrupted by metaphysics.

An appeal to "common sense" is dangerous. Some of its content changes from age to age. However, its enduring data, methods and universe of discourse are accepted, recognized and used by all normal individuals. This then is the basis for any criticism which may be offered of Whitehead's or any other philosophy.

In the view of ordinary common sense experience, there is much that cannot be described in terms of panpsychism. Perhaps this is due to the thoroughgoing indoctrination by the physicists of the past three centuries. It seems very natural to believe that: (a) matter is not living, i.e. the possessor of feelings (however the term may be stretched beyond its usual meaning); (b) therefore, there is no justification for the claim that all real things, since they are real must have the same essential characteristics.

It must, however, be remembered that progress in many fields has been hindered by a dogmatic appeal to

"common sense". In the face of the legitimate pan-
psychistic objects that (A) we are apt to be influenced
by past prejudices and (B) using an intellectual short
cut we consider only "mass effect", (C) that so-called
physical atoms may be more psychic than we suppose,-
one may be forced to give a provisional assent. One
may admit that as far as we can judge, the interaction
of the ultimate so-called "physical" components may be
better interpreted in terms of felt contact and transfer
of energy,- than by assuming that they are miniature
billiard balls coming together, for no good reason,
under the inexplicable influence of the law of gravitation.
It is to be noted that this conclusion would be reached
as a result of observation and reflection on it.

Suppose, then, it is granted that psychic, inter-
related entities can explain far more phenomena than
the familiar dead physical atoms. Suppose that there
is no  question of the fact that entities manifest
"concern". This does not mean that such a state of
mind would constitute complete acceptance of panpsychism,
(as formulated by Whitehead). The "naïve" exponent of
"common sense" wisdom may well point out that there are
still many events in the universe which are not describ-
able in Whitehead's categories,- as considered to date.

When I look at a table, I am not aware of a section or
component phase of the table becoming a component datum
of my presiding occasion (i.e. my ego at the moment).
By the act of perception, I see a table over there.
There is no experienced transfer of content from the
table to me. Thus my immediate experience of the table
cannot be described in the panpsychistic terms of
Whitehead's doctrine of "objectification". It is true
that Whitehead has formulated a careful and exacting
delineation of the process by which, over a brief
duration, <u>data come</u> from the component actual entities
of the society which is the table, through the medium of
successive objectifications, along a "personal" social
strand of actual entities from my skin to my presiding
occasion. (1)

One might accep t all this as being an adequate
description of certain phases of a very complex situation.
This process <u>makes possible</u> the act which we call
"seeing the table". <u>But the point i<u>s</u> this</u>:   the actual

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(1) Thus it seems that though every actual entity spreads
out over the universe, it exerts only a vague influence
in regions distant from the center of its life.  If
rich, "definite" content is to be transferred from one
actual entity to another, this is best accomplished when
the centers of these actual entities are adjacent.

event (of seeing the table), as experienced(not as analyzed to show how certain conditioning factors occurred) cannot be described as the transfer of part of the table (i.e. a brown feeling and a "shape" feeling), into the life of the prehending subject (the observing ego). True the table comes within the focus of the ego's attention. However, contrary to the theory of objectification,-the table does not, in the perceptive act, as experienced, cease to be an object out there and become only data within the life of the perceiving ego. In other words, the act of perception as we experience it, cannot be analyzed, without residue, into the infinite complex of minute actualities which we find to be conditioning factors.

No doubt an appeal to "common sense" in the realm of perceptual experience is about the most efficient method of raising a metaphysical hornet's nest, yet discovered. However, there is a common type of perceptual experience and a common, understandable, non-metaphysical way of describing that experience. Within this context, I think that it is correct to say, the single act of perception is not, as naïvely experienced,--an exemplification of the doctrine of "objectification". It is true that the act (process)

of perception may be made possible (or conditioned) by
a complex process of objectification, on the part of
minute actual entities stretching from the so-called
object to the ego. In other words, Whitehead's
concepts, so far considered, do not seem to apply to
certain "mass effects", as such,- of what conceivably
may be the result of, or conditioned by the activities
of actual entities.

In view of this discussion of perception, might
it not be wise to admit that there is a type of
relationship which is not describable in terms of
"objectification". (1) There is apparently, to say the
least, a distinct difference between the experience of
the transfer of a feeling of anger from moment to
moment in one's ego experience (i.e. objectification)
and the perception of a table, at a moment of experience.
As a matter of fact, Whitehead is well aware of this
difficulty. his doctrine of "presentational immediacy'
is formulated to meet this problem.

Whitehead emphasizes the fact that, in the act of
perception, the presence of a sense datum in "the

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(1) i.e. 'objectification" in its usual sense. It is
however, to be noted that the term is given a different
implication when it is applied to the process of
"presentational immediacy". See following discussion
and A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 100.

experience of a subject cannot be construed as the simple objectification of the actual entity to which in ordinary speech we ascribe that sense datum as a quality." (1) Indeed, something more complicated and quite different, actually happens.

An analysis of an experience of tactile sensation, reveals the various factors which Whitehead discovers in the act of perception (of any sort)---the factors and functions which he "describes" in his theory of "presentational immediacy". In feeling a stone, the sense "datum transmitted from the stone becomes the touch-feeling in the hand, but it preserves the vector character of its origin from the stone. The touch-feeling in the hand with this vector origin from the stone is transmitted to the percipient in the brain. Thus the final perception is the perception of the stone through the touch in the hand." (2)

In the terms of a more technical analysis, what takes place is this: "Sense derived from bodily activities in the past are precipitated upon regions in the contemporary world." (3)

It is of course evident, from Whitehead's previous

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(1) A. N. Whitehead, _Process and Reality_  p. 190
(2) Ibid  p. 188
(3) A. N. Whitehead, _Adventures of Ideas_  p. 314

exposition, that there is nothing arbitrary about this precipitation (or "symbolic reference' to the external world by the medium of experienced data (1)). The sensum which a "presiding occasion" (subject or ego) experiences at the present moment, is derived directly (by objectification, i.e. "causal efficacy') from a past bodily occasion. This past bodily occasion derived this identical sensum from one of the now past entities which formed a part of the enduring society to which the sensum is now attributed. This is all based, of course, on the assumption that the contemporary entity to which the datum is now projected, has retained the common character of the society of which it is one member. (The entity which provided data for my past bodily entity is another member of this same society, which endures through time.) In this sense, according to Whitehead, there is nothing arbitrary or presumptuous in projecting the subject's experienced datum into the contemporary world.

Further details of this situation must now be noted. Whitehead takes great pains to emphasize the "sense of derivation from the body' which accompanies all our acts.
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(1) Cf. Miss D.M.Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism
p. 180-7
(2) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Nature and Life    p. 34-5

he notes with approval, passages in Descartes and Hume in which this fact is noted (but then, unfortunately, disregarded). (1)   In other words, Whitehead stresses the claim that in our ordinary experience we are aware of data as derived from our bodies, not from the external (contemporary) world to which these data are imputed or projected, or "transmuted" (2).   The "feeling of efficacy" which seems to indicate the direct initiative of the environment in the perceptive act, is likewise projected, just as sensa are.

This theory that data are "projected" is supported, in Whitehead's opinion, by reference to the feeling of uncertainty as to the validity of our own perceptual experience.   There is always the vague sense that our experience of contemporary events may be illusory, due to the activity of the subject.   Whitehead's attitude to this general situation may be summarised thus: "Double vision, and images due to reflexion and refraction of light, show that the appearance of regions may be quite irrelevant to the happenings within regions. Appearances (data) are finally controlled by the functionings of the animal body.   These functionings

(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. 125
(2) Cf. Ibid  p. 40

and the happenings within the contemporary regions are both derived from a common past, highly relevant to both. It is thereby pertinent to ask, whether the animal body and the external regions are not attuned together, so that under normal circumstances the appearances conform to natures within the regions.'(1)

It is to be noted that the imputation or projection of data is directed by the "strain feelings" of the "focal regions". In other words, in the terms of the stone perception analogy,- the vector reference to the source of the touch-feeling, might be translated,- "strain feeling" (vector reference to) of focal region (locus of stone). Whitehead also applies a special term to the bodily occasions which provide data for the presiding occasion. He terms such an occasion the "seat" of the perceived "feelings" (sense data).

It must be remembered that this complicated process of "presentational immediacy" is required by Whitehead in his description of the act of perception, because of his belief that the contemporary world cannot be directly perceived. In short an actual entity can only be aware of its own component data (2) as such, or as referring to some external region.

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas   p. 322
Brackets mine.
(2) Cf. Thesis  p.  33

Whitehead's doctrine of 'presentational immediacy' does seem to find support (in the cases indicated) in the ordinary experience of men, who are uncorrupted by metaphysical bias. However, there are certain objections which may be brought against it- also on the basis of ordinary experience.

There are those who find it difficult to accept Whitehead's claim that sense data are appropriated as "feelings" from the life of the actual entities composing the physiological structure of the body. There is also some justification for the belief that we are directly aware of external objects, and that this act of awareness is not explicable in terms of presentational immediacy. That is to say,- there are not the factors of "projection" and "uncertainty as to results", which Whitehead seems to discover in all perceptual experience.

It might be pointed out that in perception, we perceive through the medium of the body. However, what we perceive (data) are not derived from the body as appropriated content. Through the medium of the body we directly perceive the contemporary world. (The average intelligent human being can distinguish between genuine apprehensions of the external world and awareness of sensa which might be interpreted falsely,

as being    external objects)

It will be remembered that Whitehead's objection
to the possibility of perceiving the contemporary
world was based on the claim that the entities forming
the contemporary world could not provide data until
they had passed on;  that is to say no contemporary
entity could be an object of awareness, since only a
past entity could qualify.  This may be true of the
minute components, e.g. of a table; but the table, in
its gross, enduring aspect, does not in ordinary
experience undergo the drastic changes which character-
ize the life of actual entities.  Thus, there seems
no reason why a contemporary table might not be almost
immediately perceived (allowing for a short time gap),
since it doesn't as such, perish in an instant.  On a
certain level of being, i.e. that of our ordinary
experience, a table endures for many years.  It can be
directly perceived, even though it requires a brief
moment for the neural currents to pass from eye to
brain.  The table doesn't change in a moment of time
nor need it pass out of existence as a condition of its
perception.  Further,  while on occasion we may be aware
of an uncertainty as to the validity of a perceptive act,
generally speaking there is a sense of direct awareness
of an external object.

The inaccurate form of expression, noted and discussed on page 21,Thesis , in which Whitehead refers to "sense data" as eternal objects, is repeated in his description of "presentational immediacy". (1)  The same comments made there are also applicable here.

One might also question Whitehead's doctrine of the human self (ego), i.e. as being a personal society of successive actual entities.  To some, the felt identity of selfhood in the midst of changing experiences, is not adequately dealt with by Whitehead. While it is true that a person may change drastically from moment to moment, and that my experience of "now" is at least numerically different from that of a minute ago; yet it really does seem that there is a more profound sort of identity, over a longer period of time (i.e. over many successive durations, rather then merely over the one) than Whitehead would admit. (This point is brought out, in extreme form by P. Weiss.)
(2)
The same general sort of objection might be applied to his analysis of the so-called enduring physical object.

A Platonist might make objection to Whitehead's treatment of "Ideas" (eternal objects).  It is at least conceivable that they might exist (or subsist), with

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(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality  p. 100; 475
(2) P. Weiss in Philosophical Essays for A. N. Whitehead
        p. 172-3

determined relational essence, apart from the action of God. There also seems no *a priori* reason why they could not ingress in particular actual entities, without being necessarily included in God's primordial nature. In other words, *is* it necessary, on the basis of experience, to claim that eternal objects must be shepherded under the wing of the "ontological principle"?

There is a further problem as to the nature of data. Aesthetically inclined individuals assure us that these qualities are "properly describable as feelings". It seems to be the deliverance of common sense that we feel (prehend) objects, but these objects (sense data) are not feelings. When I look at a red table, I am prehending not a red feeling (projected) but a red piece of wood (or more specifically red paint). That is the report based on "common sense" experience.

As we observe the most minute real entities, they seem to manifest a certain vague individuality of action. Each "behaves" in one way, rather than another. At the present moment, at least, such activity can not be explained in terms of purely mechanical laws. One hesitates to ascribe subject aim and subjective form to conceptual feelings enjoyed by such actual entities. Yet these terms seem to do more justice to what

actually appears to be happening, than the more
mechanical concepts of traditional physics.

However, it is still an open question as to whether
it might not be wiser to retain "psychic" terms for
definitely psychic phenomena. Thus, while we note
the spontaneity and interaction manifest in the most
minute "physical entities", might it not be wise to
apply different categories to such activity.

The question seems to reduce itself to a decision
as to whether or not the term "feeling" is to be used
in a restricted or extended sense. Shall its usage
be limited to the: (A) "tone of emotional response",
or (B) "mode of awareness" in the experience of men
and lower animals; or should the term be applied to
all real entities.

Personally, I prefer a restricted use. On that
basis, I find it difficult to regard all the data of
my experience as "feelings". The table (data) which
I sensuously perceive ((B) feel) seems to be entirely
different in nature from the (A)feelings of anger
("anger" feelings) which I have when I bump into it
in the dark. It is true that the table is composed,
as far as we can judge, of minute entities which
manifest certain, but not all, activities which are

vaguely similar to those produced by "psychic" activities.
however, this apparent similarity may be deceptive. In
any case, I hesitate to argue from similar effect to
similar causes.

It is at least possible to question the validity of
Whitehead's doctrine of "objectification",- even as
supposedly descriptive of the experience of the actual
entity "myself". According to Whitehead's analysis,
a feeling is "transferred" from one actual entity
(moment of experience) to the next moment of experience
(actual entity). It is not simply a case of successive
actual entities exemplifying a common eternal object.
In the writer's opinion, a more correct analysis of the
situation would be that,- in the case, e.g. of an "anger
feeling" "conformally appropriated", it would be more
accurate to say that the same sort of feeling, continues
to "well up" in the experience of an enduring person.

An examination of one's own "ego" experience
might also lead to a doubt of the absolute exactitude
of Whitehead's discussion of the process of prehension.
In his opinion, the self-creating subject prehends only
such data as it chooses to absorb within the sphere of
its life. Yet it is painfully evident, at times, that
certain data are forced upon us,-whether we choose it

or not.

It is interesting to note that - greatly, in a sense, Whitehead is driven by the principles of his metaphysics to postulate that an actual entity is restricted to the experience of its _own_ being (i.e. its own component elements). The data which an actual entity receives comes from other outside entities; yet when experienced, this datum is part of the constituent content of the receiving actual entity. It will be remembered that the entity which provided a datum must pass out of existence before the datum is available. This point of view is also emphasized in Whitehead's doctrine that an actual entity never has direct experience of the contemporary world (because the contemporary world has not yet died and provided a datum-which is used by the _new entity_ as part of _its constitutive content_). This general position seems to contradict one of our basic intuitions. We believe that we are directly aware of other things (despite the "time lag" element in perception, and the physiological structure which as a conditioning factor, helps make the perceptual act possible); it is _our_ experience of _other_ things. What we experience is not merely our own self-constitutive content, which may be uncertainly

referred to a contemporary region that is not directly experienced.

Another aspect of the general problem,-as to whether all events of experience can be described in terms of actual entities, or by means of categories applicable to actual entities,- comes to the fore in Whitehead's treatment of the nature of "societies" or 'organisms'.

According to Whitehead, an organism possesses only those qualities and characteristics which are to be found in the majority (or the most prominent) of its component actual entities. If this theory is to be taken with absolute literalness, certain rather strange consequences will apparently follow. It will be necessary to claim that the table is square because its component actual entities manifest or exemplify "squareness".

Judging by Whitehead's preceding analysis, any actual entity becomes square because it conceptually envisages the eternal object "squareness" and then exemplifies it. An enduring society of square actual entities constitutes the square table top (supposing the actual entities concerned had at the same time "decided" to exemplify the eternal object "wood"). It is difficult to see just how this description fits the

usual empirical description, namely,- a man takes several
boards and nails them together to form a square table
top. One could say that the component actual entities
might have been persuaded by the man's act to become
square. However, as far as one can determine, the
component actual entities of the oblong boards do not
change their minds (subjective aims) when they become
constituent members of the square table top.-----This
may seem to be a too dogmatic criticism. Perhaps, the
component actual entities do introduce new decisions
into the life of the members of the "table constituting"
societies.

However, it really is somewhat difficult to
conceive how, on the basis of Whitehead's postulates
(categories), one could account for a situation in
which various entities composing a society, come
together in a _patterned_ unity. The pattern may be
the distinguishing feature of the society. Yet, it
(the pattern) may be of the sort that it is _not_, _as_
_such_, exemplified in the life of each or _any_ of the
component actual entities. Each might contribute its
share to the realization of the pattern, but the
pattern is not exemplified in any one actual entity.
Since any society can only have characteristics found

in some component actual entity, - it is evident that a
difficulty arises at this point.

It is to be noted that all these objections do not
touch the basic insights on which Whitehead's philosophy
is reared. Exception is taken, merely to the way in
which he has attempted to justify these insights.

Whitehead has stressed the ultimate plurality of
concrete real interrelated persons and things, existing
in a changing world where choice makes a difference,
where ideals lure and good comes out of evil. In this
he expresses the profoundest convictions of men when
they are not befuddling themselves with the "pipe
dreams" of ultrasophisticated metaphysics. Whitehead
champions poor maligned "common sense" (by which we
live) against those who find sole reality in a
changeless world of essence, or within the all engulf-
ing maw of the Absolute. He explodes the decadent
bubble of the self-enraptured Rationalism, which would
force reality into the procrustean bed of life-denying
categories. He denies that distinctions in thought
(i.e. one concept is not another concept) constitute
an absolute separation of things. Whitehead refuses
to believe that a "logical" contradiction is a
calamity in the universe.

Despite his recognition of the blind alleys into
which a pseudo-rationalism has led its befuddled
devotees, Whitehead is prepared to use a chastened
reason, enlightened by examination of matters of fact,-
in the formulation of a "logical coherent necessary
system of general ideas which express the principles
exemplified in all the activities of the universe.

The writer has found it necessary, on the basis of
an examination of his own "self" experience and his
experience of physical objects and other persons, to
question certain of the details of Whitehead's
exposition. It seems that Whitehead, in his effort to
prove the validity of the principles which he has dis-
covered in <u>certain</u> realities, has been too generous in
his ascription of them to <u>all</u> realities. His basic
insight that persons and things are existent
independently of each other (in a certain sense), yet
are mutually interrelated (in an equally important
sense) may be granted. Yet, it is not necessary to
<u>justify</u> this <u>insight</u> (based on observed matter of fact)
by the <u>theory</u> that the interaction is in terms of the
transfer of feeling (content) and that the internal
nature of all real entities is subject, data, subjective
form and aim (just as the internal nature of an "ego" is).

In his refusal to attribute all 'brute' (or any
at all in the case of God's "primordial nature") power
to God, a power directed by a detailed plan of action,-
Whitehead is upholding the judgment of religious men
who survey the amazing mixture of good and evil events
which go to make up a day of the world's history.  In
refusing to read God out of the universe, or to assign
him to a merely emeritus position (as did Lucretius),-
Whitehead is once again voicing the deepest insights
of mankind.  He does this in the face of a generation
which espoused Humanism, found it shallow (or hasn't
yet) and turned to the "mysterium tremendum" of Otto
and Barth.  In Whitehead's case, God is not an exception
to all categories, nor is he the all-powerful "fount
of grace".  God needs man (and other actual entities)
and man needs God.  Indeed Whitehead might have said,-
I am what I am through the grace of God and every
other actual entity, in so far as it had data, required
to meet the needs of my subjective aim, and it was
recognized and appropriated by me (i.e. the actual
entities composing me).

Whitehead does not "fritter" away his time with
a discussion of what occurred in the distant past or
what will be in the distant future.  In so far as such

matters have relevance, they are ones here. But the chief concern is with the present, as real a matter, as it is now. It is a world of temporal entities, growing, changing, dying, influencing. It is a universe in which ideals "lure", and breaks to be "transmuted". This is the world we know, live in and enjoy. Unlike many philosophers, Whitehead does not seek to deny its reality. He strives to enable his fellows to understand it, see it as it is. _Not until_ philosophers remove the self-imposed blinds from the eyes of their reason, and view the world as it presents itself to the men who must live in it twenty four hours a day,- will they be able to discover the basic principles manifest in the universe. It is true that the "common sense" empirical man is often mistaken. At the same time he frequently is aware of facts which escape dialectically blinded eyes.

In his address to the American Philosophical Association, meeting at Harvard, December, 1936,- Whitehead declined _exclusively_ to, perch on the stool of _empiricism_ , lounge in the arm chair of _rationalism_ or hover in nebulosity above them. _He placed due weight upon both_.

This is the secret of the Philosophy of Organism. This is the basis of the critical, corrective, constructive influence which Alfred North Whitehead is exerting on all living thinkers.

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